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INTRODUCTION
History makes a fleeting appearance in recent debates about reforming the
prosecutor's office. Opponents of the way discretion is currently exercised often
contend that because a prosecutor is a public servant, he ought to protect
defendants' rights as well as convict the guilty.' When this position is couched in
historical terms, it appeals to a prosecutorial self-image, purportedly rooted in the
past, to promote fairness and to curtail the excesses of the adversary system. Bruce
Green asserts, for example, that the "prosecutor's duty to 'seek justice' . . . . dates
back well over a century." 2 Advocates of victims' rights and the re-privatization of
criminal justice also tend to assume that private prosecution in early America gave
way to impartial, or even defendant-protective, government control.3 This com-
1. See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 337 (2001)
(arguing that, as "a minister of justice to protect innocent persons from wrongful convictions," the prosecutor has
"a duty to make an independent evaluation of the credibility of his witnesses, the reliability of forensic evidence,
and the truth of the defendant's guilt" beyond that imposed by the codes); Bruce A. Green, Why Should
Prosecutors "Seek Justice"?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 636 (1999) (contending that prosecutors have "a
heightened duty to ensure the fairness of the outcome of a criminal proceeding from a substantive perspective-to
ensure both that innocent people are not punished and that the guilty are not punished with undue harshness"); H.
Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L.
REv. 1695, 1697 (2000) ("Neutrality ... puts the prosecutor in the position of advocate for all the people-
including the person against whom the evidence has been accumulating."). See also Charles D. Breitel, Controls
in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 427, 430 (1960) (maintaining that, while prosecutorial
discretion is inevitable and even desirable, the type of discretion that is justified is that which "can only save...
[but] never kill").
2. Green, supra note 1, at 612. See also Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and
Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REv. 789, 792 (2000):
[C]ourts and commentators from the earliest days of the American legal system to the present have
viewed pursuit of the public interest as a critical function of the public prosecutor. It has long been
the view in American law that the prosecutor's paramount duty is to serve justice, rather than to
secure a conviction in a given case.
Matthew S. Nichols, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Arguments Against Private Prosecutors, 13 CAP. DEF. DIG.
279, 284-86, 287 (2001) (disputing view that "the private prosecutor is a right deeply embedded in Virginia
common law" and contending that public model, which supposedly dates from the seventeenth-century,
"prevent[s] vengeance from replacing justice").
Angela Davis subscribes to the view that the American system of public prosecution arose from discontent with
the abuses and inefficiency of private prosecution. See Angela Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence,
Power and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393,449-50 (2001). She argues that the architects of the public
system desired to make it fair; however, she believes that they failed in this endeavor because they did not
"adequately consider the private nature of prosecutorial decisions and the lack of public access to information
about how and why prosecutors make decisions." Id. at 448.
3. Cf. BRUCE L. BENSON, To SERVE AND PROTECT: PRIVATIZATION AND THE COMMUNITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
222-23 (1998) (arguing that English crown transformed prosecutorial function from private to public by removing
1310
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mon narrative is largely a myth. Instead, public prosecution evolved from a private
model in a slow, uneven manner in response to fears of social disorder. The
dominant view in the second half of the nineteenth century urged public prosecu-
tors to seek convictions with zeal, leaving the responsibility to protect the rights of
the accused to defense counsel. Plea-bargaining aroused criticism, not because it
deprived defendants of a jury trial, but because prosecutors accepted guilty pleas to
charges that the public viewed as insufficient to fit the defendants' crimes.4
This Article presents a legal and cultural history of the public's relationship to
criminal prosecution that participates in two scholarly conversations. It adds a
historical dimension to the current debate about the duties of the modem prosecu-
tor. The centrality of the term "public" in almost any discussion of prosecutorial
discretion highlights the need to explore the evolving relationship between
prosecutors and the people. My research also contributes to a growing body of
legal history on criminal justice administration in the United States that includes
work by Lawrence Friedman, George Fisher, and Allen Steinberg. 5
One must be cautious about invoking the origins of public prosecution either to
supplant the goal of "winning" with a greater commitment to fairness or to criticize
the state's failure to protect the crime victim. When, in 1935, the Supreme Court
distinguished ordinary law practice from the sovereign interest in insuring that
"justice shall be done" in criminal cases,6 it articulated a standard that is now
incentives for private persons to prosecute their own injuries and thereby placed itself in better position to protect
state interests); Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 357,
362-72 (1986) (asserting that transformation of private prosecution into public role in early America was driven
by demands of population growth, increasing crime, contemporary philosophies contrasting societal and private
interest and general public concern about victims' bias). Several commentators who offer less historical
background than do Benson and Cardenas nevertheless argue that the rise of public prosecution constituted a
movement away from victims' interests. See Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and
the Effects of Utah's Victims'Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 1373, 1379-80 (1994) (contending that while
"[tihe reasons for the transformation [from private to public prosecution] are unclear[,]" this transformation
eclipsed victims' rights); Joan Meir, The 'Right'to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt: Unpacking
Public and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 85, 103 (1992) ("The reasons for this shift [from private to public
prosecution] are not entirely clear, but a widespread belief in the superiority of public 'disinterested' justice has
taken deep root."); Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes a Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 321,
352-53 (2002) (contending that, although shift to public prosecution stemmed from concerns about abuses of
justice by both victims and defendants, "the desire for neutrality has driven a wedge between prosecutors and
those individuals and communities that need their services"). For a more complete discussion of how critics of the
public model use history, see infra text accompanying notes 50-62.
A few scholars who advocate the expansion of victims' rights within the public system, instead of a return to
private prosecution, place greater emphasis on historical precedents for state protection of victims. See, e.g.,
Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a CriminalAction: An Overview of Issues and Problems, 11
PEPP. L. REV. 117, 125-31 (1984) (noting solicitude for interests of poor victims, in addition to concern about
malicious prosecutions, may have motivated shift to public model).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 155-61, 410-12.
5. See infra note 16.
6. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (holding that "while [the prosecutor] may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one").
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threatened by careerism, error, and proposals to re-privatize some aspects of
criminal prosecution.7 Modem scholars like Green sometimes invoke this standard
and the prosecutorial self-image that it implies.8 But "justice" and the "public
interest" are mutable abstractions: in the late nineteenth century, both were equated
with high conviction rates.
The historical narrative offered in this Article thus suggests a weakness in
modem reform efforts. Relying on prescriptions for prosecutors to serve the public
may do little to bridle discretionary power if the public does not share legal
theorists' concerns. This Article does not seek to rebut criticisms of excessively
adversarial decision-making or argue for an expanded role for crime victims.
Rather, by setting the historical record straight, this Article urges scholars of
modem prosecutorial ethics to provide a more precise analysis of the relationship
between their normative agendas and public attitudes toward crime control.
Although the seeds of the modem position that a prosecutor should adopt a
neutral stance, similar to that of a judge, 9 were sown by the late nineteenth century,
this was not the inevitable or even the dominant view. To the extent that such
sentiments existed, they tended to be confined to judges and law professors, while
the weight of public opinion favored a heated battle in which prosecutors strove
fervently for convictions. In the 1880s and 1890s, as today, prosecutors were
accused of failing to be accountable for pre-trial decisions.' The press made
demands for consistency, principle, and visibility similar to those articulated
7. For examples of proposals to allow greater participation by private citizens in the modern criminal justice
system, see BENSON, supra note 3, at 127-68, 188-91, 287-91 (proposing an incentive-based, privatized system of
law enforcement, including private prosecution, to serve primary goal of providing restitution to victims);
Cardenas, supra note 3, at 358 (arguing, largely on basis of secondary research, that history supports
re-introduction of victim participation in criminal justice process); Cassell, supra note 3, at 1380-81 (presenting a
favorable view of the Utah Victim's Rights Amendment).
8. See Green, supra note 1, at 614, 634 (citing Berger case for proposition that prosecutor's role is to ensure
fairness and reliability of criminal process and its outcomes). See also Berenson, supra note 2, at 792-93 (citing
Berger opinion, but indicating that "do justice" standard originated in early 1800s or even in colonial period);
Gershman, supra note 1, at 317 (describing Berger as "the seminal case defining the prosecutor's legal and ethical
role as a minister of justice"); Walker A. Matthews, 11, Note, Proposed Victim's Rights Amendment: Ethical
Considerations for the Prudent Prosecutor, II GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 735, 737, 739 (1998) (associating "[t]he
prosecutor's role as an impartial administrator of the state's case" with Berger decision, but stating that "public
prosecution provided the normal framework in the criminal judicial process ... as early as the middle of the
seventeenth century").
9. See Gershman, supra note 1, at 339 (arguing that "the prosecutor is much better qualified than the jury at
judging the factual and legal truth of a case" and that he should not bring a case to trial unless convinced beyond
reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt); Green, supra note 1, at 633-35 (discussing prosecutor's quasi-judicial role
as representative of sovereign); Uviller, supra note 1, at 1715-16 (contending that "in the performance of the
quasi-judicial role, the prosecutor should be sufficiently detached from his prospects as an advocate to reach a
dispassionate appraisal of the interests of justice").
10. James Vorenberg's concern about discretionary acts that occur before trial exemplifies the modern liberal
position. Vorenberg writes that "[t]he trial is open to the public both to protect the defendant against prejudice and
abuse and to serve the public's interest in knowing how officials deal with those accused of crime." James
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1521, 1523 (1981). However, because
prosecutors make the bulk of their discretionary decisions before trial, public scrutiny does not check their
1312
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during the past few decades;" however, the late-nineteenth-century press, like
modem voters, often espoused objectives contrary to those urged by many legal
theorists. The newspapers desired to impose accountability upon the District
Attorney's office to ensure that defendants did not escape the heavy punishments
that the public thought they deserved.'
2
In addition to providing insights to the modem debate, this Article makes three
contributions to historical scholarship on criminal justice. First, it presents detailed
information about the operation of the District Attorney's office in "the American
metropolis" 13 during the nineteenth century. New York County, which had the
same boundaries as New York City and Manhattan Island prior to 1898, is often
recognized as a leader in experimenting with public-sector criminal justice-the
model that eventually spread to the rest of the nation.' 4 New York County's large
size, consistent administrative boundaries,' 5 and wealth of records also make it
worth studying. Yet no historian has written a full-length account of prosecution in
powers. See id. at 1524. For discussion of nineteenth-century arguments for greater accountability, see infra text
accompanying notes 152-62, 209-17, 230-49, 410-12.
11. Like law review articles proposing restraints on prosecutorial discretion, modem "press accounts have
described cases in which innocent individuals were convicted of serious crimes, including capital murder," and
blamed "prosecutorial excesses" for these unjust outcomes. Green, supra note 1, at 611. Some legal scholars
suggest that public opinion may provide an effective check on the power of prosecutors in the twenty-first century.
See Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 259, 281 (2001) (arguing that "[tihe other
remedy for prosecutorial misconduct is public oversight. Elected prosecutors may be constrained by public
opinion and may be removed from office if too many voters disapprove of their practices") (internal quotations
and citations omitted); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The Limits
of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L. J. 1325, 1338-40 (1993)
(asserting that elected local prosecutors have greater political accountability than unelected officials like state
Attorney General ); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 765
(2001) [hereinafter Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors] (discussing positive role media and
voters may play in checking prosecutorial misconduct). However, other observers identify public opinion as a
potentially negative influence on prosecutorial decision-making. See, e.g., Green, supra note 1, at 642
(contending that unreasonable public expectations may undermine legitimate government aims); William Stuntz,
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 509, 533-39 (2002) (arguing that public
opinion may have negative effect upon prosecutorial discretion by encouraging prosecutors to seek public
approval in place of justice or fairness). In the present day, lack of clarity about the role of public attitudes toward
prosecution hampers effective reform. For a more complete discussion of these issues, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 42-48.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 152-62, 209-17,230-49,263-64, 410-12.
13. ERIC MONKKONEN, MURDER IN NEW YORK CITY 136 (2001) (emphasis in original).
14. See, e.g., BENSON, supra note 3, at 224 (noting that New York City established "the first true public police
force" in America in 1844); History of the Public Prosecutor, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1287
(Sanford Kadish et al. eds., 1983) (stating that although Mississippi became first state to elect its District
Attorneys, Dutch brought public prosecution to region that is now New York as early as 1650s); W. Scott Van
Alstyne, Jr., Comment, The District Attorney-A Historical Puzzle, Wis. L. REV. 125 (1952) (claiming there is
evidence for existence of district attorneys as early as eighteenth-century).
15. See MONKKONEN, supra note 13, at 136 (noting that New York City had population of 60,000 inhabitants by
1800 and one-third of a million by 1840). Moreover, because the boundaries of New York City changed only once,
with the addition of the five boroughs in 1898, studying its administration is relatively uncomplicated.
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New York in the second half of the nineteenth century.' 6 Based on the archival
papers of the District Attorney's office for New York County, including indictment
records 17 and newspaper scrapbooks,' this Article lays the groundwork for a
complete understanding of how prosecutors conducted their work. Second, legal
historians such as Fisher have focused primarily on statutory changes and
institutional power relations due to the relative dearth of information about popular
attitudes toward plea-bargaining.' 9 Drawing on the extensive newspaper clippings
preserved among the District Attorney's papers, this Article enhances knowledge
of interactions between prosecutors and the public. Although it is unclear why the
District Attorneys saved press articles related to their office, these clippings
represent a remarkably wide social and political spectrum and often express strong
criticism of prosecutorial policies. Indeed, analysis of the scrapbooks shows that
plea-bargaining occurred despite the public's hostility to reduced penalties and
16. The few scholarly accounts of public prosecution in nineteenth-century New York appear in articles about
the rise of plea-bargaining. Writing in 1928 and using New York data, Raymond Moley first sounded the alarm
about the eclipse of the jury trial by plea-bargaining. See Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury, 2 S. CAL. L. REV.
97, 106-14 (1928) (showing plea-bargaining became dominant mode of criminal case disposition in New York
County in second half of nineteenth-century).
The second helpful article is Mike McConville and Chester Mirsky's contribution to the history of plea-
bargaining. In The Rise of Guilty Pleas: New York, 1800-1865, 22 J.L. & Soc'y 443 (1995), McConville and
Mirsky respond to a thesis-espoused by John Langbein, Malcolm Feeley, and Lawrence Friedman-that
attributes the vanishing jury to the rise of professional police and prosecutors. See id. at 443, 468 (arguing that
plea-bargaining in New York arose from ethnic tensions, politicization of crime, election of District Attorneys,
and advent of positivist criminology). For the professionalization thesis that McConville and Mirsky seek to
rebut, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 1870-1910, at 194 (1981); Malcolm M. Feeley, Plea Bargaining and the
Structure of the Criminal Process, 7 JUST. SYS. J. 338,349-50 (1982); Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in
Historical Perspective, 12 LAW & Soc'y REv. 247, 247 (1979); John Langbein, Understanding the Short History
of Plea Bargaining, 12 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 261, 262-64 (1979).
A brief comparative section in George Fisher's meticulous account of plea-bargaining in Massachusetts
provides another good source of information on New York. See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining s Triumph, 109
YALE L.J. 857, 1031-38 (2000). However, there is no New York counterpart to Lawrence Friedman and Robert
Percival's study of Alameda County, California, or Allen Steinberg's work on Philadelphia. See FRIEDMAN &
PERCIVAL, supra, at 192-95 (describing way prosecutors processed felonies and arguing that administrative
system of justice, based on plea-bargaining, eclipsed jury trial at end of the nineteenth-century); ALLEN
STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PHILADELPHIA 1800-1880, at 38, 52, 54, 91 (1989)
(describing resilience of private prosecution in nineteenth-century Philadelphia).
17. The District Attorney indictment records typically contain the Coroner's Inquisition, Police Court records,
miscellaneous affidavits, trial strategy notes, and some appellate material, as well as the indictment itself.
18. The New York Municipal Archives houses a collection of newspaper scrapbooks maintained by the Office
of the New York County District Attorney. This important collection contains 340 volumes of clippings from New
York newspapers from 1882 to 1940. The scrapbooks have also been preserved on forty-nine rolls of microfilm. I
studied seventeen rolls of film containing newspaper clippings from 1882 to 1893. Because the individuals who
compiled the scrapbooks did not always provide clear citations for the clippings, the footnotes in this Article give
approximate dates and probable newspaper sources for some press reports. Researchers using these footnotes are
encouraged to rely on the microfilm roll numbers and article titles.
19. George Fisher consulted 2200 pages of Massachusetts newspapers in the mid-to-late nineteenth-century,
but found "little to suggest that the public had any real awareness of plea bargaining." Fisher, supra note 16, at
928-29 and n.264.
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non-jury dispositions. 20 Finally, by focusing on discretionary decisions in murder
cases, the second half of the Article responds to the question of why the District
Attorney's office pursued the death penalty, rather than a guilty plea, in certain
cases.
2 1
I develop my argument in three Parts. Part I briefly discusses modem views of
public prosecution and the dearth of accurate historical analysis underpinning
them. Part I analyzes the history of the District Attorney's office in New York
County and its relationship to the public and concludes that the late-nineteenth-
century New York press, both Republican and Democrat, used the language of
accountability to spur the District Attorney's office to achieve higher conviction
rates. Part III offers a case study of the complex relationship between public
attitudes and the realities of prosecutorial discretion in murder cases. Part III can
be summarized as follows: Although the District Attorney's office used plea-
bargains in the face of public opposition, analysis of murder cases shows that
external pressure from the political machine and the press affected decision-
making. Prosecutors sought the death penalty for marginal individuals, especially
"unmanly" domestic killers, and sometimes spared defendants with ties to the
political bosses. Thus, prosecutors tried to appease the public's desire for retribu-
tion and deterrence by pursuing uncontroversial targets. However, news reports
overestimated the extent to which murder indictments were dismissed or plea-
bargained. Although prosecutors often accepted guilty pleas to lesser charges than
those on the face of the indictment, they nevertheless brought more murder cases
to trial than they processed through other means. 2 2 Criticisms of prosecutorial
discretion in the late nineteenth century thus appear to have been hyperbolic. The
distortions, biases, and cultural conflicts evident in press accounts of the cases call
into question any simple identification of public opinion with the public good and
underscore the limitations of lay scrutiny as a mechanism for ensuring fairness.
The Conclusion returns to normative assumptions about public prosecution
embedded in modern scholarship. Rather than repeating the mantra that a prosecu-
tor plays a different role than does a private attorney,23 this Article underscores
tensions between public opinion, scholarly prescriptions, and the actual policies of
20. See infra text accompanying notes 155-61, 410-12.
21. Cf Eric Monkkonen, The American State from the Bottom Up: Of Homicides and Courts, 24 LAw & SOCY'
REV. 521, 527-28 (1990) (noting that few murderers were convicted and fewer actually executed in nineteenth-
century New York). Murder cases also offer insights into the modem crisis of prosecutorial ethics for, in late
nineteenth-century New York, the statutory grading of homicide gave the District Attorney's office leverage
comparable to that created by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. For a discussion of the statutory grading
of homicide in late nineteenth-century New York, see infra note 297 and accompanying text. Fisher makes a
similar point about the discretionary power that rigid Massachusetts liquor laws conferred on prosecutors in the
early nineteenth century. See Fisher, supra note 16, at 868.
22. See infra Figure 1.
23. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEo. L.J. 207,
226-28 (2000) (describing unique and "higher obligation" that prosecutors-particularly, federal prosecutors-
must uphold). Although Zacharias and Green focus on the reasons that federal prosecution is different, such
13152002]
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the District Attorney's office. In deciding whether (or how) to check prosecutors'
adversarial instincts, it is necessary to keep this history in mind.
I. MODERN VIEWS OF PUBLIC PROSECUTION
Among the recent changes in the study of criminal procedure, increased scrutiny
of prosecutorial discretion stands to benefit the most from historical inquiry. A
brief analysis of disparate modern reform agendas demonstrates that those that
devote any attention to history share common myths about the early days of public
prosecution.
Critics of the status quo often identify the invisibility of prosecutorial decision-
making and the unprincipled nature of prosecutors' choices,24 inconsistencies in
policy,2 5 lack of judicial review or repercussions for misconduct, 26 and a culture of
winning 27 as practices that cry out for reform. With notable exceptions, however,
dissatisfaction with public prosecution has not translated into an impulse to
eliminate it. Relatively few commentators want to return to the primary justice of
28the American colonial period, when lawyers were scarce, or even to the early
writers as Angela Davis urge the extension of new rules to state and local prosecutors, whom existing state ethical
codes do not adequately constrain. See Davis, supra note 2, at 460.
24. See Davis, supra note 2, at 410 (listing vindictive prosecution as one type of misconduct of which
prosecutors are accused), 412 ("Like so many other prosecutorial acts, misconduct often occurs in private and
never becomes public."); Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1555 (calling prosecutorial discretion a "hidden system of
adjudication"), 1533 (emphasizing prosecutorial discretion in plea-bargaining).
25. See Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1544-45.
26. See Davis, supra note 2, at 408 ("The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the broad exercise of
prosecutorial discretion .... "); Griffin, supra note 11, at 275-76 (stating that separation-of-powers doctrine and
difficulty of proving constitutional violations impede judicial oversight); James S. Liebman, The Overproduction
of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2126-27 (2000) (noting that prosecutors who engage in misconduct in
death-penalty cases rarely receive more than slap on wrist because neither money damages nor injunctions can be
imposed upon them); Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1538-40 (describing courts' deference toward prosecutors in
areas such as plea-bargaining and selective prosecution); Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors,
supra note 11, at 749-50 (attributing failure of third parties to make effective complaints against prosecutors to
diffuse nature of prosecutors' clientele and reluctance of defense attorneys to antagonize lawyers whom they
regularly see in court).
27. See WILLIAM T. P17Z1, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRIALS HAS BECOME AN
EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO Do TO REBUILD IT 119 (1999) ("When [advocates in a criminal case]
'win,' colleagues will congratulate them for a victory that depended on them. When they 'lose,' friends are likely
to console them, but they are also susceptible to attack for having 'blown it' by having adopted the wrong strat-
egy .... "); Liebman, supra note 26, at 2129 (contending that public and institutional pressures to secure
convictions in death cases lead prosecutors to cut corners); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good
Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 388-89 (2001) (claiming that institutional culture of prosecutors'
offices gives attorneys incentives to "proudly" convict the innocent).
28. See Allen Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, the District
Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568, 571 (1984) ("Private prosecution dominated
criminal justice during the colonial period."); see also Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical
Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MIcH. L. REv. 2626, 2656 (1996) (commenting on rarity of defense
counsel when Bill of Rights was submitted to states in 1789); Eben Moglen, Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the
Origins of the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1086, 1105-06 (1994)
1316
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nineteenth century, when crime victims in New York and Philadelphia often settled
their cases out of court.29 Rather, several legal scholars have expressed alarm at
recent proposals to resurrect the system of private criminal justice.
30
The current critique of discretionary power reveals normative assumptions
about the value of public prosecution. Aggregating these assumptions, one can
begin to sketch a model prosecutor: a government employee who engages in
truth-seeking and whose actions are constrained by rules that ensure fairness to
defendants. Proposals for achieving this ideal include exposing prosecutorial
decisions to public scrutiny,3' articulating specific policies to regulate plea-
bargaining, 32 expanding judicial review, 33 and imposing professional discipline
for misconduct. 34 However, while scholars like Rory Little and Fred Zacharias
(noting small size of "professional cadre capable of serving as judges and counsel" in American colonies,
including eighteenth-century New York). John Langbein contends that no lawyers appeared for either the
prosecution or the defense in ordinary English felony trials until the second half of the eighteenth-century. See
John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 263, 263, 282-83 (1978).
29. See STEINBERG, supra note 16, at 38, 52, 54, 91 (arguing that private prosecution dominated criminal
justice in Philadelphia for first half of nineteenth-century and persisted past mid-century mark, despite creation of
District Attorney's office and rise of modern policing); McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 455 (noting that,
in first half of nineteenth-century, private prosecutors in New York often withdrew charges or settled with
defendant before trial).
30. See John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L.
Rav. 551, 569 (1994) (arguing that potential for misconduct by private prosecutors especially acute because of
nearly unbridled power that prosecutors wield); Richard Epstein, Crime and Tort: Old Wine in New Bottles, in
AsSESSING THE CRIMINAL: RESTITUTION, RETRIBUTION, AND THE LEGAL PRocEss 231, 254-55 (R. Barnett & J.
Hagel eds., 1977) (contending that, because of their dissimilar objectives, criminal and civil law have developed
procedures that preclude blending two systems); Ahmed A. White, Victim's Rights, Rule of Law, and the Threat to
Liberal Jurisprudence, 357 Ky. L.J. 357,413-14 (1999) ("For private vindication, there remains the civil tort, but
there is not a place for victims in the criminal justice process."). But see supra notes 3, 7 and accompanying text
and infra notes 50-53, 62 and accompanying text (presenting arguments by advocates of victims' rights and
re-privatization of criminal justice).
31. See Davis, supra note 2, at 462 (proposing creation of Public Information Departments to inform public
about how prosecutors' offices work); Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1531, 1565 (raising concerns about lack of
public scrutiny and proposing that prosecutors be required to generate records of their plea-bargaining decisions).
32. See Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1563-64 (contending that specific guidelines should be drafted to define
charging and plea-bargaining policies); Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1121, 1183, 1188 (1998) [hereinafter Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining] (urging prosecutors' offices to
develop uniform model of plea-bargaining under which their staffs would operate).
33. See Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor's Expanding
Power over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERs L. REV. 199, 249-50 (1997) (arguing that her
proposed guidelines for substantial assistance departures must be coupled with expanded judicial review);
Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1572 (proposing system under which judge could review prosecutor's decision for
compliance with prevailing practices); see also Robert Heller, Comment, Selective Prosecution and the
Federalization of Criminal Law: The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U.
PA. L. REv. 1309, 1349-50, 1358 (1997) (describing need for judicial control over selective prosecution to
eliminate racial bias and arguing that such review should be based on prosecutor's fiduciary duty to all American
people, including defendant).
34. See Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, supra note 11, at 738 (indicating that such
findings are properly limited to "pretrial and trial conduct that is specifically forbidden in the codes").
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have devoted substantial energy to promoting guidelines, 35 discretion can never be
completely formulaic. Holes will exist even in the tightest net of legal and ethical
rules-holes that must be filled by the attorney's own judgment.
36
Thus, another group of scholars, including Laurie Levenson, H. Richard Uviller,
and Leslie Griffin, have discussed appropriate sources of prosecutorial judg-
ment.37 For these latter theorists, the belief that the public prosecutor should be
guided in her discretionary decisions "by an honest effort to discern public needs
and community concerns" constitutes a key aspect of the ideal. 38 As Levenson puts
it, "Morally, prosecutors must consider whether a conviction is 'consistent with the
public interest,' in conjunction with their personal sense of the defendant's
culpability for the crime ....- 3 Griffin calls this imperative "public moral
judgment" and contrasts it with moral entrepreneurship, in which the decision-
maker follows his "own substantive theories of justice."4 ° These prescriptions are
earnest and thoughtful, but it is difficult to translate them into practice. Confusion
about the most desirable reform strategy persists, in part, because the unstable
concept of the public interest often substitutes for a satisfactory explanation of
what prosecutors should do in concrete situations.
41
35. See Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in the Investigative Role, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 723, 737 (1999) (calling for new model rule requiring proportionality of judgment in
investigation phase); Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, supra note 32, at 1183, 1188 (advocating rules
governing plea-bargains); see also Lee, supra note 33, at 246-51 (proposing adoption of nationwide prosecutorial
guidelines governing motions for substantial assistance departures under United States Sentencing Guidelines).
36. See Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecu-
tors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 559 (1999) (describing prosecutors' gap-filling function in decision about what
charges state should bring); see also Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's Exercise of the
Charging Discretion, 20 FoRmAM URB. L.J. 513, 519 (1993) ("Most likely, guidelines could not be sufficiently
explicit to regulate prosecutorial discretion in fact-specific cases.").
37. See supra notes 36, 11 and infra note 38.
38. H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest for an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the ABA, 71
MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1153 (1973) [hereinafter Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor].
39. Levenson, supra note 36, at 558.
40. Griffin, supra note 11, at 307.
41. Zacharias criticizes the admonition to "do justice" on similar grounds. He contends that the ethical codes
and interpretive literature "provide remarkably little guidance on its meaning." Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the
Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 46 (1991) [hereinafter,
Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice]. See also Smith, supra note 27, at 377 ("And
what does it mean to 'seek justice'? The concept could not be more ambiguous and subject to multiple
interpretations."). However, according to Zacharias, "the noncompetitive approach to prosecutorial ethics is
inconsistent with the professional codes' underlying theory." Zacharias. Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial
Trial Practice, supra, at 52. Given the ambiguity of the "do justice" standard, Zacharias urges prosecutors neither
to exploit the state's superior resources nor to take advantage of other weaknesses in the adversary system, such as
ineffective defense counsel. See id. at 70-74. He argues that prosecutors must be especially sensitive to power
differentials, ethical rules, and evidentiary indications of innocence because norms of justice and the public
interest are difficult to discern.
Green agrees that exhorting prosecutors to seek justice may lead to ambiguity. See Green, supra note 1, at 622.
However, he attempts to clarify the issue with a "role-based" conception of duty that he considers superior to
Zacharias' "power-based" model. Id. at 631-35. For Green, a public prosecutor's special duty arises not from
unequal resources, but from the public prosecutor's role as the representative of the sovereign. id. at 633-34
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Empirical scholarship on the relationship between public opinion and criminal
justice has not focused primarily on prosecutorial ethics.4 2 Instead of examining
public attitudes toward prosecutors, such studies typically target the death penalty,
racial discrimination in policing, and the disjuncture between public perceptions
and criminal law doctrine.43 Thus, a gap remains between studies of public
(defining "goal ... paramount in importance" with regard to criminal law as that of "avoiding punishment of
those who are innocent of criminal wrongdoing .... ).
42. Several recent books strive to stimulate interest in empirical research on public views of criminal justice.
See generally JULIAN V. ROBERTS & LORETrA J. STALANS, PUBLIC OPINION, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1997)
(advocating multi-method approach, including surveys, focus groups, and laboratory research, designed to assess
public dissatisfaction with criminal justice response) [hereinafter ROBERTS & STALANS]; PAUL H. ROBINSON &
JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW xv-xvi (1995)
(contending, on basis of eighteen empirical studies, that discrepancies between community standards and criminal
codes undercut legitimacy of criminal law) [hereinafter ROBINSON & DARLEYI; AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY (Timothy J. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds., 1996) (offering
loosely-linked chapters on public attitudes toward crime, process of criminal adjudication, and validity of survey
research) [hereinafter AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE].
However, such studies place relatively little emphasis on attitudes toward prosecutorial practices like
plea-bargaining. Roberts and Stalans discuss public views of the adversary system in one brief chapter; they
conclude that the American public prefers the adversary system to inquisitorial procedure because the public
thinks that the former ensures greater fairness. See ROBERTS & STALANS, supra, at 182. AMERICANS VIEW CRIME
AND JUSTICE also devotes just one chapter to the criminal courts. That chapter mentions public hostility toward
plea-bargaining, but it does not explore the issue in detail. See Laura B. Myers, Bringing the Offender to Heel:
Views of the Criminal Courts, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra, at 46. Another essay in the same
anthology notes, "the public strongly supports efforts to reduce what is perceived to be excessive delay and
leniency in processing cases in the court system. Efforts to reduce or eliminate ... plea bargaining for serious
offenders.. . would be strongly supported." Timothy J. Flanagan, Public Opinion and Public Policy in Criminal
Justice, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra, at 158.
Scholars occasionally rely on victims' rights legislation, rather than survey results, for evidence that citizens
dislike plea-bargaining. See Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffman, Public Perception, Justice, and the "Search
for Truth" in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1267, 1292 (1996) (describing plea-bargaining as "[plerhaps the
least popular facet of the criminal justice system in the eyes of the American public" and citing California
Victims' Bill of Rights, which imposed limits on plea-bargaining, as evidence of that dislike); cf CANDACE
MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMs' RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA xii-xiii (1993) (contending that
California Victims' Bill of Rights may have arisen from "manipulation of public opinion by a dedicated group of
law and order conservatives" who generated "politically constructed version of what victims demand").
43. For recent survey information on the death penalty, compare AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra
note 42, at 93-108 (indicating that, although Americans increasingly supported death penalty after 1970, recent
data shows trend toward greater public uncertainty about appropriateness of capital punishment) and ROBERTS &
STALANS, supra note 42, at 225-46 (concluding that public support for death penalty is overstated and that
minorities, who are more likely to face capital punishment if convicted of murder, are less likely to endorse death
penalty) with Samuel R. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death Penalty-It's Getting Personal,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448, 1449 (1998) (reporting that public support for death penalty has remained high over
time, despite fluctuations in crime rates). For empirical work on views held by racial minorities, see generally
Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of Fairness in
Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REV 1219 (2000) (contending that survey data indicates that minority
communities do not desire broad police discretion or disproportionately harsh punishments); Ronald Weitzer,
Racialized Policing: Residents'Perceptions in Three Neighborhoods, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 129, 151-52 (2000)
(concluding that, despite wide agreement in three sample communities that police give blacks disparate treatment,
respondents diverged in their perceptions of problem in their own neighborhoods); Scot Wortley et al., Just
Des(s)erts? The Racial Polarization of Perceptions of Criminal Injustice, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 637 (1997)
(discussing how public identification of minority groups as criminally deviant creates conflict). For analyses of
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attitudes and prescriptions for reform. Several scholars nevertheless believe that
the media and the vote exercise a positive influence on the decisions that District
Attorneys and their deputies make. Zacharias writes, for example:
The other main remedy for prosecutorial misconduct [besides administrative
supervision, trial court control, and appellate review] is public oversight. State
district attorneys typically are elected officials. Misconduct within their
offices-even by lawyers whom they have not directly supervised-becomes
an issue during elections. Accordingly, media attention and political review by
the voters may provide a deterrent or, at least, a reason for district attorneys to
take corrective steps when misconduct is brought to their attention.
44
Other commentators display a more conflicted attitude toward the voting public.
For example, Green believes that the media opposes the conviction and execution
of innocent people. According to his review of newspaper articles on wrongful
convictions, "[t]he press has characterized the problem as widespread and has
generally attributed [it] to prosecutorial excesses. '45 However, Green also coun-
sels resistance to unreasonable public attitudes,46 and, similarly, Uviller qualifies
his exhortation to heed public morality by saying:
I do not suggest that the honorable prosecutor be the slave of his electorate.
Indeed, in many matters his duty clearly lies in the defiance of community
pressures. But within the confines of the law, I would rather see his discretion
guided by an honest effort to discern public needs and community concerns
than by personal pique or moralistic impertinence.
47
Skepticism about the electorate is warranted, for it is not clear that the modem
public embraces norms of fairness or that it is sensitive to defendants' relative lack
of resources.48
public knowledge about criminal law doctrine, see generally ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 42, at 6-7 (arguing
that incongruity between criminal codes and community norms undermines moral power of conviction and
punishment); see also John M. Darley et al., The Ex Ante Function of the Criminal Law, 35 LAW & Soc'Y REV
165, 165 (2001) (arguing that people do not know what law makes criminal, but that they "make guesses about
what their state law holds by extrapolating from their personal view of whether or not the act in question ought to
be criminalized").
44. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, supra note 11, at 765. See also Pizzi, supra note 11,
at 1339 ("If someone is to decide which laws will be enforced it makes sense that the person who has to answer to
the voters will make those determinations.").
45. Green, supra note 1, at611.
46. Id. at 642-43.
47. Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor, supra note 38, at 1152-53. Griffin's own skepticism about the lay public
is implicit in her argument that "[p]ublic moral judgment is developed through training by more experienced
prosecutors and through consultation with peers and supervisors." Griffin, supra note 11. at 306. In short, she
appears to favor internal review over direct monitoring of voter preferences.
48. See Myers, Bringing the Offender to Heel, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 42, at 48
("The public . .. places unrealistic expectations on courts to expedite justice and do more to protect society.").
Myers compares several studies, at least two of which indicate that the public shows disregard for defendants'
rights and believes that "the courts undo the work of the police to get criminals off the street." Id. Recent studies of
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History teaches us an important lesson: In the 1800s, the "public" nature of
prosecution did not translate into a commitment to neutrality and fairness to
defendants, nor did American voters demand such a commitment. Citing nineteenth-
century appellate opinions and legal theory, Green describes the imperative to
protect the innocent as a "reminder of the traditional understanding" of public
prosecution in the 1800S. 49 Here, Green conjures a mythical past. Even if it were
clear that the twenty-first-century public embraces defendant-protective norms,
my historical research shows that this understanding of the prosecutor's role is
anything but "traditional."
Advocates of re-privatization share the erroneous view that, for more than a
century, public prosecution has subordinated victims' interests to the goal of
preventing wrongful convictions. Charting the expansion of constitutional protec-
tions for defendants, for example, Paul Cassell states that "the peculiar evolution
of the office of the public prosecutor ... explains, at least in part, why crime
victims have been neglected, particularly in federal and state constitutions. ' 50 In
his view, when public prosecution supplanted primary justice, it also destroyed the
victim's status as a party to the case and silenced her voice in court without adding
constitutional protections for victims' rights. 5' Bruce Benson similarly argues that
crimes often go unreported because the injured party has little confidence that the
accused will ever come to trial or suffer the appropriate punishment.52 Noting that
the Warren Court in Miranda v. Arizona "referred to the rape victim simply as 'the
complaining witness,"' Benson asserts that "[t]his view of victims is regrettably
prominent in the public-sector criminal justice system.
' 53
While Cassell refers to the past in a few brief sentences, 5" Benson devotes more
space to historical analysis. According to Benson's account of history, the state
assumed control from private individuals to fill its own coffers and then appealed
to the public good as an ex post justification for its actions.55 Juan Cardenas,
public opinion conclude that racial minorities tend to be more concerned about defendants' rights than are whites.
See ROBERTS & STALANS, supra note 42, at 141 ("The majority of African-Americans, but only 29 percent of
Whites held the view that disregarding a defendant's rights was a problem.").
49. Green, supra note 1, at 642 (emphasis added).
50. Cassell, supra note 3, at 1380.
51. See id. Cassell opines that this imbalance justifies constitutional amendments granting victims the right to
equal participation in the criminal justice system. See id. at 1375-76, 1457.
52. Benson discusses flight, dismissal, and plea-bargaining as the principal reasons that perpetrators are not
satisfactorily convicted and punished. See BENSON, supra note 3, at 54-71.
53. Id. at 55. In Benson's view, a private model in which victims have the right to restitution represents the best
way to control crime because it provides the greatest incentives to victims "to participate in or employ specialists
for pursuit, prosecution, and effective collection of restitution debts." Id. at 316. He believes that whether such
specialists are for-profit entities or voluntary groups, they will conduct law enforcement more efficiently than
public police and prosecutors currently do. See id.
54. Cassell criticizes the detrimental effect that the advent of public prosecution had on victim's rights, but he
does not offer any historical explanation for the shift from private to public prosecution. He simply describes the
change as an unsolved riddle. See Cassell, supra note 3, at 1380 & n.25.
55. See BENSON, supra note 3, at 223.
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another proponent of re-privatization, gives the public-good rationale more cre-
dence than does Benson, identifying concerns about victims' bias as a catalyst in
the rise of state prosecution.56 Cardenas cites the writings of Jeremy Bentham,57
Sir Robert Peel 5 8 and Cesare Beccaria' 9 to show that English and Continental
theory provided an intellectual framework for distinguishing the alleged partisan-
ship of private prosecutors from societal interest. Colonists who arrived on North
American shores brought with them a tradition of allowing crime victims to initiate
and prosecute their own cases. However, "the colonies began to experiment with
forms of publicly funded prosecution" because "rtlhe system of private prosecu-
tion was criticized as elitist, inefficient, and vindictive.",60 Thus, despite his
victims'-rights orientation, Cardenas recounts a version of history similar to the
one to which Green refers. Cardenas traces the public model to an earlier time, but
he places comparable emphasis on the quasi-judicial norms underpinning it.
While the formal rules send mixed signals about whether prosecutors should
engage in adversarial or neutral conduct, 61 twenty-first-century commentators
typically favor one model over the other. The most extreme position jettisons
governmental control for a private system based on victim restitution.62 Yet
regardless of political bent, the few works that offer any historical background for
their arguments share the assumption that public prosecution has been grounded in
a quasi-judicial self-image for more than a century. My research refutes this
assumption by showing that, in the late 1800s, norms of state protection for the
accused had not yet gained ascendancy. Instead, the government was expected to
engage in the vigorous prosecution of all defendants.
Not all modem observers wax enthusiastic about the influence of the public.
56. See Cardenas, supra note 3, at 369.
57. See id. at 362 & n.24 (citing WORKS OF JEREMY BENThAM (1843)).
58. See id. at 362 (mentioning Peel, who spearheaded 1829 police reform bill in England, as critic of private
prosecution).
59. See id. at 369 & n.59 (stating that "Beccaria's Essay on Crimes and Punishments (1764) was the most
influential legal theory work of the time").
60. Id. at 369.
61. Green quotes the state Attorney General in Miranda v. Arizona, who asserted before the Supreme Court:
"Our adversary system, as such, is not completely adversary even at the trial stage in a criminal prosecution
because ... the duty of the prosecution is not simply to go out and convict, but it is to see that justice is done."
Green, supra note 1, at 614-15. Several commentators note the confusion of neutral and adversarial norms in the
current system. See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117,
2128 (1998) (arguing that discretionary power over plea-bargaining often makes system more inquisitorial than
adversarial, but that "in the final analysis the prosecutor is part of a law enforcement complex that shares policy
goals with the police"); Kevin C. McMunigal, Are Prosecutorial Ethics Standards Different?, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1453, 1463-68 (2000) (noting that prosecutorial disclosure rules, such as those imposed by Brady decision
and Jencks Act, still allow prosecutors to adopt a more adversarial posture than civil litigators); William T. Pizzi,
The American Adversary System?, 100 W. VA. L. REv. 847, 848 (1998) ("Can a system be an adversary system on
some days of the week but not others?"); Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1557 ("It is customary to note that while
prosecutors act as the government's representative in the adversary system, they are expected to be more (or is it
less?) than an adversary ....").
62. See BENSON, supra note 3, at 127-68, 188-91, 287-91 (discussing Benson's proposal).
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Indeed, pessimism about popular attitudes toward criminal justice leads some
scholars to question the election of District Attorneys, who may blindly seek
results that the public desires.63 Although concern about pernicious voter influence
is not groundless, my research indicates that historically the relationship between
popular attitudes and prosecutorial discretion has been more complex and attenu-
ated. Nineteenth-century prosecutors sometimes bowed to the public's demand for
harsh punishments, typically selecting weak and friendless killers for the death
penalty.64 But, as we shall see, plea-bargaining became a prevalent strategy for
resolving criminal cases despite public hostility toward out-of-court disposi-
65tions.
II. A HISTORY OF PROSECUTION IN NEW YORK COUNTY
Advocates of greater involvement by victims in the litigation of criminal cases
contend that their agenda taps into an Anglo-American tradition of private
prosecution that was destroyed by the state.66 New York participated in this
tradition much longer than is often recognized. 67 However, by focusing on
economic and egalitarian impulses for the rise of public prosecution, commenta-
tors who favor private initiative,68 as well as those who urge greater neutrality and
fairness, 69 overstate the degree to which governmental power eclipsed the interest
of private citizens in suppressing crime.
A better explanation for the onset of state control over criminal justice than
either camp offers is that the so-called respectable classes accepted public police
forces and the rise of District Attorneys because they feared that the alternative
was escalating violence and even social revolution. The importance of this motive
for state-sponsored criminal justice becomes clearer when one recognizes that the
fully public model dates from the mid-nineteenth century, a period when increas-
ingly complex and industrialized societies in England and in the United States
63. See Vorenberg, supra note 11, at 1558 (expressing concern that "political influences will enter into the
decisions prosecutors make and that they may deal harshly or gently with particular individuals for political
reasons"). See also Stuntz, supra note 11, at 533-39 (discussing potentially negative impact of voter preferences
on prosecutorial behavior).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 374-77, 387-97.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 155-61 (discussing public disapproval of plea-bargaining) and 121-24,
294 (describing rise of plea-bargaining).
66. See Cardenas, supra note 3, at 359 ("The practice of allowing crime victims to initiate private prosecutions
is a long-held English tradition, based on the common belief that the surest method of bringing a criminal to
justice is to leave the prosecution in the hands of the victim and his family."). Relying on secondary sources,
Cardenas discusses medieval precedents, such as a Norman procedure in which the victim initiated an "appeal"
accusing another individual of a crime. See id. at 359-60.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 80-89.
68. For the historical explanations that Benson, Cardenas, and other proponents of re-privatization offer, see
supra text accompanying notes 54-60.
69. For the views and supporting historical narratives offered by reformers who want to insure fairness within
the public model, see supra text accompanying notes 2, 31-40, 44-49.
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demanded greater state involvement than they previously had.70
The analysis of newspaper sources offered below suggests that crime-control
objectives shaped the paradigm of public prosecution in the nineteenth century.
Data on the actual disposition of murder cases presented in Part III reveals a more
conflicted reality in which District Attorneys attempted to sate the public's appetite
for convictions by targeting defendants who lacked political and cultural influence.
Taken together, these two aspects of this Article demonstrate that defendant-
protective aspirations for public prosecution are relatively new and that popular
opinion has exercised a capricious influence on prosecutorial behavior.
In addition to correcting the myths that influence modern reform arguments, this
Article offers a different view of the relationship between the public and the rise of
plea- bargaining than do several historians of nineteenth-century criminal justice.
Whereas Michael McConville and Chester Mirsky argue that non-jury dispositions
increased because voters desired this change,7' this Article shows that the opposite
was true. Public opinion generally favored a powerful response to crime, but
associated plea-bargaining with undue lenience toward defendants.
A. Private Prosecution in Early New York
W. Scott Van Alstyne, Jr. pioneered the influential thesis that the District
Attorney had Dutch (rather than English) origins and that New York led the way to
state control over prosecution.72 An official called the schout, who doubled as a
constable and fiscal agent for the Dutch West India Company, brought criminal
70. See STEINBERG, supra note 16, at 119-20 (linking state prosecution in Philadelphia to need to quell
unprecedented riots and street violence of 1840s); see also McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 460
(discussing reasons that "aggregate justice" supplanted individual justice in New York in middle of nineteenth
century); WILBUR R. MILLER, COPS AND BOBBIES: POLICE AUTHORITY IN NEW YORK AND LONDON, 1830-1870, at
23 (1973) (making similar argument about rise of organized public police force in New York); David Philips, "A
New Engine of Power and Authority": The Institutionalization of Law-Enforcement in England, 1780-1830, in
CRIME AND THE LAW: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF CRIME IN WESTERN EUROPE SINCE 1500, at 155, 182 (V.A.C. Gattrell
et al. eds., 1980) (describing resistance to creation of public police force in Britain and arguing that 1829 police
reform bill triumphed because fears of "growing crime wave, ... public disorder and social revolution"
outweighed other concerns). Cardenas displays more awareness of these forces than many other legal scholars; for
instance, he notes that concerns about the inefficiency of private prosecution contributed to its demise. See
Cardenas, supra note 3, at 368-69. However, he fails to appreciate the extent to which public crime-control
arguments reflected the interests of individuals who collectively comprised the "respectable" classes.
71. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 466; see also Mary E. Vogel, The Social Origins of Plea
Bargaining: Conflict and the Law in the Process of State Formation 1830-1860, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 161,
200-01, 232-36 (1999) (emphasizing tension between elites and newly enfranchised groups in her analysis of
plea-bargaining in Boston's police court).
72. See Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 128-29. Several scholars, especially those providing basic historical
background for modem arguments, have relied heavily and somewhat uncritically on Van Alstyne's work. See,
e.g., BENSON, supra note 3, at 96 (relying on schout thesis without attributing it to Van Alstyne); see also History
of the Public Prosecutor, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 1287 (stating that Dutch
brought public prosecution to colonies in form of schout); Thompson, supra note 3, at 351 (discussing influence
of Dutch schout on public prosecution in colonies); Gittler, supra note 3, at 128 (describing Dutch schout in
colony of New Netherland as "possible source of public prosecution" in America). But cf JOAN E. JACOBY, THE
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charges against defendants as early as 1653 in New Netherland, the colony that
later became New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware, and Pennsylvania.73
Even after the English seized control of the colony and imposed their laws in 1665,
the schout continued to bring cases. He now bore the designation of sheriff, and his
efforts to exercise prosecutorial power engendered some concern; however,
according to Van Alstyne, the English made no serious effort to halt the schout's
activities.74 Van Alstyne sees a causal link between the schout and the advent of
prosecuting attorneys before the end of the eighteenth century in the American
states that formerly comprised New Netherland.75 In New York, a lawyer with the
title of District Attorney performed at least limited public functions in criminal
cases from 1777.76
Van Alstyne correctly contends that the English were late-bloomers in replacing
private prosecution with a public model." The English did not create a Director of
Public Prosecution until 1879, nor did they have a national body that handled
criminal cases until the Crown Prosecution Service was formed in 1985. Although
English Justices of the Peace began to perform some investigative functions and to
bind witnesses for trial in the mid-sixteenth century,78 English influence on public
prosecution in America was very slight. However, that is about as far as the schout
thesis takes us.
Despite his careful research, Van Alstyne fails to distinguish a local official who
occasionally prosecuted defendants, while pursuing other business on the side,
from "a state agent concerned with orchestrating outcomes to further social-
control objectives. ' 79 New York waited until at least the mid-nineteenth century
for an attorney who approximated the latter.80 The idea that public prosecution had
become firmly established as the American system by 1789' does not bear
scrutiny. In most colonies, private citizens initiated the process by bringing a
AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 4, 6 (1980) (mentioning Van Alstyne's "highly provocative
theory" but arguing that "[tihe prosecuting attorney is a distinctly American figure").
73. See Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 131, 137.
74. See id. at 136-37.
75. See id. at 134-37.
76. See MILLER, supra note 70, at 79.
77. See Van Alstyne, supra note 14, at 127.
78. See John H. Langbein, The Origins of Public Prosecution at Common Law, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HiST. 313,
317-24 (1973) (contending that Marian Bail and Committal Statutes of 1554-55 empowered English Justices of
the Peace to perform some investigative functions and serve as back-up prosecutors if complainant failed to
appear at trial).
79. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 453.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 91-104.
81. See generally J.M. Kress, Progess and Prosecution, 423 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 99, 100
(1976) (describing development of criminal prosecution system starting with common law tradition); see JACOBY,
supra note 72, at 16 (arguing that "private prosecution failed to root in the American colonies" and that at least one
colony abandoned it in favor of public model by early eighteenth century).
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complaint before the Justice of the Peace.8 2 The Attorney General in colonial New
York was sometimes forced to drop a case because the prosecuting witness refused
to cooperate.83
Indeed, private citizens continued to initiate and litigate criminal prosecutions in
New York until the 1840s or 1850s, 8 4 and even as late as 1891, relatives of a
murder victim might urge the District Attorney to charge an individual whom they
suspected.85 Before mid-century, activities like searching for evidence, drafting
legal documents, and empanelling a jury corresponded to a fee schedule; the
complaining witness paid the District Attorney for services rendered. Moreover, in
the early 1800s, private lawyers (rather than the District Attorney) commonly
presented criminal cases in New York courts-sometimes representing the victim
in one matter and the defendant in another.
86
Neither state nor local jurisdictions kept official statistics on crime rates or case
disposition in the early 1800s, for justice was individualized and entrepreneurial,
and crime control was not viewed as part of the state interest.87 Perhaps because
the mantle of the state did not rest firmly on the New York County District
Attorney's shoulders during the early nineteenth century, prosecutorial misconduct
82. See STEINBERG, supra note 16, at 6-7; Steinberg, supra note 28, at 571; see also JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., & T.
RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 340-41, 347-48 (1944) (discussing private
complaints brought before magistrates in colonial New York).
83. See GOEBEL & NAUGHTON, supra note 82, at 368 (noting Attorney General might enter a nolle prosequi
"because a case had been compounded and the prosecuting witness desired a discontinuance"); see also DOUGLAS
GREENBERG, CRIME AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE COLONY OF NEW YORK 184-85 (1974) (making similar
observations).
84. See MeConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 447, 465 (stating that "the prosecutorial function relied
heavily on the initiative of the private citizen and the local bar" in early 1800s and "by mid-century the District
Attorney had become the sole representative of that state in prosecutions for indictable offenses").
85. In the case of Carlyle Harris, a medical student who went to the electric chair in 1893 for poisoning his
young wife, the victim's mother repeatedly visited the District Attorney's office to urge investigation of Harris.
See Mrs. Potts Repeats Her Charge: She Still Holds That Harris Caused Her Daughter's Death, N.Y. RECORDER,
Mar. 24, 1891, microformed on District Att'y Newspaper Clipping Scrapbook (N.Y. Mun. Archives) [hereinafter
DA Scrapbook] at Roll 10; Young Harris Accused: Mrs. Potts Thinks He Deliberately Killed Her Daughter, N.Y
RECORDER, Mar. 23, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra, at Roll 10. General information about the case
can be found in People v. Harris, 33 N.E. 65 (N.Y. 1893). For other examples of cases initiated by victims or their
families at the end of the 19th century, see Letters from Monroe Williams to District Att'y Olney and Recorder
Smyth, People v. Chacon, Sept. 2, Sept. 23, & Nov. 13, 1884, Folder 1454, Box 141, District Att'ys Indictment
Papers, N.Y. Mun. Archives [hereinafter DA Papers] (1884) (containing letters from victim's husband urging
District Attorney to expedite case and subpoena certain witnesses); Prosecuted by a Woman: Jeanette Conger
Charges James McNab Clark with Extortion, N.Y. STAR, Dec. 29, 1888, microfilmed on DA Scrapbook, supra, at
Roll 7 (reporting that, after New Jersey widow complained to District Attorney's office that defendant threatened
to "blast her good character" if she tried to recover on loan, District Attorney Fellows had defendant arrested).
86. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 452-53 (noting that, in this situation, attorneys were bound by
attorney-client privilege).
87. See id. at 448-49 (stating that in first half of nineteenth-century New York City justice system was
entrepreneurial and that there was no "independent state interest in the rate of acquittals and convictions and the
aggregate number of dispositions").
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"infrequently attracted criticism and adverse comment.... "" Unlike the newspa-
pers of the 1880s and 1890s,"9 the early-nineteenth-century press did not seek to
impose public accountability on the District Attorney.90
B. The Beginnings of Public Prosecution
Private lawyers ceased to represent victims at trial when the District Attorney
became an elected official in 1846.9 I Private settlements were also eliminated.92 A
complainant might approach the District Attorney to urge investigation and
prosecution; however, by the second half of the nineteenth century, the District
Attorney possessed sole discretion over whether to present the victim's charges to
the grand jury.
93
Why did these changes occur? In his manifesto of re-privatization, Benson
offers a financial explanation for the rise of public prosecution. He argues that the
English Crown wielded the criminal law to its monetary benefit as early as the
twelfth century: "criminal causes referred to offenses that generated revenues for
the king or the sheriffs rather than payment to a victim."94 Private initiative
ultimately waned, according to Benson, because the government's appropriation
of the financial fruits of prosecution left no incentive for citizens to pursue their
own cases.
95
This thesis has some resonance in New York, but there is still little reason to
think that public prosecution was established primarily as a fundraising device.
When the New York Constitution was revised in 1846, its drafters did not engage
in any explicit discussion of the need to replace private bias with public spirit in the
prosecution of criminal cases. Yet the Convention did address financial consider-
ations: the Secretaries required all District Attorneys to divulge the fees that they
88. Id. at 453 (explaining that infrequent criticism of District Attorney was usually centered on District
Attorney's refusal to introduce exculpatory statements made by defendants).
89. See infra text accompanying notes 151-61, 410-12 (analyzing nineteenth-century criticisms of plea-
bargaining) & notes 185-204 (discussing role of press) and 210-17, 233-49 (providing more examples of public
censure of District Attorneys).
90. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 453 (noting that "adverse comment [concerning District
Attorney conduct] was muted"). For the press' critical stance toward public prosecutors in the last two decades of
the nineteenth century, see infra text accompanying notes 151-61, 185-204, 233-49, 410-12.
91. N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. X, § 1; see McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 464-65 (explaining that
transformation of District Attorney from an appointed position to an elected position "affected the degree of
control the state exercised over the criminal process as a whole").
92. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 465 (stating that private parties no longer settled cases in absence
of formal adjudication).
93. After Mrs. Potts complained that Carlyle Harris murdered her daughter, for example, "[tihe District
Attorney said he would give the case the fullest investigation, and if he found sufficient evidence would place it
before the Grand Jury." Young Harris Accused, supra note 85.
94. See BENSON, supra note 3, at 210 (emphasis omitted).
95. See id. at 10, 223 (concluding that evolutionary path of England's criminal justice system, including kings'
elimination of victims' "property rights" to restitution, weakened private citizens' incentives to voluntarily
participate in law enforcement).
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received from bail bonds and recognizances during the past year.96 Thus, the
legislators appear to have been concerned about the costs associated with criminal
litigation.
Money, however, was not the only or even the primary motive behind alterations
in the prosecutor's role. The election of District Attorneys represented a small part
of the move to subject a variety of local officials, including sheriffs and coroners,
to the vote.9 7 The change ostensibly arose from a desire to increase accountability
to the voters.98 But in a climate of increasing political, social, and ethnic conflict,
such accountability had little to do with protecting defendants from the arbitrari-
ness of private prosecutors and much to do with the desire of the "respectable"
classes to suppress crime.99
Steinberg's research on criminal justice in nineteenth-century Philadelphia
corroborates this view. Although Philadelphia jurists "often advised aldermen not
to encourage trivial and malicious litigation" by alleged victims, criticism of the
private system was not unanimous.' 00 Indeed, the legal profession and other
municipal elites failed to unite behind professionalization until riots and gang
violence in the 1840s raised the specter of a total breakdown in public order.''
Even then, reform occurred in a piecemeal fashion; 10 2 the first election of a District
Attorney in Philadelphia did not occur until 1850. 103 New York preceded Philadel-
phia in bringing prosecutors under state control, but similar motivations were at
work in both cities. When the law-abiding citizens of Gotham decided to wage an
organized assault on corruption and violence, they saw government intervention as
the best way to achieve that goal.' °4
96. See REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK 86, 100 (William G. Bishop & William H. Attree eds., 1846), microformed on
N.Y. (State) Const. Convention (1846), Reel C(3) unit 1, title 1.
97. See N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art. X, § 1 (providing for election of "[siheriffs, clerks of counties, including the
register and clerk of the city and county of New York, coroners, and district attorneys"); see also DEBATES AND
PROCEEDINGS IN THE NEW YORK STATE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION 120 (S. Croswell &
R. Sutton eds., 1846), microformedon N.Y (State) Const. Convention (1846), Reel C(2) unit 2, title I (resolving
to consider "the expediency of providing in the constitution for the election by the people, of county treasurers,
district attorneys, and surrogates").
98. See CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK, 1777-1958, at 30 (Ernest Henry Breuer ed., 1958)
("The debates and decisions of [the 1846] convention reflected the aroused public interest in popular election of
most of the higher officers of State government, short terms of office to guarantee public responsibility and a
greater participation of the people in their government.").
99. See infra text accompanying notes 137, 180-84, 232-36, 345 & 354-55 (describing how "respectable"
citizens wanted law and order in society).
100. STEINBERG, supra note 16, at 42.
101. See id. at 119-20 (explaining that riots in 1840s forced Philadelphia's legal professionals and other
municipal elites to augment apparatus of state prosecution and increase support for professional police force).
102. See id. at 120 (stating that development of state prosecution emerged piecemeal "primarily through the
haphazard growth of the authority of the police").
103. See id. at 158.
104. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 460 (discussing rise of elected District Attorneys in New
York); see also MILLER, supra note 70, at 23 (discussing impetus for public policing in New York).
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Some vestiges of the old system remained. As late as 1896, statutory law
empowered the District Attorney to hire private counsel to assist in criminal trials.
Such employment could only occur with leave of court and at the expense of the
county in which the indictment was returned. 0 5 Newspaper reports indicate that
the practice sometimes caused tension. For example, in the summer of 1890, two
of District Attorney Fellows' subordinates-Assistant District Attorney Bedford
and Deputy Assistant District Attorney Dawson-got into a dispute about the way
Bedford conducted a murder trial. Among other grievances, Dawson complained
about Bedford's refusal to hire Dawson's friend to assist in the case. The New York
Times disparagingly remarked that, "[t]he difficulty between [the two assistants]
appears to have grown out of the system of employing needy favorites as 'extra
counsel."
06
This situation was not unique to New York County. Furthermore, at the end of
the nineteenth century, at least fifteen states also allowed privately funded
attorneys (as opposed to associates paid with public funds) to help with criminal
prosecutions. ' 0 7 Such arrangements were especially common in murder trials. For
example, in Boston in 1850, the family of Dr. George Parkman, who was allegedly
slain by Harvard University professor John White Webster, retained a lawyer to
help the Massachusetts Attorney General prosecute the case. '
0 8
Poorer folk also attempted to control the outcome of criminal litigation.
Although the District Attorney and the police had usurped the citizen's power to
pursue or drop charges after the initial complaint,' 0 9 late-nineteenth-century cases
testify to the resilience of private initiative at the bottom of the socioeconomic
105. N.Y. REv. STAT. art. 10, § 204 (Collin 1896).
106. Fellows'Aides at War: The Fiery Dawson Makes Charges Against Ex-Judge Bedford, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
1890, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 9. New York was not the only state that allowed
private attorneys to assist in criminal cases. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Williams, 56 Mass. 582, 583-85 (2 Cush.
1849) (explaining that although not ordinarily permitted, in certain cases, at request of public prosecutor and with
leave of court, additional private counsel may aid public prosecutor in a case).
107. Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution of Crime in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 39
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43, 49 (1995) (stating that high courts of Alabama, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia upheld
privately-funded prosecution).
108. Id. at 46 (stating that slain Dr. Parkman's family hired one of most prominent criminal lawyers in Boston
to assist Attorney General John H. Clifford in prosecution).
109. In the earliest phases of the criminal process, the police might dismiss a case. Although New York desk
officers were not officially entrusted with the power to discharge prisoners, they exercised that power
extra-legally. See MILLER, supra note 70, at 69, 71 (stating that although Metropolitan Police regulations specified
that captains, sergeants, policemen and doormen were not authorized to discharge prisoners, desk officers did
discharge prisoners in station house). Moreover, all criminal cases, including murder, officially began in the police
courts, which conducted a preliminary investigation to determine whether the suspect should be bound over or
confined until a jury trial could be held in a higher court. See id. at 58-59 (explaining that "Justices of the Peace in
the overcrowded police courts did not take time to investigate cases fully .... ); id. at 94-95 (stating Justices of
the Peace "were accused by critics of pocketing fines and letting off known thieves for a price"). Coroners seem to
have taken a more active role in murder cases than did police. However, the police exercised substantial
discretionary powers at an early stage of other criminal cases.
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scale. For example, in 1884, Monroe Williams, the African-American husband of a
woman fatally shot by her lover, not only urged the District Attorney to "get my
case on as soon as possible" but also asked him to subpoena three witnesses.
Williams was especially anxious for prosecutors to "bring forward [his] trial"
because he was confined in the House of Detention for Witnesses.'10 While
Williams wanted to be released, many other complainants simply desired to end
the criminal wrongdoing' or to have the satisfaction of knowing that the real
perpetrator would be punished.' 12 Private involvement continued, within new
bounds, even though victims did not receive financial restitution. Contrary to
Benson's thesis," t 3 money did not rank highly among the motivations of crime
victims or their families.
Uncertainty did attend the initiation of criminal charges; complainants were
sometimes frustrated in their goals. In 1886, for example, John Wheaten com-
plained to the police that Wheaten's brother-in-law had stabbed him in an
argument about his sister. 14 After listening to contradictory evidence, the police
dismissed the complaint against the brother-in-law, but they ordered Wheaten and
his friend John Brown to answer a robbery charge made against them by John
Bischoff. Bischoff accused Wheaten and Brown of robbing him of a gold watch
and chain that same evening.' 1 5 Like squabbles over the use of private lawyers to
assist in criminal cases, the misadventures of Williams, Wheaten, and other
complainants indicate that, although New York created a system of public
110. Letters from Monroe Williams to District Att'y Olney, Sept. 2, 1884, People v. Chacon, DA Papers, supra
note 85 (asking District Attorney "to bring" his "case up as soon as possible"). For other cases in which the victim
or her family played a key role, see supra note 85.
111. See Prosecuted by a Woman: Jeannette Conger Charges James McNab Clark with Extortion, supra note
85 (describing female complainant who sought District Attorney's aid in extortion case). Steinberg notes the
utility of private prosecution to interrupt patterns of bullying and minor physical assaults in Philadelphia. See
STEINBERG, supra note 16, at 44, 46-48 (explaining that charges of assault and other similar crimes were most
common private prosecutions, that "women regularly brought these charges against men for assault," and that
because magistrates were receptive to these charges, "battered wives had somewhere to go to exert some control
over men who exceeded their authority in the home"). In particular, battered women often sought to scare their
husbands, on whom they depended financially, rather than having them imprisoned. See id. at 69.
112. This seems to have been especially true of Mrs. Potts' desire to secure the conviction of her daughter's
murderer. See Mrs. Potts Repeats Her Charge, supra note 85 (reporting that Mrs. Potts paid another visit to
District Attorney and consulted with him concerning her accusation that Harris gave her daughter an overdose of
morphine); Young Harris Accused, supra note 85 (reporting that Mrs. Potts related her belief in Harris' guilt to
District Attorney and said that she was "anxious for his whole truth to come out," as "[t]he coroner's verdict left
her daughter's name under a cloud").
113. See BENSON, supra note 3, at 223 (indicating that private citizens abandoned their role in criminal cases
because lack of restitution made their participation too costly).
114. See A Complainant Made Defendant, SuN (N.Y), June 22, 1886, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra
note 85, at Roll 3 (reporting that Wheaten appeared as complainant against his sister's husband, Louis Wolff,
alleging that after a conversation about his sister, Wolff stabbed him).
115. See id. This incident had a similar outcome to scenarios occasioned by the filing of criminal cross-bills in
nineteenth-century Philadelphia. See STEINBERG, supra note 16, at 46 (describing practice whereby defendants
sought to gain control of criminal process by becoming private prosecutors themselves).
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prosecution before Philadelphia did, 116 the transition from private to public in both
cities was slow and uneven.
C. Collectivized Crime Control and the Rise of Plea-bargaining
1. Scholarly Views
Despite the fact that private citizens usually initiated prosecutions in the early
1800s, McConville and Mirsky dispute the idea that criminal trials were amateur
affairs before mid-century. 117 Their analysis of the District Attorney's files and
printed case reports for the early 1800s demonstrates the presence of trained
lawyers in the courtroom. What was missing in New York before mid-century was
a collectivized interest in crime control, not formal legal training or modern
procedures like voir dire and judicial enforcement of evidentiary rules. 18
McConville and Mirsky attribute the relative lack of plea-bargaining in early-
nineteenth-century New York to the private nature of the criminal process. "9 Their
data indicates that, in the first decade of the 1800s, only about one-fifth of all
defendants entered guilty pleas, 120 a number that stands in sharp contrast to
Raymond Moley's figures for the beginning of the twentieth century. Moley
estimated that by 1925, as many as eighty-eight percent of all defendants in New
York City pled guilty, either to the face of the indictment or to a lesser charge.' 2'
The shift toward plea-bargaining preceded the end of the nineteenth century,
however. It became the dominant method of case disposition by the 1860s, and by
1879, more than seventy-five percent of all New York County cases resulted in
plea- bargains. 122 Moreover, the nature of the pleas themselves changed overwhelm-
116. McConville and Mirsky associate the decline of private prosecution with the rise of elected District
Attorneys in 1846. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 465 (arguing that by mid-century, District
Attorney was sole representative of state in prosecutions of indictable offenses, eliminating practice of private
lawyers representing victim). In contrast, Steinberg believes that private prosecutors continued to play a role in
Philadelphia until 1875, when private prosecution was finally "delegitimized," despite the formation of both the
District Attorney's office in 1850 and the municipal police in 1854. See STEINBERG, supra note 16, at 224-25.
117. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 443 (contending that transition from jury trials to guilty pleas
was not a result of professionalization of lawyers and police).
118. See id. at 460 (describing rise of collective interest in crime control by mid-1800s and noting that
"individual concerns" had been preeminent prior to that era).
119. See id. (attributing rise of plea-bargaining to collectivized criminal justice of second-half of the
nineteenth-century). Collectivized justice differed from the individualized system of the early 1800s in its focus
on the state's responsibility for controlling the criminality of the "dangerous classes." Id. at 461; see also MILLER,
supra note 70, at 166 (stating that skilled workers and members of propertied classes valued police protection
against unskilled immigrants).
120. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 468 (stating that in '1804-1805, one in five defendant-
indictments were disposed by guilty plea").
121. See Moley, supra note 16, at 105 (providing statistical information on guilty pleas and verdicts of guilty in
various cities).
122. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 466 (showing an increase in percentage of guilty pleas
during the period 1800-1890); Moley, supra note 16, at 108 (showing an increase in relative proportion of
convictions after pleas of guilty, compared to conviction by juries, in New York State during period 1839-1926).
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ingly to charge-bargains from defendants' earlier practice of pleading guilty to the
face of the indictment. 23 Charge-bargaining thus appears to have gained a firm
foothold in New York much earlier than it did in Massachusetts. Seventy percent of
guilty pleas in New York in 1865 were to a lesser offense, whereas Fisher finds that
less than nine percent of bargains involved reduced charges in Massachusetts'
middle-tier courts at mid-century. 
24
Although McConville and Mirsky present little evidence about public views of
the New York County District Attorney's work and no data on the staffing of his
office, they attribute the rise of plea-bargaining to three factors. The first was a new
concern with the state's responsibility to secure guilt determinations in a county
divided by ethnic and class tensions.'2 5 The second factor was the increasingly
heavy criminal docket, which grew exponentially between 1839 and 1865.126 The
third factor was that, by 1846, the District Attorney had evolved from a prominent
private lawyer and court official who shepherded victims' cases through the system
to an elected state agent subject to pressure from the voting public. 127 According to
McConville and Mirsky, these three factors spurred prosecutors to accept guilty
pleas to lesser charges: "Itihe interest in securing individual justice for the private
prosecutor and the defendant came to be displaced by a political concern with
maximizing the rate of conviction through reliance on guilty pleas to lesser
offenses."' 28 In their view, plea-bargaining triumphed because the public liked it.
This Article questions McConville and Mirsky's theory by arguing that press
reports on the District Attorney's handling of cases in late-nineteenth-century New
York County reveal public disagreement with prosecutorial discretion. In particu-
lar, critics of the District Attorney's practices distinguished plea-bargains from
convictions earned at trial and expressed concern that defendants who pled guilty
to lesser charges were shielded from the punishments they deserved.' 29 Tensions
123. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 466 (stating that "District Attorney adopted a 'half-loaf'
philosophy by offering guilty pleas to lesser offences, in lieu of a trial of the entire indictment").
124. See id. (stating that over thirty-day period in 1865, seventy-three of 103 guilty pleas (seventy percent)
were to lesser offenses); Fisher, supra note 16, at 1031 (attributing low rate of charge-bargaining in Massachusetts
to fact that statutory penalty schemes only gave prosecutors power to engage in charge-bargaining in murder
cases).
125. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 460.
126. See id. at 463 (stating that, whereas there were 268 indictments in Court of General Sessions in 1839,
there were 1323 in 1865).
127. See id. at 464 (stating that office of District Attorney was "transformed from that of a minister ofjustice
appointed by the court to that of an elected official, openly aligned with the political interests of the state").
128. Id. at 460.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 155-61, 410-12. In her social and cultural analysis of Boston's police
court during the 1830s-1850s, Mary Vogel describes plea-bargaining as a form of merciful discretion that
encouraged compliance with law enforcement while at the same time satisfying newly-enfranchised voters. See
Vogel, supra note 71, at 232-36. Fisher skillfully deflates Vogel's claims. In his important article, he argues that
the non-jury court that she studied was anomalous; evidence from drunkenness cases conflicts with her thesis; and
the public was not aware of the "episodic leniency" that is central to her explanation of plea bargaining's rise. See
Fisher, supra note 16, at 919-36. Fisher's rebuttal is convincing, at least with regard to Massachusetts. This Article
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produced by immigration and a new, positivist criminology obsessed with crime
statistics did foster concern about the "dangerous classes."'130 But rather than
urging prosecutors to dispose of their heavy caseloads without trial, the press
chastised the District Attorney's office for using covert means to grant penalty
discounts, or even outright dismissals, to the enemies of "respectable" citizens.
The increased power and incentive of New York prosecutors to negotiate guilty
pleas seems to have stemmed from case pressure, judicial complicity,' 3 1 and the
statutory grading of crimes starting in 1829,132 not from widespread public support
for plea-bargaining.
McConville and Mirsky may be closer to the truth when they briefly identify
plea-bargaining as a political strategy that "avoided the discontent that imprison-
ment for the full indictment would engender among the immigrant underclass,
who... had become part of the newly formed electorate."1 33 Unfortunately, they
fail to develop this argument.
I make a similar point in Part III, when I discuss the acceptance of guilty pleas
from Irish defendants 34 and the commutation of death sentences for prisoners
provides cultural evidence for Fisher's hypothesis that the public disapproved of plea-bargaining and related
practices. See id. at 930, 935 (arguing that there is "some evidence of disapproval of practices related to plea
bargaining" (emphasis in original) and that political advantage gained by prosecutors from reports of high
conviction rates suggests that "public preferred severity to leniency and full convictions to plea bargains").
130. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 460-61 (stating that once race and ethnicity of defendants
changed, "the foreign-born came to be viewed as criminogenic and dangerous" and that new concern was
manifested by statistics published by Secretary of State that "attempted to quantify criminal cases in terms of
outcome and to classify criminal defendants in terms of demographic characteristics").
131. Judges in New York tended to rubber-stamp guilty pleas, despite their power to reject them. William
Francis Kuntz 1I's work on sentencing indicates that New York prosecutors enjoyed judicial support for
plea-bargaining earlier than their counterparts in Massachusetts. Compare WILLIAM FRANCIS KUINTZ 11, CRIMINAL
SENTENCING IN THREE NINETEENTH-CENTURY CITIES: SOCIAL HISTORY OF PUNISHMENT IN NEw YORK, BOSTON, AND
PHILADELPHIA, 1830-1880, at 160-63 (1988) (discussing judges' tendency to accept New York prosecutors'
explanations of guilty pleas in 1830s and 1840s), with Fisher, supra note 16, at 986-89 (arguing that enormous
growth of plea-bargaining in Massachusetts in last quarter of nineteenthcentury could not have occurred until case
pressure gave judges incentive to favor practice).
Of course, prosecutors could reduce their caseload through other means. For example, before 1881, the
Attorney General could enter a nolle prosequi on an indictment, and the District Attorney could do so with leave
of court. 1881 N.Y. Laws, ch. 7, § 672 (vol. 2); see N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoC. § 672 (Parker 1905) (1881 N.Y. Laws,
ch. 442, as amended by 1882-1905 N.Y. Laws) (discontinuing nolle prosequi); GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAIN-
LNG'S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (forthcoming 2002 or 2003). Fisher suggests that the
abolition of the District Attorney's unilateral power to enter a nolle prosequi in 1829 failed to curtail
charge-bargaining because New Yorkjudges cheerfully agreed to the necessary nol prosses. See FISHER supra. For
more information about the formal nolle prosequi power and the mystery of its abolition, see infra notes 302-03
and accompanying text.
132. See Fisher, supra note 16, at 1032-33 (discussing impact of 1829 criminal code on plea-bargaining). The
legislature did not divide murder into degrees until 1862. See 1862 N.Y. Laws, ch. 197 (creating degrees for
murder charges); see also infra notes 296-301 and accompanying text (showing that homicide grading increased
prosecutors' potential leverage in plea-bargaining).
133. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 466 (emphasis added).
134. See infra text accompanying notes 430-36.
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with ties to ethnic communities. 135 However, two caveats are needed. First,
respectability and criminality transcended class and ethnic boundaries; not all
immigrants had reason to favor leniency toward defendants.' 36 Second, pressure
from the so-called criminal classes was insufficient to explain plea-bargaining's
rise, for "respectable" New Yorkers were at least as vocal in exhorting the District
Attorney to prosecute on the most serious charges possible.' 37
2. Case Pressure in New York County
In the 1880s and 1890s, the New York County District Attorney's office toiled
under a heavy load of cases. Whereas only three lawyers worked for the District
Attorney in Alameda County, California, in 1885 and six in 1901,138 District
Attorney De Lancey Nicoll boasted five or six assistants and seven deputy
assistants in New York in 1891 and 1892.139 However, when population data is
considered, it becomes evident that prosecutors in New York County were
stretched very thin. According to decennial census records, New York County's
population of more than one million in 1880 dwarfed that of Alameda County, in
which only 62,976 people resided.' 40 Ten years later, New York County had
1,515,301 inhabitants, compared to just 93,864 in Alameda County. 141 New York
prosecutors received better pay than their counterparts in California. In contrast
to the meager $2500 per year that the Alameda County District Attorney
earned until 1897 and the salaries of approximately $2000 or less that his
assistants took home, 14 2 Nicoll's assistants made $7500 per year, and his
deputy assistants pocketed between $3000 and $5000.14 3 But the larger salaries
135. See infra notes 291-93 and accompanying text (discussing immigrant pressure for lenient sentencing).
136. See infra text accompanying note 183 (discussing Joseph Pulitzer as representative of immigrants who
favored rigorous crime control).
137. See infra text accompanying notes 155-62, 410-12 (showing vigorous press opposition to plea-
bargaining). The press generally represented the voice of "respectable" New Yorkers.
138. FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 16, at 50.
139. Nicoll Names His Aids [sic], WORLD (N.Y.), Jan. 1, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85,
at Roll 10 (listing six assistants and seven deputy assistants); Public and Private Pay, PRESS (N.Y.), Apr. 14, 1892,
microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 12 (listing same staff as Nicoll Names His Aids [sic], supra,
but with one fewer assistant).
140. INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POL. AND Soc. RESEARCH, HISTORICAL, DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC, AND
SOCIAL DATA: THE UNITED STATES, 1790-1970 (Computer File) (last updated 1992), available at http:/l
fisher.lib.virginia.edu/census (reporting data from TENTH DECENNIAL CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1880:
VOLUME 1, STATISTICS OF THE POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES (D.C.: 1883-88)); see also FRIEDMAN &
PERCIVAL, supra note 16, at 21 (reporting population of Alameda County, California, in 1880).
141. INTER-UNIV. CONSORTIUM FOR POL. AND SOC. RESEARCH, supra note 140 (reporting data from ELEVENTH
DECENNIAL CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1890: VOLUME 1, POPULATION, PART ONE (D.C.: 1892-97)); see also
FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 16, at 21 (reporting population of Alameda County, California, in 1890).
142. FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 16, at 50 n.19.
143. Public and Private Pay, supra note 139. The session laws show that the District Attorney earned $12,000
per year in New York County in 1875. 1875 N.Y. Laws, ch. 480; see also 1885 N.Y. Laws, ch. 239 (indicating that
annual salary remained $12,000 in 1885). The 1885 law also allowed the District Attorney to have five assistants,
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that New York prosecutors received must have been little solace for their
crushing workload.
The New York County District Attorney's office constantly complained that it
was swamped with indictments. For example, District Attorney Randolph Martine
reported that there were between 3600 and 4000 Grand Jury indictments in 1885
and admitted that about 1000 of these would be pigeon-holed-that is, placed in a
large safe, where they remained indefinitely without further action taken in the
case. 144 In other words, prosecutors disposed of only 2600 to 3000 of the nearly
4000 indictments in 1885. Despite his reputation for laxity, District Attorney John
Fellows disposed of more cases than Martine-2910 in 1887 and 4221 in 1888.145
The zealous De Lancey Nicoll pushed more than 5000 cases through the system in
1892.146 The number of indictments processed does not tell the whole story,
however, for the District Attorney's office did not bring all of its cases before the
Grand Jury. In 1889, for instance, Fellows decided not to seek indictments in 2265
of the 5855 cases received from the Police Court. 147 Case pressure may have
resulted in unfairness to poor defendants. Faced with more cases than the system
could handle, Nicoll noted that rich defendants went practically unpunished, while
poor defendants who could not post bail were penalized because the law required
the District Attorney to bring them to trial within two court terms.'
48
Not only did the press criticize prosecutors for the backlog, but the mounting
caseload caused Nicoll and the bench to butt heads over whether the solution lay in
an increase in the number of courts or in greater efficiency on the part of the
District Attorney's office. Judges were accused of taking too many vacations; in return,
they and other members of the bar censured prosecutors for arriving at work late,
requesting unnecessary continuances, and pursuing private legal practice on the side. 49
each making $7500 per year. 1885 N.Y. Laws, ch. 239. However, some press reports indicate that Nicoll had six
assistants in 1891. See supra note 139 (indicating six assistants in 1891 and five assistants in 1892).
144. See More Facilities Wanted: Why the District Attorney Cannot Keep Up With His Work, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
30, 1885, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 2 (providing statistics on processing of cases
under District Attorney Martine); see also infra note 245 (discussing District Attorney Nicoll's campaign to
process indictments placed in safe during his predecessor's term).
145. See Untitled, WORLD (N.Y.), Dec. 28, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 7
(providing statistics on processing of cases under District Attorney Fellows).
146. See Mr Nicoll's Record for 1892, N.Y. TlvmEs, Dec. 31, 1892, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 14; Nicoll's Report: What the District Attorney Has Done This Year, EVENING SUN (N.Y.), Dec. 30,
1892, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 14; Work in the District-Attorney's Office, N.Y.
DAILY T~zm., Dec. 31, 1892, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 14; Work of Mr Nicoll's Office:
Unusually Large Number of Criminal Cases Disposed of, N.Y. HERALD, Dec. 31, 1892, microformed on DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 14.
147. What Colonel Fellows Did Last Year, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 3, 1890, microformed on DA Scrapbook,
supra note 85, at Roll 9.
148. An Army of Criminals at Large, N.Y. HERALD, Feb. 9, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 10.
149. See Big Pay for Little Work: Private Practice of Mr Nicoll's Assistants, N.Y DAILY TRIa., Apr. 11, 1892,
microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 12 (criticizing Nicoll for sending assistants to try civil
cases of his former clients); Differing Over "Part 4," N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 3, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook,
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3. Nineteenth-century Criticisms of Plea-bargaining
If case pressure gave judges and prosecutors mutual self-interest in accepting
guilty pleas, as Fisher argues that it did in Massachusetts, 50 the New York County
District Attorney's office nevertheless failed to satisfy demands for high convic-
tion rates by expediting cases with charge-bargains. The press,"[t]he greatest organ
of the public sphere," 5 ' complained about lagging attention to criminal matters in
the 1880s and 1890s. From barbed remarks about prosecutorial sloth during the
tenure of ailing District Attorney John McKeon 152 to disapproval of the volume of
private litigation that Nicoll's assistants pursued,' 53 the newspapers chimed the
refrain: "Public officers must be made to do the work that people pay them for." '15 4
The press rarely saw plea-bargaining as an appropriate part of that work. For
example, in December 1882, the New York Daily Tribune castigated McKeon for
accepting a guilty plea to first-degree manslaughter in the case of a Polish
cigar-maker who killed his wife under circumstances showing "unusual premedita-
tion and careful preparation." 5 5 Informed that an Assistant District Attorney said
that "justice would be accomplished by accepting the plea," the Tribune raged:
supra note 85, at Roll 10 (reporting Nicoll's view that existing judges could give up vacation time to staff new
criminal court); Public and Private Pay, supra note 139 (prosecutors criticized for pursuing private legal
practice); The Extra Criminal Court: District-Attorney Nicoll Says the Increased Expense Will be Slight, WORLD
(N.Y), Mar. 2, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 10 (discussing Nicoll's opinion that
existing judges could staff new criminal court); Wants More Work: Recorder Smyth Says District-Attorney Nicoll
Slights His Court, MORNING J. (N.Y.), Feb. 9, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 10
(reporting view that new court would be unnecessary if prosecutors worked more diligently in existing courts);
Why Indictments Accumulate, SUN (N.Y.), Mar. 15, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll
10 (same). In the previous decade, at least one newspaper attributed the backlog to the need for more Assistant
District Attorneys. See A New Court Room Needed, N.Y. DAILY TRm., Apr. 30, 1885, microformed on DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 2.
150. See Fisher, supra note 16, at 986-89.
151. PHILIP J. ETHINGTON, THE PUBLIC CITY: THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF URBAN LIFE IN SAN FRANCISCO,
1850-1900 19 (1994). But see infra text accompanying notes 250-52 (noting sensationalism of nineteenth-century
yellow journalism).
152. See Criminal Business Delayed, N.Y. HERALD, Nov. 22, 1883, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 1 (quoting Chief Justice Davis of Court of Oyer and Terminer, who complained that "the general
criminal business of the county ... is nearly all behindhand"); District Attorney's Neglected Work, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 1882, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll I (reporting that one murder trial and one
assault case were continued because no representative of District Attorney's office appeared in court for
sentencing); The District Attorney s Office-Shameful Neglect of Duty, SUN (N. Y), Dec. 24, 1882, microformed
on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 1 (reporting judicial displeasure with repeated failure of public
prosecutors to appear for court dates).
153. See Big Pay for Little Work, supra note 149 (complaining that assistant spent one week trying civil case);
Public and Private Pay, supra note 139 (detailing Assistants' pay from private sources).
154. The District Attorney's Office-Shameful Neglect of Duty, supra note 152. For a discussion of the political
and social composition of the newspapers excerpted in the District Attorney scrapbooks, see infra text
accompanying notes 185-204.
155. An Absurd End to a Murder Case, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 7, 1882, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra
note 85, at Roll 1; see generally, People v. Siebert, Box 71, Folder 791, DA Papers, supra note 85, (1882)
(containing material related to Siebert murder case).
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"What does this mean?" 1
56
The Tribune's view that prosecutors should follow the letter of the statute
making premeditated murder a capital crime 157 was shared by other newspapers in
other cases. Perhaps the most controversial of these bargains was the second-
degree murder plea that District Attorney Martine's office accepted from William
Conroy, an on-duty police officer who brutally murdered a bar patron during a
drunken spree. After the Supreme Court, General Term, overturned Conroy's
first-degree murder conviction, 58 the prosecutor decided to accept a plea rather
than hold a new trial. The New York Herald lamented: "When a crime so atrocious
can go unpunished for nearly two years and the criminal finally escape the penalty
he ought to be made to pay, the administration of justice in this city must be
discreditably and even dangerously amiss."'159 The Register echoed these senti-
ments, opining that "a more wanton and unprovoked murder cannot be found."
161
Even the sentencing judge thought "the sentence he was about to pass was not
adequate punishment for the offence [sic].' 16' As was often the case during the last
decades of the nineteenth century, discretion exercised to secure leniency incited
public outrage. 1
62
D. Machine Politics and Public Criticism of the District Attorney's Office
Prosecutorial discretion in the second half of the nineteenth century sometimes
benefited machine politics and served self-interested ends. The elected nature of
the District Attorney's post after 1846 made prosecutors beholden to the voters, but
in the decades surrounding the Civil War, politicized gangs began to bully
people at the polls. 163 The vote did not transparently reveal public preferences.
156. An Absurd End to a Murder Case, supra note 155; see also infra text accompanying notes 410-12
(describing conditions under which District Attorney's office accepted Siebert's guilty plea and press hostility to
that decision).
157. An Absurd End to a Murder Case, supra note 155. For information of the statutory grading and penalties
for homicide, see infra notes 295-301 and accompanying text.
158. See People v. Conroy, 97 N.Y. 62, 81 (N.Y. 1884) (affirming Supreme Court, General Term's order of new
trial).
159. Failure of Justice, N.Y. HERALD, Apr. 23, 1885, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 2.
Disagreement with the outcome of this case arguably had more to do with the fact that the defendant got drunk and
violent while on duty as a police officer than with the other details of the incident, which began as a saloon fight.
See Conroy, 97 N.Y. at 73-74 (describing facts of case). This Article later argues that male-on-male violence
generally attracted less concern than the murder of women by male family members and lovers. See infra Part
I1I.C. Plea-bargains in cases of male honor-killing rarely attracted as much outrage as Conroy's guilty plea did.
See infra Part III.C.2. Conroy's status as an on-duty police officer explains the greater controversy.
160. A Ruffianly Murderer Saving His Worthless Neck, REGISTER (N.Y.), Apr. 22, 1885, microformed on DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 2.
161. Id.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 270-71.
163. See MILLER supra note 70, at 144 (noting that political bosses used New York City's rough elements to
intimidate voters and start brawls at polls); MONKKONEN, supra note 13, at 120-21 (stating that it was common for
men to fight and murder to get Tammany Hall's support).
2002] 1337
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
Indeed, the nineteenth-century public often existed in opposition to the elected
government.
To assess criticism of the District Attorney's office, it is necessary to discuss the
nature of the public and the newspapers that catered to it in the second half of the
nineteenth century. The meaning of the word "public" changes from discipline to
discipline. Economists use the term to mean interventionist or non-market 16 -the
aspects of the economy that the state controls. Urban planners designate physical
spaces like parks, town squares, or streets as "public." In politics, the term has
several meanings as well. It sometimes refers to state power or to institutions that
the government runs. 165 However, when historians and political theorists talk
about the public sphere, they refer to something external to the state itself. 1
66
In this sense, the public refers to the "political expression of diverse inter-
ests." 167 It does not inevitably imply either consensus or bi-polarity, but rather, to
paraphrase Thomas Bender, the public is "an arena where different interests,
commitments, and values collide and resolve themselves" into a civic sense that is
constantly being questioned and reconstituted. 168 Reliance on Bender's term
"arena" does not imply that I view the public as a physical space or an assembly of
citizens in a meeting hall. Rather, the press played the most important role in the
creation of the public sphere. 169 In late-nineteenth-century New York, newspapers
took the lead in articulating concern about the perceived shortcomings of the
District Attorney's office: its softness on crime and its indebtedness to the political
bosses.
1. Political Bosses and the Public
Founded in the early 1800s as a fraternal organization of artisans, Tammany
Hall consolidated its power over the political machine in the 1870s and 1880S.
170
Although young professionals and second-generation immigrants sought to oust
164. Thomas Bender, Metropolitan Life and the Making of Public Culture, in POWER, CuLTmIE, AND PLACE:
EsSAYS ON NEW YORK CITY 261,264 (John Hull Mollenkopf ed., 1988) [hereinafter POWER, CULTURE, AND PLACE].
165. Id. at 264.
166. See ETHINGTON. supra note 151, at 15 (borrowing from Jtirgen Habermas' view that "the public sphere
came into being in the late eighteenth century, when private persons came together to contest the governing
relations of the state and society"); see also generally JURGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF
THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger & Frederick
Lawrence trans., MIT Press 1989) (describing formation of public as space between state and society).
167. Bender, supra note 164, at 264; see also ETHINGTON, supra note 151, at 15, 412 (stating that public's
"location in the print media was more important than its location in a physical public space, like the Plaza").
168. Bender, supra note 164, at 264; see also ETHINGTON, supra note 151, at 15 (discussing role of
communication and action in formation of public).
169. See ETHINOTON, supra note 151, at 15, 19-24 (noting that public sphere arose primarily through political
journalism which allowed for criticism of state authorities; stating that republican political process cannot exist
without free press; and comparing modern newspaper to Greek Agora).
170. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 460; Martin Shefter, Political Incorporation and Contain-
ment: Regime Transformation in New York City, in POWER, CULTURE, AND PLACE, supra note 164, at 135.
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machine politicians during the 1890s, the reformers could not break the grip of the
bosses. 171 The fact that late-nineteenth-century prosecutors served the state failed
to make their discretionary power more enlightened than that of private citizens
using the fee system in the early 1800s. Nevertheless, the main conflict that this
Article documents was a battle between a normative vision of governmental
responsibility for deterring crime and the less-than-perfect reality of urban
politics-not a struggle between a new public model and the old private one.
By the last decades of the nineteenth century, New York had begun to shed its
dependence on Atlantic trade and the rise of industry resulted in economic trouble
for the artisans whom Tammany Hall was founded to represent. 172 By the 1880s
and 1890s, two-thirds of all immigrants to the United States arrived via Castle
Garden or Ellis Island and temporarily settled on the Lower East Side.
173
Foreign-born individuals, many of them desperately poor, outstripped the native
population by mid-century in the Western Hemisphere's largest city. 174 Ethnic
conflict bloodied New York's streets and divided lower Manhattan into rival
territories, controlled by Irish or Jewish gangs. 1
75
Tammany Hall owed its ascendance, in part, to its cultivation of these gangs.
The New York political bosses reflected the "hard-fisted" style of the working
class, but unlike their counterparts in other cities, they rejected a nativist pro-
gram. 176 Instead, they sometimes courted immigrant votes. 177 According to several
revisionist historians, machine politics neither arose from nor produced stark
ethnic and class polarities.""' Rather, Tammany Hall's resilience in the face of
reform indicates that it enjoyed some support from the upper and middle classes
and was able to garner a working-class following without completely antagonizing
business interests.
179
The deepest conflict pitted "respectable" New Yorkers, a category not solely
defined by class or ethnicity,' 80 against groups associated with violence, shady
171. See Shefter, supra note 170, at 142, 146.
172. Amy Bridges, Rethinking the Origins of Machine Politics, in POWER, CULTURE, AND PLACE, supra note
164, at 58. But cf. Shefter, supra note 170, at 136-37 (indicating that New York retained its mercantile image
longer than Bridges describes).
173. Shefter, supra note 170, at 136.
174. Bridges, supra note 172, at 58; McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 459.
175. See Shefter, supra note 170, at 136-37.
176. Bridges, supra note 172, at 63.
177. See id. at 65. But see Shefter, supra note 170, at 139 (contending that, although machine politicians
supported downtown Jewish saloon- and brothel-keepers in 1880s, neither Republicans nor Democrats made
concerted effort to mobilize immigrants before 1890s).
178. See Bender, supra note 164, at 267; Bridges, supra note 172, at 63, 65. But see EDWARD BANFIELD &
JAMES Q. WILSON, CrY POLITICS 40-41 (contending that urban machine politics had its roots in immigrant values
that conflicted with those of middle-class WASPs).
179. See Shefter, supra note 170, at 141.
180. Recent historical work on urban culture in nineteenthth-century New York City suggests that neither
respectability nor vice inhered in any one social class. For example, Timothy Gilfoyle states that "neither the
benefits of privilege nor the trappings of wealth discouraged visits to the whorehouse" during this period.
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income, and disrespect for law. While the newspapers often voiced the concerns of
the former, machine politicians were identified with the latter. This opposition
eventually solidified in the 1930s, in the New York of Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia,
when the machine represented a "special interest' locking horns with the "public
interest."' '
Although class and ethnic tensions and efforts to impose top-down social
control were realities in New York, "respectability" resisted the bourgeoisie's
attempts to claim it as their own. Just as rich and poor men consumed illegal
commercial sex and engaged in other vices,' 8 2 New Yorkers from a variety of
socioeconomic and ethnic backgrounds shared a desire to promote orderliness and
to oust corrupt politicians. The stereotypical identification of immigrants and
unskilled workers with street violence did not mean that these individuals always
favored prosecutorial leniency. Nor was the native-born middle class the only
army in the battle against crime, as Joseph Pulitzer's career exemplifies. Born in
Mako, Hungary, in 1847, Pulitzer was an immigrant Jew and also one of the most
ardent crusaders against gambling and political corruption during the last few
decades of the nineteenth century.'8 3 "Respectable" values transcended political
parties as well. As we shall see, newspapers aimed at Democratic and Republican
audiences, at tenements and elite addresses, shared similar concerns about prosecu-
torial leniency toward criminals.' 1
8 4
2. The Role of the Press
Like Tammany Hall's supporters and public culture itself, New York newspa-
pers have been characterized as a pastiche. 185 Joseph Pulitzer of the World was one
of the first publishers to realize that as the profit model shifted from sales to
advertising, "a successful newspaper must appeal to many different kinds of
readers."' 8 6 Low prices attracted the working class, and by 1900, even the
high-brow New York Times had cut its price to one penny to attract the less
TIMOTHY J. GILFOYLE, CITY OF EROS: NEW YORK CITY, PROSTITUTION, AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF SEX,
1790-1920, at 103 (1992). But see CHRISTINE STANSELL, CITY OF WOMEN: SEX AND CLASS IN NEW YORK,
1789-1860, at 219 (1986) (describing dichotomies of class in New York City that were blurred only in rare
instances that working-class individuals conformed to standards imposed by urban elites).
181. Bender, supra note 164, at 267; Shefter, supra note 170, at 148-50.
182. See GILFOYLE, supra note 180, at 19. Gilfoyle argues that "[e]ven the supposedly sharp distinction
between those who frequented [prostitutes in] the Bowery and those who went to Broadway, often seen by
contemporaries and later historians as indicative of class divisions, was in fact quite fluid ..... Id. at 107. For my
discussion of norms of masculine honor that transcended class and ethnicity, see infra text accompanying notes
339-48.
183. See HY B. TURNER, WHEN GIANTS RULED: THE STORY OF PARK Row, NEW YORK'S GREAT NEWSPAPER
STREET 100-01 (1999).
184. See infra text accompanying notes 201-04, 232-33.
185. See WILLIAM R. TAYLOR, IN PURSUIT OF GOTHAM: CULTURE AND COMMERCE IN NEW YORK 81 (1992)
(noting that daily newspapers began to diversify their content to attract broad range of readers).
186. Id. at 81.
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affluent.18 7 The Morning Journal was known as the "washer-woman's gazette"
because its one-penny price appealed to readers in the tenements. 88 While cost
determined the poorer end of a paper's readership, nothing prevented wealthy
people from buying a cheap news-sheet. For example, both working men and "the
polo-playing, yacht-racing groups" may have read the New York Herald. i8 9
Just as the newspapers strived to reach a broad spectrum of New Yorkers with
their prices, they also published a variety of articles-political opinion, fashion,
sports, household advice, and of course, coverage of crimes and trials.' 90 The
World, the Herald, and the Morning Journal were particularly prone to covering
salacious news and adopting a sensational tone when reporting on crime. In its
early days, the Herald "reigned supreme in shock treatment to attract readers" but
softened its tone in the 1840s.1 91 Nonetheless, its "reputation for the tawdry
remained for decades."' 192 The World became "the people's paper" in the last two
decades of the nineteenth century by offering "stories of sex, money, murder, and
success; stories of the powerful and the rich who dealt in corruption; stories of the
weak who were not always right and whom [Pulitzer] could frown upon but
champion."'
193
In contrast, the Times and the Sun tended to be more high-brow. Although the
Sun began as a "nonpartisan tabloid... earthy enough to be understood by the man
laying gas pipes in the Bowery,' 194 editor Charles Anderson Dana "injected . .. a
literary style" when he acquired the paper in 1868.'9' By the end of the nineteenth
century, the Sun gave its sophisticated flair priority over coverage of all the
news;' 96 it specialized in exposing scandal and fraud. 19 7 The Times took a more
187. TURNER, supra note 183, at 146. Turner describes why the price cut was greeted with surprise: "No other
conservative daily in the city charged less than three [cents], and it was assumed that only a yellow sheet would
sell for a penny." Id. The Times insisted that it had changed its price but not its quality. See id.
188. Id. at 119. It focused primarily on gossip until William Randolph Hearst assumed control in 1895 and
added political crusading and the depiction of scantily-clad women to the Journal's menu. See id. at 123-26.
189. Id. at 144. Some scholars depict the Herald as a primarily working-class, penny newspaper that, from its
inception under Irish editor James Gordon Bennett, specialized in sensational crime reporting. See id. at 10-26.
However, due to the lack of market research and the fact that the Herald was sold by newsboys, not by
subscription, we cannot be sure of its readership. See JAMES L. CROUTHAMEL, BENNETT'S NEW YORK HERALD AND
THE RISE OF THE POPULAR PRESS 158 (1989). It seems reasonable to assume that the Herald appealed to a broad
audience that transcended class. Politicians in Washington, including the president of the United States, read it,
and it had enjoyed "the largest circulation in Europe of any American newspaper" in the 1830s. Id. Crouthamel
speculates that, based on the nature of the advertising contained within its pages, the Herald enjoyed a universal
appeal. See id. at 159.
190. See TAYLOR, supra note 185, at 81.
191. TURNER, supra note 183, at 26
192. Id. at 3 1; see also CROLTHAMEL, supra note 189, at 28-31,37-39, 100-01 (describing Herald's sensational
crime coverage).
193. TURNER, supra note 183, at 106.
194. ld. at4.
195. ld. at 85.
196. See id. at 144.
197. See id. at 86.
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intellectual approach than other Democratic publications, but it reported more
news than did the literary Sun. '
98
William Taylor argues that, because the press dffered a pastiche, it failed to
dominate public thinking. Readers could pick and choose according to their own
tastes, rather than allowing the newspaper to control values and preferences.' 99
However, Taylor's "culture of pastiche" model has limited utility in describing
late-nineteenth-century New York. Public attitudes were not completely incoher-
ent or unmanageable. 2° Indeed, with few exceptions, the newspaper scrapbooks
that the District Attorney's office maintained reveal a critical view of the prosecu-
tors. The potential for the District Attorney to become a pawn of corruption and
violence lies at the heart of press reports within the scrapbooks' pages. Remark-
ably, this perspective seems to have transcended class and party. While powerful
editors often claimed that their newspapers maintained political independence, this
was rarely true. 20 ' Nevertheless, a populist, widely-circulated paper like the
World20 2 and a Republican Party organ like the Tribune20 3 could agree upon the
need to prosecute corrupt aldermen and send murderers to a speedy execution.
204
3. Norms of Public Prosecution in the Late Nineteenth Century
The meaning of "public" prosecution was still contested at the end of the
nineteenth century and arguably remains so today. For example, late-nineteenth-
century newspapers debated whether the District Attorney should pursue a case
that the victim wanted to drop, an issue that continues to be controversial in our
own time, especially in domestic violence cases. 20 5 In 1882, the Evening Telegram
198. See TURNER, supra note 183, at 144-47.
199. See TAYLOR, supra note 185, at 82.
200. See Bender, supra note 164, at 265-66. Bender writes:
[W]e must not go from bi-polarity to bricolage. Historiography, like the city itself, may become
simply unmanageable if one too enthusiastically multiplies such distinctions.... [T]he focus on
public culture seems to offer a means of acknowledging complexity in a relational sense without
being overwhelmed by it. The focus on the construction of the public realm allows the scholar to
approach what is "common" without sacrificing the fact and the fundamental significance of
difference.
201. See, e.g., ETHINGTON, supra note 151, at 22 (discussing partisan stance that Bennett's New York Herald
adopted on issues like banking and labor, despite its claims of political independence).
202. The World enjoyed the largest circulation of any New York newspaper in the 1890s, eclipsing the Sun,
which claimed that honor in 1883. See TURNER, supra note 183, at 98, 106, 124-25. The World's low price,
sensational coverage, and the nature of its editorials attracted a mostly working-class audience. Turner describes
its publisher, Joseph Pulitzer, as a vigorous champion of the rights of "the masses." Id. at 106.
203. See id. at 144 (stating that Tribune "catered to a small, sturdy, wealthy Republican following and was the
party's foremost organ in the nation").
204. See infra text accompanying notes 232-33, 238-49.
205. Compare Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1907-09 (1996) ("[Lleaving the choice of prosecution to the victim-and
rationalizing that decision on the basis of feminist theory--creates more problems than it solves."), with Linda G.
Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 554
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complained about the willingness to prosecute in the victim's absence.20 6 By
* contrast, the New York Herald opined:
In many cases the victim will make no complaint, will even try to thwart the
prosecution. It is none the less the duty of the authorities to bring the offender
to justice .... Whether an offender shall be tried and punished is not simply an
issue between him and his victim, but between him and society.
20 7
Although the relationship between the complainant and the state was still
unsettled in the 1880s, acute interest in the activities of the District Attorney's
office demonstrated that an ideal of public prosecution was emerging. Unlike the
normative vision of the public prosecutor espoused by twenty-first-century law
professors,20 8 the prescriptions that "respectable" New Yorkers urged upon the
District Attorney were those of adversary and crime-fighter. According to the
prevalent view, the prosecuting lawyer should pursue social-control objectives
greater than the victim's grievance, while the rights of the defendant should be left
to defense lawyers. As the New York Daily Tribune argued in 1887:
It is the [District Attorney's] function and his duty in each criminal case to
present every fact and circumstance that can be brought forward on behalf of
the people. The prisoner's counsel may be trusted to present every fact in favor
of his client .... [T]he plea of mercy is one with which the District-Attorney
has little or nothing to do.
209
Newspapers expressed concern that the District Attorney's office was neglecting
to perform its adversarial role. The fact that public prosecutors owed allegiance to
Tammany Hall was often identified as the cause of this failure. 210 Press reports
criticized the District Attorneys of the 1880s and 1890s for making partisan
appointments, allegedly underpinned by covert deals with the Tammany bosses,
and attributed pigeonholed indictments and plea-bargains to political entangle-
(1999) ("1 argue ... that such policies as mandatory arrest, prosecution, and reporting, which have become
standard legal fare in the fight against domestic violence and which categorically ignore the battered woman's
perspective, can themselves be forms of abuse."). See also Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the
State's Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1865-69 (2002) (discussing arguments for
and against no-drop policies and other forms of mandatory state intervention in domestic abuse).
206. According to the New Code, EVENING TELEGRAM (N.Y.), Aug. 17, 1882, microformed on DA Scrapbook,
supra note 85, at Roll 1 ("The new Code seems to operate to the prejudice of criminals, or of persons accused of
being criminals, even where the complainant takes flight and fails to substantiate his charges.").
207. Prosecution Without Complaint, N.Y. HERALD, June 20, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 6 (defending decision to prosecute in case in which victim duped by supposed Spiritualist declined to
make complaint).
208. Earlier, this Article faulted modem critics of prosecutorial discretion for failing to provide a convincing
discussion of the extent to which the public subscribes to their views of fairness and justice. See supra text
accompanying notes 42-48.
209. The District-Attorney's Proper Functions, N.Y DAILY TWB., Nov. 26, 1887, microformed on DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 5.
210. See infra text accompanying notes 234-35, 246-47.
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ments. Few District Attorneys escaped such allegations. For example, John
McKeon was eulogized on his death in November 1883 for opposing machine
politics at many points in his career." ' However, there was a general belief that,
afflicted with illness during his final term as District Attorney, McKeon succumbed
to pressure from the political bosses to appoint partisan subordinates who made
unscrupulous choices about whom to prosecute. McKeon's assistants were ac-
cused of pursuing charges by disreputable complainants while turning a blind eye
to election fraud and gambling.212 The Times opined:
[The less able or honest of McKeon's assistants] were forced upon [him] by the
halls, not a little to the scandal of the public, and were what the choice of
Tammany and Irving Hall might have been expected to be, being distinguished
rather for factious zeal than for professional skill or standing. The result has
been that the office has been managed [according to the] interests of the
criminal classes. z1 3
John Fellows, whose tenure as District Attorney is described in detail below,
battled even more hostile reports. The newspapers charged that, during Fellows'
term, the machinery of justice was not set in motion "when the offenders happened
to be politicians with 'pull"' 21 4 and labeled Fellows "a man of infinite excuses" for
not trying important cases.2t 5
In contrast, the prosecutors for whom the press expressed the greatest admira-
211. See John M'Keon's Work Done, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1883, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 1.
212. See The District Attorney's Duty, N.Y. DAILY TaIn., Dec. 4, 1882, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra
note 85, at Roll 1. The Tribune complained:
There has been a signal failure to punish a single one of the many leading lottery managers whom
Mr. McKeon has indicted. The unwarrantable assertions before election that false registration was
being carried out to an enormous extent have been followed, after election, by suspicious inactivity
in prosecuting those accused.
Id. The New York Times seconded concerns about the "[pleculiar difficulties [that] seem to hedge about the
conviction of the lottery men." Untitled, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1883, microformedon DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll I. It also raised suspicions that, in exchange for a fee, then-Assistant District Attorney John Fellows
secured the pardon of "a criminal undergoing a well-deserved sentence," id. In the Times' view, there was "reason
to fear that the [District Attorney's] office badly needs overhauling." Id.
213. John M'Keon's Work Done, supra note 211. In a similar vein, the Tribune complained:
His assistants, with hardly an exception... were unfitted by their lack of experience, by political
entanglements and by private obligations for doing their full duty .... We regret to add also that
Mr. McKeon did not on entering office act upon the ideas which he had approved when advanced
in his support [i.e., his supposed opposition to boss rule], but made partisan appointments of some
men whom he knew to be incompetent, and others of whom he had proof that they were not
scrupulously honorable.
The District Attorney, N.Y. DAILY TRI., Nov. 23, 1883, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 1.
214. The District Attorney's Neglect, WORLD (N.Y.), June 22, 1889, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 8.
215. Our Genial District Attorney, N.Y. HERALD, June 23, 1889, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 8.
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tion were those who appeared to rise above the political machine. When Wheeler
Peckham was appointed to fill McKeon's vacant spot after his sudden death in
1883, the Times noted with approval that "the new District Attorney has not 'fixed
things with the boys' before his appointment, and there is, therefore, reasonable
ground for hope that he will fix things in a manner which will not suit the boys, and
which, therefore, will suit respectable citizens." 216 When journalists used terms
like "judicial" and "impartial," they referred to independence from boss rule and
the so-called criminal classes, not to evenhandedness toward victims and defen-
dants.21 7
This was not a monolithic view. Whereas the public in the second half of the
nineteenth century favored a bitterly adversarial system, some judges and legal
theorists began to articulate norms of fairness and neutrality. For example, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin offered the following interpretation of an 1887
statute that precluded private attorneys from prosecuting criminal cases:
The laws have clearly provided that the district attorney, who is the officer
provided by the laws of the state to initiate and carry on such trials, shall be
unprejudiced and unpaid except by the state, and that he shall have no private
interest in such prosecution. He is an officer of the state, provided at the
expense of the state for the purpose of seeing that the criminal laws of the state
are honestly and impartially administered, unprejudiced by any motives of
private gain, and holding a position analogous to that of the judge who
presides at the trial.... [T]he duty of the prosecuting attorney [is] to proceed
with all fairness in presenting the cause of the state to the jury, and in
prosecuting the whole case, even though parts of the case as presented should
make in favor of the innocence of the accused.218
In addition to citing judicial opinions urging prosecutorial neutrality, Green notes
that an 1854 essay upon which the American Bar Association modeled its first
ethics code described the office of Attorney General as "a public trust, which
involves ... the exertion of an almost boundless discretion, by an officer who
216. Mr M'Keon's Successor: Wheeler H. Peckham Appointed District Attorney by the Governor, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 1, 1883, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll I (describing fact that Peckham had "[n]o
affiliation with any Tammany ring" as his chief virtue).
217. For example, the Tribune's comment that "the office is judicial" was paired with criticism of the political
partisanship that McKeon's assistants displayed with their leniency toward certain defendants. The District-
Attorney, supra note 213.
218. Biemel v. State, 37 N.W. 244, 247 (Wis. 1888) (emphasis added); see Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99,
103-04 (Mich. 1875) (opining that similar law was "designed to secure impartiality from all persons connected
with criminal trials" and analogizing public prosecutors to judges); see also People v. Cahoon, 50 N.W. 384, 385
(Mich. 1891) (reprimanding public prosecutor for using innuendo to discredit witness in violation of quasi-
judicial duties of his office); People v. Chuck, 20 P. 719, 723 (Cal. 1889) (censuring prosecutor for introducing
inadmissible evidence and reminding him that adversarial zeal must be tempered by duty, shared "[e]qually with
the court," to ensure that defendant received fair and impartial trial).
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stands as impartial as a judge. ''2 1 9 The ABA did not publish its code until 1908, but
the author of this essay, George Sharswood, was a respected member of the legal
profession in the mid- to late-nineteenth century. He taught law at the University of
Pennsylvania from 1850 to 1868. In 1879, he donned the robes of the Chief Justice
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and still sat on the Pennsylvania bench when
his Essay on Professional Ethics appeared in print.220
However, despite the existence of judicial and academic writings supporting
Green's view, we should not assume that the public prosecutor's quasi-judicial role
was a nineteenth-century tradition.22' Judges in Philadephia failed to stifle prac-
tices associated with private prosecution during Sharswood's days as a law
professor in that city.222 And the views that Sharswood espoused had not gained
acceptance in New York even a few decades later. The New York District Attorney
scrapbooks rarely express a desire for prosecutors to be more solicitous of
defendants' rights, although such scrapbooks contain articles from a wide variety
of newspapers, many of them strongly critical of the District Attorney's office.
Ironically, the New York Star, a tabloid that may have been on Boss Tweed's
payroll in the early 1870'S,223 was one of the few periodicals to state what many of
us today consider axiomatic: "Success or failure in securing a conviction in every
proceeding is not a fair standard of the merit of a public prosecutor. Our courts
exist for the protection of the innocent as well as for the punishment of the guilty.
District Attorneys are not bloodhounds. 22 4
219. Green, supra note 1, at 612 (quoting George Sharswood, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 94 (F.B.
Rothman 5th ed., 1993) (1854)).
220. See Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: the 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar
Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471,495 (1998) (describing Sharswood's career).
221. See Green, supra note 1, at 635 (suggesting that "[l]atter day writings" continue to espouse this view of
prosecutor's function).
222. See STEINBERG, supra note 16, at 182-87 (describing inability of bench to eradicate private prosecution in
Philadelphia in 1850s and 1860s).
223. See TURNER, supra note 183, at 88. Other periodicals that Boss Tweed bribed included the Tribune,
Herald, World, and Commercial Advertiser. Id. Of the newspapers excerpted in the District Attorney's
scrapbooks, only the Times "ceaselessly attacked Tweed or other Ring members." Id. at 89. However, by the
1880s, many of the papers formerly silenced by the Ring took an adversarial stance toward boss politics. For
instance, Charles Anderson Dana's Sun helped defeat a mayora candidate that Tammany boss, "Honest" John
Kelly, backed in 1878. See id. at 97. And, of course, in the 1880s, the World emerged as a leading mouthpiece for
denouncing municipal corruption. See id. at 102-18; see also supra text accompanying note 183-86 (discussing
Pulitzer's career).
224. A Decisive Fact, N.Y. STAR, Oct. 17, 1887, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 5
(defending then-District Attorney candidate John Fellows against allegations that he won fewer cases than his
rival, De Lancey Nicoll); see The District Attorney, N.Y. STAR, Apr. 5, 1888, microforned on DA Scrapbook
supra note 85, at Roll 5 (using almost identical language and adding that "[i]t is not the part of the District
Attorney to exult in a conviction or to deplore an acquittal"); see also Why Not a Public Defender?, DAILY
MERCURY (N.Y.), May 10, 1893, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 15 (expressing need for
public defender to combat rapaciousness of District Attorney's office). Forecasting modern criticisms of
prosecutors, the Mercury contended:
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The New York bench sometimes exhorted the District Attorney's office to give
defendants the benefit of the doubt when exercising prosecutorial discretion, 225 but
judges more frequently espoused crime-control objectives, censuring prosecutors
for indolence 226 and jurors for lenient verdicts. 227 The fact that a few judges,
attorneys, and news reporters voiced aspirations to prosecutorial impartiality did
not make those views representative of the legal profession or the press, Nor did
such sporadic expressions of a fairness norm constitute a tradition in which the
public participated. Although the view that the District Attorney must safeguard
defendants' rights was sometimes expressed, it still lacked deep roots in American
legal culture at the end of the nineteenth century.
E. A Tale of Two Prosecutors: John Fellows and De Lancey Nicoll
No rivalry more clearly crystallized late-nineteenth-century norms of public
prosecution than the struggle between John Fellows and his successor De Lancey
Nicoll.228 Although the case study presented in Part III focuses on murder, much of
the criticism directed at public prosecutors in the last decades of the nineteenth
century related to the fate of municipal officials accused of corruption. Bribery, not
murder, seems to have been Public Enemy Number One. Indeed, in an open letter
lambasting District Attorney Fellows for his failure to prosecute aldermen and
assemblymen for bribing voters, the Reform Club explicitly asserted that "even
the crime of murder must be less abhorrent to the citizen as a citizen [than
election bribery]., 2 29 Neither crime, however, can be viewed in isolation
because a District Attorney might hold show trials of murderers to deflect
criticism away from his non-prosecution of machine politicians, lottery men,
and liquor sellers.
Fellows and Nicoll served together as Assistant District Attorneys under
It has come to be the purpose of the district attorneys to secure as many verdicts of "guilty" as
possible. They strive to convict at all hazards and by any means within their power. They try to
"make a record," just as a policeman does, and reckon their efficiency by the number and severity
of sentences imposed by the courts in which they plead.... Facts coming to the knowledge of the
public prosecutor which would tell in favor of a prisoner are not communicated to the defense, and
the accused is left to his own resources and those of the counsel employed by him, or assigned to
him by the bench.
Id. The Mercury's concerns lend support to the idea that the dominant norms of public prosecution-the norms
with which the Mercury disagreed-pushed the District Attorney to more zealously pursue convictions.
225. See, e.g., People v. Conroy, 97 N.Y. 62, 72 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1884) (urging District Attorney's office not to
oppose new trial order in William Conroy's case). For more information on this controversial case, which
ultimately resulted in a plea-bargain, see supra text accompanying note 158-61.
226. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
227. See infra text accompanying note 308.
228. See infra text accompanying notes 230-45.
229. Colonel Fellows Attacked: The City Reform Club Uses Pretty Plain Language Before His Face, MORNING
J. (N.Y.), June 21, 1889, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 8.
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Randolph Martine from 1884 to 1887. During Martine's tenure, the prosecutor's
office took on the Boodlers-a group of aldermen bribed by railway owner Jacob
Sharp to support the construction of a streetcar line on Broadway. Nicoll was
credited with zealously preparing the Boodle cases for trial,230 although Fellows
actually delivered many of the closing arguments.2 3' When Nicoll opposed
Fellows for District Attorney in 1887, the weight of "respectable" opinion, both
Republican and Democrat, appeared to favor Nicoll. 2 3 2 According to newspapers
like the Times, which voiced "respectable" values, Nicoll's victory would ensure
"that the Aldermanic bribery trials may go on."
233
In contrast, such papers depicted Tammany-backed Fellows as sympathetic
toward criminals and raised "the apprehension that as District Attorney he would
take it upon himself ... to see that no one received criminal punishment, except in
accordance with his particular views and wishes. 234 In short, they feared that
Fellows would exercise the District Attorney's significant discretion in favor of
leniency and personal bias.
Distaste for Fellows stemmed, in part, from his involvement with the Tweed
ring in the late 1860s and from concern that his corrupt ties would impede crime
control25 Nicoll became the Republican candidate after failing to secure the
Democratic nomination and was subsequently defeated in the 1887 election.
However, his loss should not be equated with diminished hostility toward boss
power on the part of "respectable" New Yorkers; some last-minute votes were
230. See It is a Public Issue, WORLD (N.Y.), Oct. 19, 1887, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 82, at
Roll 5 (wondering whether Nicoll would be defeated because he "made New York too hot for Boodlers" with his
vigorous prosecution).
231. Vehement in its support for Nicoll, the Democratic World admitted that Fellows summed up for the
People in most of the Boodle cases during Martine's tenure, but claimed that Fellows disappeared, making
dubious claims of illness, when one of his chief political supporters was brought to trial. See John R. Fellows,
WORLD (N.Y.), Oct. 22, 1887, microforned on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 5. Of course, supporters of
Fellows put a positive spin on Fellows' participation in the early Boodle trials. See A Decisive Fact, supra note
224 (noting that Fellows addressed jury in every trial in which conviction was obtained). Despite his political bias
and indolence in prosecuting cases, Fellows was recognized as a superb orator. See Carlton Guilty of Wilful
Murder, N.Y. HERALD, Dec. 15, 1888, microformedon DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 7 (likening Fellows'
thunderous closing argument in first-degree murder case of Henry Carlton to "powerful sermon" by preacher).
232. See Mr Nicoll Opposed by the "Boodlers, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1887, microformed on DA Scrapbook,
supra note 85, at Roll 5 (contending that "[t]he reputable and law-abiding part of the community, irrespective of
party, demands Mr. Nicoll's nomination"); Our District-Attorney, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., June 14, 1888, microformed
on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 6 (noting, after Fellows' victory, that Nicoll was favored by "reputable
voters").
233. Mr Nicoll Opposed by the "Boodlers, " supra note 232. The Democratic World favorably quoted a
Republican newspaper, the Tribune, for the sentiment that: "There is not an intelligent citizen of New York who
does not know that Mr. Nicotl is opposed solely because he has relentlessly prosecuted to conviction Jacob Sharp
and a few of the rotten Aldermen that criminal bought." It is a Public Issue, supra note 230.
234. The District Attorney's Proper Functions, supra note 209 (asserting that Fellows' advocacy was based on
personal bias).
235. See John R. Fellows, supra note 231 (reporting that Fellows first became Assistant District Attorney due
to his Tweed connections and temporarily returned to private practice only upon ouster of Tweed Ring).
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unprincipled decisions that had little to do with the public's generally positive view
of Nicoll. 236 The losing candidate groused that he was "defeated in the boodlers'
districts, ' 237 and the World counted convicts like Sharp among Fellows' support-
ers.238 In short, Nicoll loyalists depicted Fellows' victory as a triumph for boss
rule.239
Fellows proved to be a very unpopular District Attorney. Even newspapers that
supported him in 1887 reversed their loyalties because of his dismissal of Boodle
indictments and his practice of pigeon-holing cases that he did not want to try. The
Herald complained, for example: "He can give a perfectly convincing reason for
not doing any duty except that of drawing his salary.... His theory is that no one
ought ever to be prosecuted for crime."'24 The Times put it even more strongly,
reporting that when Fellows argued several important Boodle motions, he "practi-
cally appeared for the defense .,24 1 Fellows' claim that he intended to reserve
scarce resources for trials that he thought he could win fell on deaf ears.
242
Thus, criticisms of Fellows associated cooperative or lenient behavior on the
part of the public prosecutor's office with crooked politics, whereas Nicoll's
adversarial stance was described as "manly, vigorous, unflinching, and impar-
tial.' 24 3 In this context, impartiality meant independence from boss politicians and
their constituents among the so-called dangerous classes, rather than concern for
defendants' rights. After Nicoll finally became District Attorney in 1891, the
Herald assured its readership that statistics on increased convictions in New York
236. For example, the Sun switched its allegiance to Fellows largely because its editor, Charles Anderson
Dana, quarreled with Nicoll supporter Joseph Pulitzer over Pulitzer's aggrandizement of the evening journal
market. See TURNER, supra note 183, at 111-12.
237. At the District Attorney's Office, SUN (N.Y.), Nov. 10, 1887, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 5 (reporting Nicoll's reaction to losing election).
238. Untitled, WORLD (N.Y), Oct. 17, 1887, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 5.
239. The World was livid when its party, the Democrats, failed to nominate Nicoll: "When the news of the
nomination of the New York Democrats reached Montreal [where several prominent Boodlers were exiled]
Keenan and Moloney doubtless cracked an extra bottle of champagne and sent a congratulatory message to 'Boss
Power."' See id. (suggesting that Fellows' victory was supported by boss rule).
240. Our Genial District Attorney, supra note 215 (demonstrating Fellows' unpopularity as District Attorney
because of his failure to try certain cases).
241. Col. Fellows's Farce, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1890, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 5
(emphasis added) (illustrating public disapproval of Fellows for his failure to prosecute criminals zealously).
242. See Boodle Cases Ended, N.Y. STAR, Feb. 1, 1890, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll
9 (explaining Fellows' decision to dismiss indictments against several major Boodlers); Surcease of Sorrow for
the Aldermanic Boodlers, MORNING J. (N.Y.), Feb. 1, 1890 (quoting Fellows' view that "no prosecuting officer is
justified in spending ... money [to bring witnesses from as far away as California and Minnesota] unless there is
some reasonable assurance that results can be reached").
243. Mr. Nicoll " Triumph, WORLD (N.Y.), Nov. 5,1890, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll
10 (emphasis added) (demonstrating popular public approval of Nicoll's election to District Attorney). Also note
the reference to Nicoll's masculinity, which purportedly was revealed by his industry and toughness on crime. See
also Nicoll Makes Fair Promises, PRESS (N.Y.), Jan. 5, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at
Roll 10 (celebrating Nicoll's election to District Attorney's post in 1891, at end of Fellows' term).
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demonstrated Nicoll's success in protecting the people.244 Indeed, Nicoll appears
to have been best known for processing indictments that accumulated in the
pigeonholes of "two mammoth safes" during Fellows' term.
245
However, Nicoll did not escape criticism during his tenure as District Attorney
either. The attacks the press aimed at him sounded common themes of public
concern about the prosecutorial role. For example, because Nicoll finally obtained
his post in 1891 with the blessings of Tammany Hall, he bore Tammany's taint. His
longtime champion, the Tribune, worried that he had made a deal with the liquor
interests to secure his election.246 The Republican paper increasingly expressed the
view that, because Tammany Hall backed Nicoll, he negotiated plea-bargains in
policy cases, so that the defendant only suffered a fine; engaged in the selective
non-prosecution of excise violators by allowing the statute of limitations to lapse;
and even failed to secure the conviction of murderers.247 The discretion not to
prosecute was identified with the strategies of boss rule.
In addition, Nicoll's policy of allowing his subordinates to pursue private legal
244. Clearing House for all Crimes, N.Y. HERALD, May 7, 1893, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 15 (asserting that increase in convictions was caused by Nicoll's performance as District Attorney).
245. Overhauling Old Indictments: The Pigeonholes of the District Attorney's Office Giving Up Their Dead,
SUN (N.Y.), Jan. 3, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 10 (proposing that Nicoll
successfully finished work that Fellows was unwilling to complete); see also An Army of Criminals at Large,
supra note 148 (describing Nicoll's campaign to inventory and dispose of untried cases); cf Praise for Nicoll,
N.Y. RECORDER, July 16, 1893, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 15 (quoting Judge Cowing
as saying, toward end of Nicoll's term, that District Attorney "has kept the machinery of criminal law in rapid
motion, and by his efforts the city prisons are almost empty" of individuals awaiting trial); Nicoll Makes Fair
Promises, supra note 243 (reporting that, shortly after taking office, Nicoll was in his office on a Saturday
"enveloped in a great overcoat because the janitor, never dreaming that a District Attorney would remain down
town longer than possible, had turned off the steam"); The District-Attorney Busy, WORLD (N.Y.), Dec. 23, 1891,
microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 12 (reporting case-disposition statistics and noting that
"[tihe District Attorney's office is the busiest department of the city government in these days.").
246. See Mr. Nicoll's Staff, N.Y. DAILY TR1ia., Jan. 1, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at
Roll 10 (reporting "open claims of the liquor dealers that they had secured from Mr. Nicoll the pledge of [former]
Judge Bedford's appointment [as an Assistant District Attorney] as the price of their support"); Tammany
Protection, N.Y DAILY TRIB., Oct. 28, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 12 (reporting
rumnors of explicit or tacit deal in which liquor interests supported Nicoll in exchange for protection of persons
charged with excise violations).
247. See He Has a Tammany "Pull", N.Y DAILY TRIB., July 27, 1893, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra
note 85, at Roll 15 (predicting that murder defendant with Tammany influence would not be vigorously
prosecuted); Untitled, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 23, 1892, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 12
(reporting judicial censure of Nicoll for accumulation of policy cases); Tammany Protection, supra note 246
(alleging that thousands of excise cases never reached jury during Nicoll's term). The Tribune was not the only
newspaper that became convinced of Nicoll's deference to Tammany Hall. For example, the New York Recorder
blamed boss power for the District Attorney's failure to fund the capture of criminals who fled to other states. The
Recorder contended that Tammany Hall was willing to pay the salaries of its factotums in the District Attorney's
office but not "to secure the return of criminals who, with their friends, are perhaps among the strongest
constituents of Tammany." New York the Criminal Mecca, N.Y. RECORDER, Dec. 18, 1891, microformed an DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 12.
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practice raised conflict-of-interest concerns. 248 The press explicitly worried about
leniency to defendants, as opposed to victims' influence over the criminal process.
Among three salient concerns, two involved the improper influence of criminal
defendants, leading to the ineffective prosecution or dismissal of cases.2 49
Although Fellows played the villain more often than did Nicoll, both men trod a
thin line between the demands of the press and those of the political factions that
put them into the District Attorney's office. We should not uncritically equate the
newspapers with the public, for the press' influence on public opinion may have
been more ambiguous than some historians indicate. ° Yellow journalism, blazing
with lurid details of "sex, crime, and tragedy," dominated Park Row in the late
nineteenth century.25' Yet given fierce competition for readers, newspapermen
presumably wrote about subjects that interested New Yorkers and expressed views
with which a critical mass of their readership agreed. Moreover, while exposing
corruption was part of the sensationalistic formula, there is reason to believe that
newspapers also attacked the political machine with the objective of fostering
reform.
2 5 2
By the end of the nineteenth century, two of the most important features of the
prosecutor's office were the elected nature of its chief attorney and the interest the
public took in its operations. Concern about the practices of the District Attorney
were often expressed in language familiar to us today-the language of account-
ability and impartiality. Yet in the 1880s and 1890s, the evolution of public
prosecution toward greater sensitivity to defendants' rights lay far down the road.
The question of when and how norms of fairness began to affect criminal justice
remains for further research. This Article simply indicates that defendant-
protective goals had no appreciable impact on the paradigm of public prosecution
in the nineteenth century.
248. See Big Pay for Little Work, supra note 149 (complaining that Nicoll allowed his assistants to conduct
private work in addition to state criminal work); Public and Private Pay, supra note 139 (listing Nicoll's
attorneys' salaries and asserting that they were overpaid because of their supplemental income from private
practice).
249. See Big Pay for Little Work, supra note 149. The three concerns were that: (1) an unethical prosecutor
might not zealously pursue a criminal case in consideration for employment in a civil suit by a friend of the
criminal defendant; (2) even an ethical prosecutor might fail to vigorously prosecute a criminal case if he were
litigating a civil case for a friend of the criminal defendant; and (3) the jury might give more weight to arguments
of a civi] litigant represented by an Assistant District Attorney, who ostensibly represented the interests of the
public. See id.
250. See ETHINGTON, supra note 151, at 19 ("It is impossible to overestimate the role of the press as the central
institution of the public sphere."). While I generally accept Ethington's views about the primacy of newspapers in
the public sphere, the sensationalism of late-nineteenth-century journalism warrants mention.
251. CROUITHAMEL, supra note 189, at 24 (quoting GEORGE JUERGENS, JOSEPH PULITZER AND THE NEW YORK
WORLD (1966)), for definition of "sensationalism" of nineteenth-century press). See also supra text accompanying
notes 190-93.
252. Cf. CROUTHAMEL, supra note 189, at 159 (contending that, in mid-nineteenth century, Bennett's Herald
covered shocking crime stories to expose inegalitarian effects of criminal law and procedure).
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III. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE FATE OF FIRST-DEGREE
MURDER DEFENDANTS
A. Rationale and Methodology for the Case Study
Why use murder as a window for observing prosecutorial discretion? Lawrence
Friedman and Robert Percival have suggested that murder may be less worthy of
research than other crimes because capital defendants are subject to show trials and
afforded greater procedural protections than ordinary defendants enjoy.25 3 How-
ever, precisely because alleged murderers risk the ultimate penalty, their cases
provide rich information about the intersection of prosecutorial behavior and
public attitudes.
Prosecutorial discretion causes alarm in capital cases for the obvious reason that
the stakes are staggeringly high. James S. Liebman contends that the current death
penalty regime encourages trial-level actors to mete out death sentences, regard-
less of justice 254 and suggests that the Supreme Court attacks procedural protec-
tions for capital defendants on the rationale that "death is different in the amount of
delay it foists on the system. ' 255 Laxly supervised by the courts, prosecutors may
seek death sentences with impunity, counting on post-trial review to spare innocent
prisoners without penalizing the state's lawyer for misconduct.
25 6
Nineteenth-century commentators also believed that the death sanction made
murder cases especially worthy of scrutiny. For instance, respected Philadelphia
attorney David Paul Brown urged the private bar not to take "blood money," but
rather to leave the prosecution of great public wrongs, such as murders and riots, to
the government.25 7 Although Brown's statement indicates concern about fairness,
the nineteenth-century view that capital crimes required the intervention of the
state was not synonymous with modem liberal distaste for extremely adversarial
tactics where a death sentence may result.
The late-nineteenth-century press urged public prosecutors to adopt a hawkish
stance toward alleged murderers and decried strategies for avoiding trial.258 There
was no public defender's office, and appointed counsel with little experience in
criminal cases sometimes represented the accused. 59 A lawyer subsequently
253. FRIEDMAN & PERCIVAL, supra note 16, at 311-12.
254. See Liebman, supra note 26, at 2155 (standing for proposition that current capital punishment procedures
do not effectively serve substantive goal of sending only deserving criminals to death penalty).
255. Id. at 2046 (emphasis in original).
256. See id. at 2078-81, 2111, 2121, 2126.
257. STEINBERG, supra note 16, at 81.
258. See infra text accompanying notes 263-64.
259. For example, the court appointed young Stephen Baldwin to represent first-degree murder defendant John
Osmond in 1891. Baldwin was only twenty-seven years old, and what little trial experience he possessed was in
civil causes. In a motion for continuance, he expressed concern about representing a death-penalty defendant and
indicated that he sought a more experienced criminal lawyer to help him with the case. First, he tried to associate
Frederick House, who, at least ostensibly, fell ill. He then asked Charles Brooke, who claimed to have taken sick,
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indicted for practicing without admittance to the New York Bar appeared for at
least three capital defendants whose death sentences appellate courts still af-
firmed. 260 Despite this inequality of resources, the newspapers were filled not with
demands for a level playing field, but with exhortations to the District Attorney to
kick the ball harder for the People.26'
Public views of sentencing were similarly harsh. The movement to abolish
capital punishment enjoyed "widespread enthusiasm and evangelical fervor" in
New York in the 1830s and 1840s; however, the Civil War "hardened and blunted"
public attitudes toward severe sentences.262 By the last decades of the nineteenth
century, a prominent view held that capital defendants should be executed as
quickly as possible to ensure the maximum deterrent effect.26 3 Delays of a year or
as well. Osmond's case undoubtedly suffered from Baldwin's inexperience. See Motion for Continuance, People
v. Osmond, Folder 4180, Box 454, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1891).
260. See Heinzleman's [sic] Defense: He Took Cases Because They Came His Way and He Needed Clients,
SUN (N.Y.), July 1, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 11 (reporting indictment of
defense attorney John R. Heinzelman for misdemeanor of practicing law without being admitted to New York
Bar). Before his crime was discovered, Heinzelman represented James Slocum, Harris Smiler, Martin Loppy, and
Schihiok Jugigo, all of whom were executed for first-degree murder.
For Heinzelman's involvement in the Slocum case, see People v. Slocum, 26 N.E. 311, 311 (N.Y. 1891)
(recording Heinzelman as Slocum's lawyer); Indictment Coversheet, People v. Slocum, Folder 3570, Box 383,
DA Papers, supra note 85 (1890) (same); Hope for Murderers, TELEGRAM (N.Y.), Mar. 6, 1891, microformed on
DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 10 (reporting that Slocum brought habeas corpus petition alleging deficient
counsel). For the Smiler case, see People v. Smiler, 26 N.E. 312, 312 (N.Y. 1891) (recording that Heinzelman
represented Smiler on appeal); Respite for Two Murderers: Heinzelman, Who Defended Smiler and Slocum, Was
Never Admitted to the Bar, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 13, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll
10; Death Came Painlessly to the Four, N.Y. HERALD, July 7, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 11 (reporting that Ambrose Purdy applied for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Smiler, based on
violation of right to counsel); Delayed by a Quibble, N.Y. RECORDER, Mar. 12, 1891, microformed on DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 10 (stating that Purdy wrote to every county clerk in state of New York to
confirm that Heinzelman was not admitted to Bar). For the Loppy case, see Indictment Coversheet, People v.
Loppy, Folder 3766, Box 407, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1890) (recording Heinzelman as Loppy's lawyer); Three
Shocks Killed Martin D. Loppy, TELEGRAM (N.Y.), Dec. 7, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at
Roll 12 (same). For the Jugigo case, see He Bowed for the Axe: Singular Scene at the Opening of the Jap's Trial
for Murder, MORNING J. (N.Y), Dec. 5, 1889, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 8 (reporting
that Heinzelman represented Jugigo).
261. See infra notes 263-64, 272 and accompanying text.
262. David Brion Davis, The Movement to Abolish Capital Punishment in America, 1787-1861, 63 AM. HIST.
REV. 23,46 (1957).
263. The Star, which was often more sympathetic to defendants than other papers, asserted:
It is perhaps a hard thing to write, and may by the sensational humanitarians be deemed unfeeling,
that the laws [sic] vindication of human justice should be prompt and effective; that the
murderer-that is, the calm and cool and cautious murderer-is best out of the way of society; that
if example and not vengeance be the object of capital punishment, the more prompt it is the more
effective it will be.
Hovey to Die at Sunrise, N.Y. STAR, Oct. 19, 1893, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 1.
Celebrating the Supreme Court's decision that capital defendants must appeal directly to the Court of Appeals,
without first going to the Supreme Court, the Sunday Union and Catholic Times predicted:
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two were considered unsupportable, 264 a sentiment that seems odd today.265
Through intensive analysis of 405 first-degree or common-law murder indict-
ments between 1879 and 1893,266 this case study seeks not only to illuminate
public attitudes toward prosecutorial discretion, but also to provide data on how
the District Attorney's office actually disposed of capital cases. Lack of research
on prosecutorial discretion in late-nineteenth-century New York makes the 1880s
and 1890s an attractive choice. The few extant studies either stop during the
Hereafter there will be less roundabout devices at the disposal of condemned criminals to evade or
postpone punishment. The appeal now lies direct to the Court of Appeals, and the man who
commits a murder and receives sentence for it, will not have so many chances to cheat the gallows.
0 Murderers Must Really Hang, SUNDAY UNION & CATH. TIMEs (N.Y.), Aug. 19, 1888, microformed on DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 6.
264. For example, the Mail and Express complained:
[Tihe tardiness of [the prisoner's] execution greatly diminishes its effect upon the criminal class.
The average time in New York from the commission of a murder to its expiation on the gallows is
not less than a year, and it is not infrequently that more than two years intervene between the crime
and its penalty of death.
Delays of the Gallows, MAIL & EXPRESs (N.Y.), Oct. 19, 1883, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at
Roll 1. Lamenting the promulgation of code provisions in 1888 allowing a defendant to ask the Court of Appeals
for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the Evening Post opined:
It is nothing more or less than new machinery for taking the case of every condemned murderer to
the Court of Appeals. "Newly discovered evidence" is something which almost every man
condemned to be hung can find in greater or less quantities ... . Such a system as this has never
been tried, so far as we know, in any civilized state, and would work well for no one but murderers.
The Hovey Case, EvEN ING POST (N.Y.), July 26, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 1.
The Herald commented in a similar vein in 1889 that "it seems to us that the real defect of our system is not in the
penalty, but rather in the procrastinating methods of our courts. If the law is to have terrors for criminally disposed
men and women it must be executed swiftly and surely." Crime and Capital Punishment, N.Y. HERALD, Aug. 24,
1889, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 8; see also Law in Aid of Crime, WORLD (N.Y.), Aug.
24, 1889, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 8 (arguing that delays in punishment were
responsible for high rate of murder). The following year, the Herald decried defense counsel's ability to file a
habeas corpus petition and then appeal the denial of that petition to the United State Supreme Court: "[T]he law of
capital punishment in every State of the Union may be travestied and paralyzed at the will of any condemned
murderer or notoriety seeking attorney." What the Attorney for Any Murderer May Do, N.Y. HERALD, Dec. 3,
1890, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 10.
265. Modern defendants usually spend about eleven years on death row while their cases are vetted for errors.
Liebman, supra note 26, at 2056.
266. The records of the District Attorney's Office in the New York Municipal Archives contain 405 entries for
first-degree murder for the 1879-93 period. Each entry corresponds to the name of a defendant listed on an
indictment coversheet. The District Attorney's office noted the disposition of the case in ink or pencil on the
coversheet of each indictment, Such notations included the entry of guilty pleas, convictions, acquittals, insanity
determinations, dismissals, nolle prosequis, superseding indictments, and instances where the defendant was
"discharged on his own recognizance" due to insufficient evidence. However, some of the names merely bore the
designation "N/A," which might mean that no indictment was ever obtained. For the purposes of this Article, each
entry is treated as an indictment, but the ones labeled "NIA" and others for which the notation was ambiguous
appear under the category "Disposition Unclear" in Figure 1.
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aftermath of the Civil War 267 or fail to provide detailed information about the
culture of the District Attorney's office at the end of the nineteenth century.268
There are practical reasons for choosing this time frame, as well. The fourteen-year
period from which the data is drawn offers unusually bountiful sources-
indictment papers, newspaper clippings, appellate opinions, and other raw materi-
als for constructing a computer database to quantify research results. Because this
case study stems from such rich archival material, it shows what happened to more
than 400 murder defendants once their cases fell into the hands of the District
Attorney.
While newspapers help us identify late-nineteenth-century views of the public
prosecutor's role, they are less reliable in providing information about case
disposition. Accordingly, the bulk of quantitative material on the outcome of
murder cases is drawn from notations that the District Attorney's personnel made
on the coversheet of each indictment. That information has been supplemented by
press reports and appellate opinions, especially in cases where a first-degree
murder conviction was obtained. Very few prosecutorial misconduct claims were
advanced on appeal.269 Hence, the case study concerns itself with how the District
Attorney's office disposed of cases and what the public thought of such practices,
rather than with specific rules violations.
The picture of prosecutorial behavior that emerges suggests that the newspapers
published hyperbolic reports. Despite the press's outrage at the alleged failure to
prosecute defendants, slightly more than half of all first-degree murder cases
proceeded to a jury trial.2 70 The District Attorney's office did, however, make
discretionary decisions about whom to prosecute for first-degree murder, and such
decisions implicated cultural conflict in a county torn by ethnic and class rivalries.
Drunken, shiftless men accused of domestic murders-rather than "toughs"
aligned with machine politics and streetwise norms of masculine valor-made
uncontroversial candidates for the death penalty. Although the latter were some-
times executed, the former predominated among capital convictions despite
evidence that male-on-male homicides outnumbered the killing of women. 27'
Spurred by the press to account for its use of public funds, the District Attorney's
office selectively pursued capital punishment for defendants who violated preva-
lent norms of masculinity.
267. See generally KuTZ II, supra note 131; McConville & Mirsky, supra note 16, at 466; Monkkonen, supra
note 21, at 527-29,
268. See generally MONKKONEN, supra note 13; Moley, supra note 16.
269. Indeed the only real claim of prosecutorial misconduct-as opposed to trial errors, such as the admission
of prejudicial evidence-involved a closing argument. See People v. Rohl, 33 N.E. 933, 935 (N.Y. 1893)
(summarizing appellant's objection to District Attorney's statement that, because victim was war veteran, he
could not have insulted appellant's wife).
270. See infra Figure 1.
271. See infra Figure 5 and text accompanying notes 317-22.
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B. The Disposition of Murder Cases
1. Hyperbolic Views of Prosecutorial Leniency
The press complained vociferously about public prosecutors' failure to secure
convictions, even under the stewardship of De Lancey Nicoll, whose industry was
widely contrasted with Fellows' sloth. The District Attorney scrapbooks are replete
with exaggerated news reports about well-connected murderers eluding justice.
For instance, the Mail and Express summarized Nicoll's record by alleging that
"influential offenders against the law are in slight danger of suffering merited
punishment, while friendless persons must suffer the full extent., 272 There was
some truth to these allegations, but they overstated the prosecutors' culpability.
Fears that murder defendants with political connections would escape a jury trial
were often unfounded. At least three of the twenty-four first-degree murder
defendants from the sample used in this Article who were executed for their crimes
led the notorious Whyo gang, which was at the height of its power and influence in
the 1880s and early 1890S. 273 Michael McGloin, Daniel Driscoll, and Daniel
272. Mr. Nicoll's Methods, MAIL & EXPRESS (N.Y.), June 16, 1893, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 15. The Tribune faulted Nicoll for "repeated and numerous failures to convict in criminal cases of the
most serious nature." The Jury-box a Nursery of Crime, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 26, 1892, microformed on DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 12. Although the title of this newspaper article indicates that the Tribune
castigated the jury for acquitting culprits or convicting them of lesser offenses, that sentiment usually emanated
from the bench, not the press. See infra notes 308-09 and accompanying text. The Tribune laid the blame at the
door of the District Attorney's office, commenting that "District Attorney Nicoll must realize himself that his
office is sinking lower and lower every week in the opinion of this community" due to losses in serious felony
cases. Id.
273. For information on McGloin's case, see People v. McGloin, 91 N.Y. 241, 252-55 (N.Y. 1882) (affirming
defendant's conviction for first-degree murder of Louis Hanier during burglary attempt and describing salient
facts); Affidavit of Police Inspector Byrnes, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. McGloin, Folder 681, Box 60, DA
Papers, supra note 85 (1882) (recording that defendant led gang of thieves); The McGloin Gang, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
12, 1883, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 1 (calling McGloin "the leading spirit" of gang of
thieves that continued to commit robberies after McGloin's arrest); see also HERBERT ASBURY, THE GANGS OF
NEW YORK: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE UNDERWORLD 225, 227 (1928) (identifying McGloin as early Whyo
and describing Whyos' power in New York in last two decades of the nineteenth century).
For more on Daniel Driscoll, see generally People v. Driscoll, 14 N.E. 305 (N.Y. 1887) (affirming Driscoll's
conviction for transferred-intent killing of his girlfriend, who got in line of fire during attempted shooting of
Driscoll's rival); People v. Driscoll, Folder 2209, Box 225, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1886) (including evidence
in first-degree murder case, recorder's charge to jury, and complaints in prior criminal actions involving Driscoll);
A Bullet Ended Her Spree, N.Y. STAR, June 27, 1886, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 3
(describing Driscoll as member of "notorious Whyo gang that terrorized the Five Points" and noting that about
fifty members of gang crowded into police court to show their support for him); Trying to Kill McCarthy, SUN
(N.Y.), June 27, 1886, DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 3 (identifying Driscoll as "a Sixth ward desperado
and the leader of the notorious Whyo gang"); see also ASBURY, supra, at 228 (calling Driscoll and Lyons greatest
Whyo leaders).
For the details of the Lyons case, see generally People v. Lyons, 17 N.E. 391 (N.Y. 1888) (affirming Lyons'
conviction for premeditated murder of rival); Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Lyons, Folder 2614, Box 272, DA
Papers, supra note 85 (1887) (preserving frequently dubious affidavits of disreputable persons with whom Lyons
associated); Lyons Gains Four Days, N.Y. STAR, Aug. 12, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at
Roll 6 (quoting governor's comment, that Lyons was of "notoriously bad character"); see also ASBURY, supra, at
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Lyons each committed offenses before the killings that led them to the gallows.274
However, particularly in Driscoll's case, the press believed that "politicians of
power [were] behind him and frequently and openly [got] him out of [scrapes],"
and "ascribed his success in having indictments against him pigeon-holed" to his
political relationships.2 75 Referring to Driscoll's role in intimidating voters, one
newspaper commented that "[h]e has never worked in his life, except on election
day, and he did not intend to [once he was arrested for killing Bridget Garrity]. His
influence would set him all right again without any exertion on his part. 2 7 6
Nevertheless, the District Attorney's office vigorously prosecuted all three Whyos
on capital charges. The trials and executions occurred despite threats of retaliation
and the crowds of "toughs" who gathered to support their heroes.277
These three Whyo cases are not the only examples of successful prosecutions
228-29 (stating that Lyons was "probably the most ferocious gangster of his period" and one of first gang leaders
to be pimp for prostitutes).
274. See McGloin, 91 N.Y. at 245 (noting that police inspector saw defendant steal barrel of whiskey night
before the murder); see also generally Driscoll, Folder 2209, Box 225, DA Papers, supra note 273 (containing
dismissed or withdrawn complaints in earlier cases involving Driscoll); A Bullet Ended Her Spree, supra note 273
(describing numerous violent fights and shootings in which Driscoll was allegedly involved); Defending Himself
with a Pistol, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 21, 1883, microformedon DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 1 (reporting
incident in which Driscoll and Green wounded each other with pistols after dispute at lodging house); Died Like a
True Tough, N.Y. STAR, Aug. 22, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 6 (indicating that
Lyons had been in prison for stealing); Lyons Gains Four Days, supra note 273 (reporting that Lyons previously
had served terms in State reformatory and state prison); Trying to Kill McCarthy, supra note 273 (mentioning
Driscoll's alleged attempt to shoot police detective).
275. Leader of the Whyo Gang, WORLD (N.Y.), date unclear, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at
Roll 3. Another paper reported that Driscoll's "ability to spirit away complainants enabled him to get out of other
shooting and stabbing scrapes, and he even shot at Detective Woods, then of the Central Office, in Chatham
Square five or six years ago without coming to great grief." Trying to Kill McCarthy, supra note 273.
276. Driscoll is a Murderer, WORLD (N.Y.), date unclear, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at
Roll 3.
277. For the McGloin case, see McGloin, 91 N.Y. at 255 (affirming McGloin's first-degree murder conviction);
Funerals of Hanged Men, EVENING TELEGRAM (N.Y.), Mar. 18, 1883, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 1 (reporting that thousands of people turned out for McGloin's funeral procession); Twice Fired: The
M'Gloin Gang Attempt to Burn the House Where Hanier Was Killed, TRUTH (N.Y.), May 14, 1883, microformed
on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 1 (reporting threats to set arson fires if McGloin were executed).
For the Driscoll case, see Driscoll, 14 N.E. at 312 (affirming Driscoll's conviction); A Bullet Ended Her Spree,
supra note 273 (reporting that fifty Whyos, including one who had escaped from courtroom by jumping through
window, were evicted from police court proceedings in Driscoll case); Lived and Died a Whyo, WORLD (N.Y.),
Jan. 24, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 5 ("There were many threats made against
politicians who 'had allowed Danny to be sacrificed,' and the Whyos were liberal in promises to get even."); The
Whyo Hanged, N.Y. STAR, Jan. 24, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 5 (describing
"'ugly" confrontation between police and Whyos who came to undertaker's office to view Driscoll's body after his
execution).
For the Lyons case, see Lyons, 17 N.E. at 396 (affirming Lyons' conviction); Life for Life, MORNING J. (N.Y.),
Aug. 22, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 6 (describing "rough" crowd of about 1000
people that gathered in front of undertaker's establishment after Lyons was hanged). But see Lyons Met Death
Coolly, WORLD (N.Y.), Aug. 22, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 6 (reporting that
only about fifty "hard-faced men and tawdry women," including "members of the Chain Gang and the Whyos"
gathered after Lyons' execution).
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that raised the fear of retaliation. For example, when Peter Smith was executed for
shooting a man who bested Smith's friend in a saloon fight, "prison officials feared
that a rattling at the gate [of the Tombs prison] was Smith's rescuing party," but it
was only the undertaker's wagon.278
Politically connected defendants in less celebrated cases also felt the sting of the
criminal law. In 1891, the Tribune predicted that Burton Webster, a racing-man
with Tammany influence, would never be tried for the murder of Charles E.
Goodwin, Jr.279 Yet De Lancey Nicoll brought the case to trial and secured a
first-degree manslaughter determination. Webster's conviction for a lesser-
included offense likely stemmed from the jury's leniency rather than from
prosecutorial light-handedness. 280 Moreover, Webster did not fail to pay a price, as
the judge sentenced him to nineteen years in state prison.28'
In tandem with its coverage of the Webster case, the Tribune reported that
Michael Gallivan's friends in Tammany Hall would spare him from trial for
murdering a man during an argument over a canary.28 2 Unlike Webster, Gallivan
was acquitted.283 Yet even this acquittal shows that the District Attorney's office
did not always dismiss, plea-bargain, or pigeon-hole charges against Tammany
men. Rather, when killers got away with murder, such leniency was often
attributable to juries and, to a lesser extent, the governor's power to commute
death sentences.
Eric Monkkonen notes that nineteenth-century New York juries appeared
reluctant to convict defendants in felony cases; he estimates that ten to twenty-five
percent of all felonies reaching trial during the Civil War period resulted in
acquittal. 284 This statistic is similar to an acquittal rate of about twenty-two percent
in first-degree murder trials from 1879 to 1893.285 Gubernatorial clemency also
spared death-penalty prisoners, although the number of commutations in the 1880s
was much lower than that between 1830 and 1860.286 According to my count, the
governor commuted slightly less than one-fifth of the thirty-four capital sentences
278. Smith Meets His Doom, SUN (N.Y.), May 6, 1887, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at
Roll 4.
279. See Tammany Protection, supra note 246.
280. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Webster, Folder 4151, Box 451, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1892)
(recording Webster's conviction on Oct. 3, 1892).
281. See id.
282. See Tammany Protection, supra note 246.
283. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Gallivan, Folder 3939, Box 427, DAPapers, supra note 85 (1891)
(recording Gallivan's acquittal on December 3, 1891).
284. See Monkkonen, supra note 21, at 527.
285. See Figure 1. For Monkkonen's calculation of acquittals in the Civil War period, see id. For the acquittal
rate for first-degree murder defendants brought to trial between 1879 and 1893, see infra Figure 1. The latter rate
might be higher if insanity acquittals were counted.
286. See Monkkonen, supra note 21, at 528 (stating that twenty-four out of forty-three capital sentences were
commuted in the 1830-60 period).
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to life imprisonment between 1879 and 1893.287
Although several of these cases presented serious mitigating circumstances, 288
the commutation of other death sentences revealed the influence of various
pressure groups, especially those based on ethnicity. For example, in the case of
James Minnaugh, who killed a man for insulting and physically assaulting him, the
murder occurred after a cooling period and "without new provocation., 289 The
presiding judge stated that he never knew of such a clear case of "deliberate,
premeditated, and intentional killing. 290 Yet the governor commuted Minnaugh's
sentence to life imprisonment, at least in part because "[s]everal prominent Irish
Catholics interested themselves in the prisoner, who had become very devout and
repentant during his confinement in the Tombs."'29 1 Even cases presenting compel-
ling mitigating factors, such as Chiara Cignarale's murder of her abusive husband,
bore the stamp of pressure from immigrant communities.292
Gang members and other defendants with political or ethnic connections thus
287. See Figure 2.
288. The case of Italian immigrant Chiara Cignarale, who killed her abusive husband, constitutes one example.
See People v. Cignarale, 17 N.E. 135, 138-39 (N.Y. 1888) (noting that Cignarale killed her husband after thirteen
years of physical abuse and threats by him); Cignarale's Life Spared, SuN (N.Y.), July 28, 1888, microformed on
DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 6 (quoting governor's memorandum, which explained that commutation of
defendant's sentence was based on circumstances of her marriage, her ill health, weakness of evidence against her,
and fact that, as new immigrant, she might not understand American laws). The District Attorney himself
recommended clemency for Cignarale. See Col. Fellows for Mrs. Cignarale: Clemency Recommended in
Consideration of her Accepted Plea, N.Y. STAR, July 27, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at
Roll 6 (reporting District Attorney's recommendation of clemency); Pleading for Cignarale, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 6 (describing then-Assistant District Attorney
Nicoll's role in seeking clemency). For a discussion of the unusual procedural history of People v. Cignarale, see
infra note 319.
The case of Adolph Reich, whose wife allegedly committed adultery and then attacked him when he chastised
her for it, also presented compelling mitigating factors. See People v. Reich, 18 N.E. 104, 105 (N.Y. 1888) (noting
that victim allegedly provoked defendant by engaging in adultery and physically assaulting him); A Big Petition in
Behalf of Reich, N.Y. DAILY TIn., Nov. 21, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 7
(reporting that campaign urging governor to commute Reich's death sentence was based on his advanced age and
his wife's alleged infidelity); Reich's Neck is Saved, N.Y. HERALD, Jan. 5, 1889, microformed on DA Scrapbook,
supra note 85, at Roll 7 (reporting commutation of Reich's sentence due to his age and existence of provocation);
Reich Not to Hang, MORNING J. (N.Y.), Jan. 5, 1889, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 7
(same); Trying Hard to Save Reich 's Neck: Two Petitions to be Presented to Governor Hill for Executive
Clemency, N.Y. DAILY TRIa., Nov. 23, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 7 (contending
that Reich, who spoke no English, had been coerced by his incompetent lawyer into arguing self-defense, instead
of provocation).
Finally, the governor seemed convinced that the evidence in Charles Giblin's case was too weak to sustain a
death sentence. See Giblin Escapes the Death, WORLD (N.Y), Nov. 22, 1889, microformed on DA Scrapbook,
supra note 85, at Roll 8 (reporting that governor found too much doubt in robbery-murder case of Charles Giblin
to inflict death penalty).
289. People v. Minnaugh, 29 N.E. 750, 751 (N.Y. 1892).
290. Minnaugh's Sentence Commuted: Gov. Flower Changes His Punishment from the Death Chair to
Imprisonment, SUN (N.Y.), Mar. 15, 1892, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 12.
291. Id.
292. See, e.g., No Gallows for Chiara, MORNING J. (N.Y.), July 23, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook,
supra note 85, at Roll 6 (indicating that Cignarale case became somewhat of an Italian cause celebre); Trying
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exerted considerable pressure on various arms of the state-the District Attorney's
office, the court, and the governor. The material on guilty pleas presented later in
this Article also suggests some correlation between Irishness and the ability to
bargain, arising from close ties between the police, the District Attorney, and the
Irish immigrant community.2 9 3 Yet we should be wary of concluding that these
influential murderers always escaped punishment, or that when they did, public
prosecutors were to blame.
2. Bringing Murderers to Trial
The statistics from the sample period do not indicate a marked failure on the part
of the District Attorney's office to bring first-degree murder defendants to trial. In
contrast to the high percentage of total cases that New York prosecutors processed
through bargaining (more than seventy-five percent by 1879),294 murder cases
were slightly more likely to go to trial than to be resolved through other means.
Furthermore, among defendants indicted for first-degree murder between 1879 and
1893, convictions at trial outstripped plea-bargains by 152 to 103 (see Figure 1).
Only about one-quarter of all first-degree murder indictments resulted in plea-
bargains in New York County, compared with thirty-five percent to more than fifty
percent of Massachusetts murder cases after 1870.295 These relatively low num-
bers raise questions, given the substantial bargaining power that statutory grading
gave the New York County District Attorney's office. In both New York and
Massachusetts, the grading of homicide provided prosecutors with leverage
comparable to that created by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 96
Because types of homicide were graded and first-degree murder bore a manda-
tory death sentence, 297 a prosecutor could either explicitly or implicitly promise a
defendant a penalty discount if he pled guilty to a lesser offense. Defendants
Hard to Save Reich's Neck, supra note 288 (reporting that, among supporters of clemency for Reich, committee of
prominent Jews signed petition).
293. See infra text accompanying notes 430, 434. See also MILLER, supra note 70, at 140 (discussing
Republican fears that police were dominated by Democrats who relied on Irish votes).
294. See Moley, supra note 16, at 108.
295. According to Fisher, the number of plea-bargains in murder cases mushroomed after the statutory division
of murder into degrees in Massachusetts in 1858. Charge-bargaining in capital cases emerged around 1841 in that
state and accounted for nearly half of all murder cases by the 1870s; thirty-five percent in the 1880s; and as many
as sixty-one percent in the 1890s. See Fisher, supra note 16, at 885-93, 1031.
296. See Fisher, supra note 16, at 868, 1072-74.
297. The legislature first divided murder into two degrees in 1862. First-degree murder encompassed
premeditated killings and homicides perpetrated "by any act imminently dangerous to others, and evincing a
depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design .... " 1862 N.Y. Laws, ch.
197. This grading of murder continued to be in force in the 1880s, with the addition of killings "perpetrated by a
person engaged in the commission of any felony" to the definition of first-degree murder. N.Y. REV. STAT., part 4,
ch. 1, tit. i, § 5 (Throop 1882); see N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. §§ 183, 183a (Parker 1905) (1881 N.Y. Laws, ch. 676,
as amended by 1882-1905 N.Y. Laws). First-degree murder was punishable by death in 1862, see 1862 N.Y.
Laws, ch. 197, and this penalty remained mandatory throughout the 1880s. See N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 186
(Parker 1905) (1881 N.Y. Laws, ch. 676, as amended by 1882-1905 N.Y. Laws); N.Y. REv. STAT., part 4, tit. 1, § 1
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Figure 1: Disposition of First-degree Murder Indictments, 1879-93
First-degree murder charges 405
Other convictions (not first-degree murder) 118
Plea-bargains without trial 99
Acquitted 47
First-degree murder convictions 34 (+1 reversal)
Indictment dismissed 27
Discharged on own recognizance 24
Incompetent to stand trial or acquitted by
reason of insanity 24
Disposition unclear 13
Indictment superseded 5
Plea-bargains after hung jury 3
Indictment dismissed after hung jury 3
Died before trial 3
Nolle prosequi (before abolished) 2
Indictment dismissed and defendant
convicted of another crime 1
Plea-bargains after reversal of first-degree
murder conviction 1
Convicted of other charges after hung jury 1
risking trial automatically received a death sentence if convicted of first-degree
murder or life imprisonment for second-degree murder,298 and few of those
convicted of the capital crime could hope realistically for gubernatorial clemency.
Whereas the governor commuted just seven New York County death sentences to
life imprisonment during the relevant period (see Figure 2), eighty-two of the 103
defendants who pled guilty entered pleas to some degree of manslaughter (see
Figure 3), for which sentences usually ranged from one year to about twenty-five
years in state prison.299
(Throop 1882). In addition to first- and second-degree murder, the statutes provided for four degrees of
manslaughter. See N.Y. REV. STAT., part 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, §§ 6-8, 10-19 (Throop 1882).
298. In 1873, the legislature provided a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment for second-degree murder-a
provision that stayed in force throughout the 1880s. 1873 N.Y. Laws, ch. 664; N.Y. REV. STAT., part 4, ch. 1, tit. I
(Throop 1882); see N.Y. CODE CRI. PROC. § 187 (Parker 1905) (1881 N.Y. Laws, ch. 676, as amended by
1882-1905 N.Y. Laws).
299. See N.Y. REV. STAT., part 4, ch. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, § 20 (Throop 1882). For the defendants in my sample who
pled to first-degree manslaughter, twenty years in state prison was a common penalty. A second-degree
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Figure 2: Outcomes for Defendants Convicted of First-degree Murder, 1879-93
Total first-degree murder convictions 35
Executed 24
Governor commuted sentence to life imprisonment 7
Died in prison or during escape 3
Conviction reversed 1
Figure 3: Plea-bargains in First-degree Murder Cases, 1879-93
Total plea-bargains 103
First-degree manslaughter pleas 41
Second-degree manslaughter pleas 21
Third-degree manslaughter pleas 18
Second-degree murder pleas 10
Assault pleas 6
Fourth-degree manslaughter pleas 5
Nature of plea unclear 2
Relatively few defendants pled guilty to second-degree murder because it
carried a mandatory life sentence. 30 0 The most common plea, first-degree man-
slaughter, had a possible sentencing range of seven years to life, with sentences of
about twenty years constituting the typical outcome. 30 1 Thus, defendants stood to
gain from bargaining, and case pressure should have given prosecutors an
incentive to accept guilty pleas.
Why, then, do the District Attorney's papers reveal comparatively low numbers
for plea-bargaining in first-degree murder cases? The least likely answer is that the
prosecutors had other means of disposing of indictments besides jury trials and
plea-bargaining. Although District Attorneys lacked the unilateral power to initiate
manslaughter plea resulted in a greater discount because sentences for this crime ranged from four to seven years
in prison. Defendants pleading guilty to third-degree manslaughter could expect a penalty of approximately two
to four years in prison, whereas those pleading guilty to fourth-degree manslaughter faced one to two years'
incarceration in state prison, one year in county jail, or a fine not exceeding $1000. See N.Y. REV. STAT., part 4, ch.
1, tit. 2, art. 1, §§ 20 & 21 (Throop 1882).
300. Supra note 298 (noting second-degree murder carries a mandatory life sentence). See infra Figure 3
(illustrating that out of 405 first-degree murder indictments, 103 of which resulted in plea-bargains, there were
only ten guilty pleas to second-degree murder).
301. See infra Figure 3 (illustrating that for first-degree murder indictments, majority of pleas were for
first-degree manslaughter).
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dismissals, they could still employ this strategy with leave of court.30 2 After 1881,
the court could also dismiss an indictment sua sponte.3 °3 Thirty murder indict-
ments were simply dismissed (including two nolle prosequis in 1880), and
twenty-four defendants were discharged on their own recognizance due to insuffi-
cient evidence. 3 ' About fourteen percent of the 405 indictments were resolved
through such means. Another three defendants' cases were dismissed after a trial
jury failed to reach a verdict. 30 5 As Figure 1 demonstrates, there were twice as
many plea-bargains as dismissals, nolle prosequis, and discharges (combined)
between 1879 and 1893. Thus, it seems unlikely that the District Attorney's office
preferred these tactics to plea-bargaining, especially because dismissals required
the judge's agreement.
The leniency of nineteenth-century juries offers a slightly better explanation for
the relatively low number of plea-bargains in murder cases compared to other
crimes.30 6 Despite public pressure for vigorous prosecution, individual jurors
faced with the daunting decision to send a defendant to his death often balked at
returning a capital verdict. First-degree murder defendants may have realized that
302. A statutory provision in 1829 stripped District Attorneys of the authority to nol pros a case without leave
of court, although the Attorney General's power in this area remained unscathed. FISHER, supra note 131
(forthcoming).
303. 1881 N.Y. Laws, ch. 7, § 672 (vol. 2); see N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 672 (Parker 1905) (1881 NY Laws,
ch. 442, as amended by 1882-1905 NY LAws); see also People v. Beckwith, 2 N.Y. Cr. Rep. 29, 32 (1884) (stating
that § 672, enacted in 1881, abolished nolle prosequi, which, prior to 1881, was a proceeding that only prosecutor
could initiate with motion). The District Attorney indictments for New York County during the sample period
indicate that there were only two nolle prosequis for first-degree murder cases before the abolition of the nolle
prosequi power in 1881. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Davis, Folder 202, Box 16, DA Papers, supra note
85 (1880) (recording nolle prosequi); Indictment Coversheet, People v. Green, Folder 321, Box 28, DA Papers,
supra note 85 (1880) (recording nolle prosequi). It is worth noting, however, that Green was subsequently
convicted of second-degree manslaughter on another indictment. Indictment Coversheet, People v. Green, Folder
400, Box 33, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1881).
304. The District Attorney's office noted dismissals on the coversheet of the indictment, but it is not clear that
these notations regularly distinguished dismissals initiated by the prosecutor from sua sponte dismissals by the
court. Of the thirty dismissals, fifteen were clearly recommended by the District Attorney. The other fifteen may or
may not have resulted from the court's unilateral decision. Dismissals and discharges were not synonymous.
When a prosecutor discharged a defendant on his own recognizance, he might still hope to acquire stronger proof
of guilt. See, e.g., Indictment Coversheet, People v. Fuimicello, Folder 2985, Box 314, DA Papers, supra note 85
(1888) (noting on coversheet that District Attorney did not recommend dismissal, but that he had to discharge
Fuimicello until more evidence was amassed).
305. Indictment Coversheet, People v. Bevans, Folder 2022, Box 202, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1886);
Indictment Coversheet, People v. Lehman, Folder 2217, Box 226, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1886); Indictment
Coversheet, People v. Bush, Folder 1453, Box 141, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1884).
306. See supra text accompanying note 294-95 (noting that in contrast with other cases, murder cases were
more likely to go to trial). The Commissioners of the New York Penal Code expressed the view, in 1864, that the
division of murder into two degrees would encourage lenient verdicts:
The practical result of introducing such a distinction [between first- and second-degree murder]
will be that jurors influenced by unwillingness to unite in a capital conviction, will always find the
prisoner guilty of the second degree only. The Commissioners are of the opinion that the simplicity
of the definition in the Revised Statutes should be restored.
DRAFT OF A PENAL CODE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK, ch. 2, § 241 (Commissioners of the Code eds., 1864).
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even if they were not acquitted, they were likely to receive a manslaughter
determination if they went to trial. Slightly more first-degree murder defendants
were convicted of first-degree manslaughter than entered guilty pleas to this lesser
offense (compare Figures 3 and 4). Juries sometimes recommended mercy in











sentencing, in addition to convicting the defendant of a crime that carried a lighter
penalty. 3°7
There is reason to suspect that defendants knew about jury leniency because
judges railed about acquittals and convictions for lesser offenses. For instance,
Judge Martine complained that the acquittal of David Ramsey on an attempted
murder charge encouraged similar shootings.30 8 Moreover, although the press
tended to blame prosecutors for losing cases due to partisanship and sloth,
newspapers also publicized and condemned jury leniency. The New York Daily
Tribune, for example, complained: "There is a growing indisposition on the part of
juries to convict of murder in the first degree. Jurors seem to think their function is
307. See, e.g., Indictment Coversheet, People v. Albert, Folder 4413, Box 427, DA Papers, supra note 85
(1892) (noting that first-degree manslaughter conviction included recommendation of mercy); Indictment
Coversheet, People v. Schilling, Folder 2900, Box 305, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1888) (noting first-degree
manslaughter conviction included recommendation of mercy); Indictment Coversheet, People v. Reich, Folder
2529, Box 263, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1887) (noting first-degree murder conviction included recommenda-
tion of mercy). Such recommendations were especially significant in manslaughter verdicts, considering the
broad sentencing ranges for this type of homicide.
308. See The Jury-box a Nursery of Crime, supra note 272 (noting that Judge Martine blamed jurors who
refused to convict defendants despite evidence of increasing crime rates). In contrast, another judge praised the
jury for convicting African-American defendant John Lewis of the first-degree murder of Lewis' lover: "The
newspapers are filled with accounts of shootings of this fatal kind, and it is only by verdicts of the character you
have found in this case that their number can be diminished." A Salutary Verdict: Judge Cowing Hopes the
Conviction of Lewis Will Lessen the Number of Murders, source unclear, Dec. 17, 1888, microformed on DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 7.
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that of counsel for the defence [sic]-to get the prisoner off if possible. '30 9 The
possibility of jury leniency, however, sometimes exerted pressure against going to
trial. Analysis of guilty pleas in a subsequent section of this Article 3 10 suggests that
the likelihood of conviction for a lesser offense tended to bring the parties to the
bargaining table.
The most plausible explanation for the low percentage of guilty pleas is that
public prosecutors felt reluctant to enter plea agreements in first-degree murder
cases in light of the criticism they faced. It was often more politically palatable to
achieve a conviction at trial. Press reports offer anecdotal evidence that the District
Attorney's office refused to accept guilty pleas from several defendants in cases
where premeditation was relatively easy to prove. For example, John Fellows
rejected a second-degree murder plea by Patrick Packenham, 3 11 a drunken wife-
abuser who fatally slashed his wife with a razor after serving a prison term for
stabbing her.31 2 Betting on a capital conviction rather than bargaining the case
away for a life sentence probably seemed like the best option, especially since
Packenham's own son, an eyewitness to the brutal murder, agreed to take the
stand.31 3
Going to trial also may have accorded with the District Attorney's sense of
justice in such cases. 3 14 If the mandatory life sentence for second-degree murder
made a defendant unwilling to plead to an offense greater than manslaughter, a
bargain under-punished his crime. The Osmond case in 1891 presented exactly this
dilemma.3 5 Counsel for double-murderer John Osmond attempted to get District
Attorney Nicoll to accept a guilty plea to first-degree manslaughter. Nicoll refused
and instead took the case to trial on the first-degree murder indictment, securing a
capital conviction. 316 It is unclear whether he acted out of principle or merely
309. Convictions Too Rare, N.Y. DAILY TRI., Mar. 7, 1892, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at
Roll 12. Other aspects of my research indicate that jury leniency sometimes exerted pressure against going to trial.
My analysis of plea-bargains, discussed infra Part III.C.2, suggests that prosecutors accepted plea-bargains when
they suspected that a jury would not convict the defendant of first-degree murder.
310. See discussion infra Part III.C.2 (analyzing plea-bargains in murder cases).
311. See Couldn't Save his Mother: Sixteen-year-old Robert Packingham [sic] Tells How His Father Slew Her,
WORLD (N.Y.), Nov. 3, 1888, microforned on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 7.
312. People v. Packenham, 21 N.E. 1035, 1035 (N.Y 1889) (recounting facts ofcase); Murderedby a Drunken
Husband, N.Y. DAILY TRI., Apr. 3, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, at Roll 6 (same); Indictment, People v.
Packenham, Folder 2897, Box 304, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1888) (charging defendant with using razor to
commit first-degree murder of Margaret Packenham).
313. See Couldn't Save His Mother, supra note 311 (noting prosecution refused Packenham's plea to murder in
second degree after Packenham's agreed to testify against him).
314. Fisher offers a similar explanation for the comparative rarity of charge bargains in murder cases, as
compared to liquor cases, in Massachusetts. See Fisher, supra note 16, at 889.
315. See Motion for Continuance, People v. Osmond, supra note 259, at 4 (noting that defendant unsuccess-
fully sought to enter a guilty plea to first-degree manslaughter); see also Letter from Stephen Baldwin to DA
Delancey Nicoll, Mar. 21, 1892, People v. Osmond, Folder 4180, Box 454, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1891)
(indicating that defense counsel sought acceptance of guilty plea).
316. Indictment Coversheet, People v. Osmond, Folder 4180, Box 454, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1891)
(recording disposition of case).
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worried that accepting a manslaughter plea would constitute political error, but it is
likely that the two motivations combined to increase his zeal.
C. Manly Violence and Unmanly Violence
1. First-degree Murder Convictions
One of the most mysterious aspects of the first-degree murder cases in the 1879
to 1893 time-period is the relatively large number of men executed for killing
female lovers, wives, or other female family members. In his sociology of murder
based on New York sources, Monkkonen shows that nineteenth-century killings
usually represented the assertion of dominance by one man over another.31 7
Although wife-killing accounted for only fourteen percent of nineteenth-century
homicides committed by men in New York,3" 8 seventeen of the thirty-four males
convicted of first-degree murder from 1879 to 1893 killed female intimates (see
Figure 5).
The sole woman convicted of first-degree murder shot her abusive husband in a
public street; her sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.31 9 The governor
denied clemency for all but two of the seventeen men who committed the
premeditated killing of female intimates (see Figure 5).320 Another of these men,
John Carpenter, committed suicide in prison (see Figures 5 and 6).321
Thus, the killing of opposite-sex intimates accounted for more than half of the
first-degree murder convictions on indictments returned between 1879 and 1893
and resulted in fourteen out of twenty-four state-sponsored executions. The
exclusively male gender of the executed prisoners and the fact that more than half
of them were domestic killers is surely remarkable considering that the last two
317. See MONKKONEN, supra note 13, at 73.
318. See id. at 75.
319. See People v. Cignarale, 17 N.E. 135, 136-40 (N.Y. 1888) (describing circumstances of murder); Chiara
Cignarale 's Life Spared, THE PRESS (N.Y.), July 23, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 6
(reporting governor's grant of clemency). Chiara Cignarale's case is unusual, and arguably should count as a
plea-bargain, because the defendant initially pled guilty to second-degree murder. The District Attorney accepted
the plea, but Cignarale then withdrew it. On appeal of her first-degree murder conviction, she claimed that the
withdrawn plea to second-degree murder precluded subsequent conviction for the capital crime. The New York
Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed her conviction. See Cignarale, 17 N.E. at 142. However, the case's
anomalous history became grounds for the District Attorney to recommend clemency. See Colonel Fellows For
Ms. Cignarale: Clemency Recommended in Consideration of Her Accepted Plea, supra note 288 (reporting
District Attorney's letter recommending clemency).
320. The prosecutor's office did not record the commutation on the coversheet of the indictment, but the two
commutations can be tracked through newspaper sources. See Fanning's Sentence Commuted, N.Y. TItMES, May
14, 1892, microformedon DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 13 (reporting that governor commuted Fanning's
sentence to life imprisonment after citizens of Utica brought petition on his behalf); Reich's Neck is Saved, supra
note 288 (reporting governor's clemency decision in Reich case).
321. See Carpenter Kills Himself, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 20, 1886, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 3 (reporting that prisoner committed suicide with razor after appellate court affirmed his conviction).
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Figure 5: First-degree Murder Convictions by Type of Victim, 1879-93
Number of
Type of Victim Defendants Outcome
Total number of first-degree 35 24 executions
murder convictions 7 sentences commuted
2 deaths during escape
1 suicide
1 reversal




Female domestic partner 4
Female lover 2
Other female family member 1
Total male intimates: 1 1 sentence commuted
Husband I
Male rival 9 6 executions
1 sentence commuted
1 death during escape
1 reversal
Robbery Victim 5 3 executions
1 sentence commuted
1 death during escape
Other 3 1 execution
2 sentences commuted
decades of the nineteenth century had low murder rates for female victims.322
The relatively large number of domestic murderers who were tried, convicted,
and executed in late-nineteenth-century New York County sharply contrasts with
the modem tendency to seek the death penalty for murders committed in the course
of a felony like robbery, but not for intimate homicides.323 At the end of the 1900s,
322. See MONKKONEN, supra note 13, at 64 (describing 1820s, 1830s, part of 1840s, and 1883-1903 as troughs
in wave pattern of woman-killing).
323. See SAMUEL R, GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH AND DISCRIMINATION: RACIAL DISPARITIES IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING 45 (1989) (stating that over eighty percent of death penalties in Florida and Georgia and seventy-five
percent of death penalties in Illinois occurred in murder cases involving another felony); THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSmS 30 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1997) (noting that murder committed during
robbery is type of crime most likely to result in death sentence); William C. Bailey & Ruth D. Peterson, Murder
Capital Punishment, and Deterrence: A Review of the Literature, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT
CONTROVERSIES, supra, at 149 ("Felony murders and suspected felony murders constitute a quarter to a third of
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Figure 6: Outcomes for Defendants Convicted of the First-degree Murder of
Opposite-Sex Intimates, 1879-93
Sex of
Defendant Defendant Type of Victim Outcome
Leighton Male Female lover Executed
Majone Male (Estranged) wife & her Executed
mother
Hovey Male Sister-in-law, who shielded Executed
D's abused wife
Carpenter Male (Estranged) wife Suicide in prison
Chacon Male Female lover Executed
Cignarale Female (Estranged) husband Commuted to life
imprisonment
Reich Male Wife Commuted to life
imprisonment
Carolin Male Female domestic partner Executed
Packenham Male Wife Executed
Nolan Male (Former) female domestic Executed
partner
Lewis Male (Former) female domestic Executed
partner
Smiler Male (Estranged) wife Executed
Loppy Male Wife Executed
Slocum Male Wife Executed
Fanning Male (Former) female domestic Commuted to life
partner imprisonment
Osmond Male (Estranged) wife & her Executed
lover
Harris Male Wife Executed
Buchanan Male Wife Executed
homicides annually, and they also account for the large majority of death sentences and executions."); Elizabeth
Rapaport, Capital Murder and the Domestic Discount: A Study of Capital Murder in the Post-Furman Era, 49
SMU L. REv. 1507, 1510 (1986) (indicating that about seventy-five percent of death row prisoners committed
murder in course of another serious felony); cf Deon Brock et al., Arbitrariness in the Imposition of Death
Sentences in Texas: An Analysis of Four Counties by Offense Seriousness, Race of Victim, and Race of Offense, 28
AM. J. CRIM. L. 43, 65 (2000) ("As expected, given the statutory definition of capital murder, the presence of a
contemporaneous felony was the best predictor of a death sentence, with sexual assaults being over-represented
among death sentences by a ratio of twenty-five to one.").
1368 [Vol. 39:1309
"PUBLIC" PROSECUTORS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
less than twelve percent of men sentenced to death were domestic murderers.324 In
contrast, predatory killings of strangers constitute the type of crime most likely to
result in capital punishment. 325 Elizabeth Rapaport argues that domestic homicides
result in more lenient treatment for defendants than predatory crimes because
modem American society assigns less moral outrage to wife-killing.
326
What explains the execution of domestic killers in New York County in the
1880s and 1890s? Historians of societal attitudes toward intimate violence note
that the 1880s represented one of two peaks in reformist activity. Puritan laws
against beating wives and children, enacted in the American colonies between
1640 and 1680, comprised the first peak.32 7 Linda Gordon and Elizabeth Pleck
identify a second peak in the 1880s, when societies against cruelty to children
reluctantly adopted the cause of battered women. 328 A comprehensive historical
treatment of the prosecution of domestic killers lies beyond the scope of this
Article.32 9 At the very least, however, my data corroborates the existence of a late-
nineteenth-century spike in concern about intimate violence. It may also indicate that
historians underestimate nineteenth-century public abhorrence for lethal violence against
women, perhaps because such abhorrence did not stem from feminist impulses.
Moreover, comparing intimate violence cases that resulted in capital punish-
ment with the more controversial prosecution of "toughs" who killed other men in
late-nineteenth-century New York County tells us a great deal about the operation
of prosecutorial discretion. Although Monkkonen argues that murders in New
York often went unpunished,33 ° the allegedly indolent District Attorney John
Fellows once sent four men who killed their wives or lovers to the gallows on a
single day.33 t In fact, Fellows secured the capital convictions of seven domestic
murderers, compared to Nicoll's four, and was responsible for the largest number
of death sentences of any District Attorney during the 1879 to 1893 time frame.332
The tension between Fellows' reputation for leniency and the capital convic-
324. Rapaport, supra note 323, at 1510,
325. Id.
326. See id. at 1534.
327. ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY-THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 4 (1987).
328. See id. at 4-11, 95-97; LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES; THE POLmCS AND HISTORY OF
FAMILY VIOLENCE: BOSTON 1880-1960, at 20-21, 252 (1988).
329. I am researching the legal history of intimate murder for another law review article.
330. See Monkkonen, supra note 21, at 521, 527-29.
331. Patrick Packenham, James Nolan, John Lewis, and Ferdinand Carolin were hanged on August 23, 1889.
See Four Murderers Hanged, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 24, 1889, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at
Roll 8; Last of Earth, MORNING J. (N.Y.), Aug. 23, 1889, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 8.
332. For evidence from legal records that the seven domestic killers were convicted of first-degree murder, see
Indictment Coversheet, People v. Loppy, supra note 260 (recording defendant's first-degree murder conviction);
Indictment Coversheet, People v. Slocum, supra note 260 (same); Indictment Coversheet, People v. Smiler,
Folder 3661, Box 393, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1890) (same); Indictment Coversheet, People v. Carolin, Folder
2878, Box 302, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1888) (same); Indictment Coversheet, People v. Lewis, Folder 3084,
Box 325, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1888) (same); Indictment Coversheet, People v. Nolan, Folder 3158, Box
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tions for first-degree intimate killings that were achieved on his watch merits
closer attention. Fellows prosecuted one tough who killed a police officer during a
robbery,333 but more than half of the capital convictions that he obtained were for
murders of female intimates334 and involved defendants who often violated gender
norms with their unemployment, alcoholism, and cowardice.
334, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1888) (same); Indictment Coversheet, People v. Packenham, supra note 312
(same). Discussion of these defendants' domestic killings appears in notes 358-66, 368-69and accompanying text.
In addition to the seven domestic murderers, Fellows achieved first-degree murder verdicts in the cases of
Schihiok Jugigo, Joseph Wood, Henry Carlton, and Charles Giblin. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Jugigo,
Folder 3494, Box 373, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1889) (recording defendant's first-degree murder conviction);
Indictment Coversheet, People v. Wood, Folder, 3478, Box 373, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1889) (same);
Indictment Coversheet, People v. Carlton, Folder 3105, Box 327, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1888) (same);
Indictment Coversheet, People v. Giblin, Folder 2851, Box 299, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1888) (same). For
more information on Giblin's case, see supra note 288 and accompanying text.
The other two defendants in male-on-male murder cases were non-whites: Wood-a black man-was
convicted of first-degree murder for killing a male rival. See Affidavit of Officer John Pepper, Police Court
Records, People v. Wood, Folder 2897, Box 304, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1889) (describing incident);
Testimony of Joseph Gillespie, Patrick Timberlake, and Joseph Bland, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Wood,
supra (describing circumstances of murder); Death Came Painlessly to the Four, supra note 260 (reporting nature
of murder); Five Murderers Waiting: Joseph Wood Will Be "Next" in the Electric Chair, WORLD (N.Y.), Mar. 13,
1890, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 9 (same); Joseph Wood, a Mulatto, Accused of
Murder Says That He Shot in Self-Defence, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 12, 1890, microformed on DA Scrapbook,
supra note 85, at Roll 9 (detailing murder and highlighting Wood's race); Murderer Wood Confronts His Death,
N.Y. HERALD, Nov. 28, 1890, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 10 (describing events leading
up to Wood's execution).
The second non-white killer of a male was the Japanese sailor, Schihiok Jugigo. Jugigo fatally stabbed a rival
who took his place on a fishing vessel. See Examination of Schihiok Jugigo, Police Court Records, People v.
Jugigo, Folder 3494, Box 373, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1889) (recording defendant's statement that he was born
in Japan and worked as a sailor); Examination of Schihiok Jugigo, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Jugigo, supra
(same). For testimony about the murder of Jugigo's rival, see Testimony of Charles Eymoto, Police Court
Records, People v. Jugigo, supra (describing murder and preceding events); Testimony of Officer J. Courtlander,
Charles Eymoto, Sagara Coursabe, Nora Gara, Hano Noko (a.k.a. Kogano), Coroner's Inquisition, People v.
Jugigo, supra (describing fatal stabbing); Unsigned Statement of Josephine Eymoto, People v. Jugigo, supra
(providing similar account). This Article discusses possible racial bias in the prosecution and conviction of
alleged murderers, infra text accompanying notes 389-97, 434-36; however, my data is too sparse to reach a
definite conclusion on this issue.
Nicoll was responsible for the convictions of domestic killers Robert Buchanan, Henry Fanning, Carlyle
Harris, and John Osmond. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Buchanan, Folder 4415, Box 483, DA Papers,
supra note 85 (1892) (recording defendant's conviction for first-degree murder); Indictment Coversheet, People v.
Fanning, Folder 4026, Box 437, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1891) (same); Indictment Coversheet, People v.
Harris, Folder 4030, Box 437, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1891) (same); Indictment Coversheet, People v.
Osmond, supra note 316 (same). For details of the killings committed by Buchanan and Harris, see infra notes
357, 378-86 and accompanying text. For details of the Fanning murder, see infra note 371 and accompanying text.
The Osmond case is further described at notes 364 and 369, infra.
333. See Carlton's Death on the Scaffold, N.Y. HERALD, Dec. 6, 1889, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra
note 85, at Roll 8 (indicating defendant Henry Carlton was white); Carlton Weakens in Court, WoRLD (N.Y), Dec.
14, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 7 (describing murder that Carlton committed);
The Carlton Murder Trial, PREss (N.Y.), Dec. 14, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 7
(offering nearly identical report).
334. Seven out of ten first-degree murder convictions during Fellows' term as District Attorney were male
killers of female intimates. See supra note 332.
1370
"PUBLIC" PROSECUTORS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Despite the fact that the state executed several male gang leaders, the dangerous
behavior that they exemplified was not universally condemned. Many in New
York's streets revered the bravado and violence of the Five Points335 "tough," who
was often of Irish heritage. For instance, in 1883, the funeral for the Whyo leader
McGloin turned into such a spectacle of mourners, "flowers and strings of
carriages" 336 that legislation was introduced "to suppress ovations to the memory
of departed murderers., 337 However, "[t]he chances of escape involved in the
law's delay [still gave an] opportunity for an encouraging hero worship. 338
The killing of male rivals, the second largest category of capital convictions (see
Figure 5), tapped into the norms of a masculine street culture in which men
defended their honor with bloodshed and refused to withstand an insult without
physical retaliation. 339 Daniel Driscoll mistakenly killed his paramour with a
bullet intended for a male rival. Peter Smith shot a night watchman for beating his
co-defendant, Patrick Sweeney, in a bar-room brawl. Thomas Pallister fatally
stabbed a policeman who accidentally ran into him and knocked him down, 340 and
McGloin, who killed a robbery victim, rather than a rival, purportedly exclaimed at
the time of the murder, "Now I'm a tough!",
34 1
Besides a death sentence, these men also shared "an ethos of toughness, defense
335. Since the early nineteenth century, this neighborhood in Lower Manhattan had housed poor laborers,
immigrants, and prostitutes in "small, cramped, uncomfortable apartments, [that] appeared 'ready to tumble
together in a vast rubbish heap."' GILFOYLE, supra note 180, at 38. Located on a landfill where the former Collect
Pond once stood, "Five Points was considered by a wide range of observers to be the most notorious slum in the
Western Hemisphere." Id. at 36, 38.
336. Murder Repeated, EVENING TELEGRAM (N.Y.), Mar. 14, 1883, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 1.
337. Funerals of Hanged Men, supra note 277. The same newspaper worried that "the extraordinary scenes
that followed the execution [of McGloin] probably created a greater admiration for deeds of bloodshed among the
vicious class, whose sole hope of distinction is in the line of crime." Murder Repeated, supra note 336.
338. Hovey to Die at Sunrise, supra note 263 (making veiled reference to McGloin case).
339. See Elliot J. Gorn, "Good-Bye Boys, I Die a True American ": Homicide, Nativism, and Working-Class
Culture in Antebellum New York City, 74 J. AM. HIST. 388, 408 (1987) (describing male, working-class culture in
lower Manhattan during antebellum era); see also MONKKONEN, supra note 13, at 70-73, 112-13 (discussing
same-sex murders in nineteenth-century New York City).
340. For details of the Driscoll case, see Testimony of Officer John Mulholland, Officer Peter J. Monahan,
John McCarthy, Daniel Driscoll, Police Court Records, People v. Driscoll, Folder 2209, Box 225, DA Papers,
supra note 85 (1886). See also Affidavit of Margaret Sullivan, People v. Driscoll, supra (describing victim's dying
declaration that Driscoll killed her); and discussion of the case, supra notes 274-77 and accompanying text.
Regarding the Smith case, see generally Trial Transcript, People v. Sweeney, Folder 1795, Box 177, DA Papers,
supra note 85 (1889) (presenting evidence of Smith's role in murder, of which Sweeney was acquitted); Coroner's
Inquisition, People v. Smith, Folder 1795, Box 177, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1885) (same).
Information about the Pallister case can be found in People v. Pallister, 33 N.E. 741, 742 (N.Y. 1893); see also
Two Murderers Escape from Sing Sing, TELEGRAM (N.Y.), Apr. 21, 1893, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra
note 85, at Roll 14 (providing details of murder and Pallister's subsequent escape from prison).
341. Ought McGloin to Hang?, TRuTti (N.Y.), Mar. 2, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at
Roll 1.
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of territory, and masculine honor., 342 When the state executed Daniel Lyons for
murdering a former Whyo who hit him with a cane, the Star commented:
"Unquestionably the man displayed great physical courage; and men admire
courage. Among the young men who really knew Dan Lyons and cared anything
about his fate the prevailing thought to-day is that Dan was a hero. 34 3
Elliot Gorn argues that this all-male subculture transcended ethnicity but existed
in diametrical opposition to bourgeois values.344 However, he overlooks ways in
which the middle and upper classes reinforced male-on-male violence by showing
reluctant esteem for it. "Respectable" New Yorkers condemned desperados "[u]n-
educated to self denial or self restraint ... " and susceptible to "passion for
revenge, 345 but news reports describing cases of male-on-male violence neverthe-
less offered an odd mixture of praise and denunciation. While murder was
condemned, physical displays of courage were not. For example, the normally
anti-defendant Herald contrasted McGloin's stoic death with that of whimpering,
drug-addicted Edward Hovey, who was executed in October 1883 for murdering
his sister-in-law:
Unlike the man who preceded him on the same gibbet, Hovey was not a
"tough" in the local acceptation of the term. His misdeeds were of a weak,
characterless kind, and, unlike those of McGloin, entailed little personal risk.
The element of danger, which seems to add a charm to "toughness," did not
excite his weak spirit, and an accidental drunk gave society the opportunity of
finally ridding itself of a character in many respects more dangerous than a
more vigorous criminal.34 6
New York County wanted its condemned men to die bravely, chins high and
voices steady. The worst insult that could be made about an execution was the
remark that the prisoner did not die like a man.3 4 7 In this sense, "creature[s] of
342. Gorn, supra note 339, at 408 (making this observation about murder of saloonkeeper William Poole in
1855).
343. A Hero of the "Toughs," N.Y. STAR, Aug. 22, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll
6 (lamenting corrosive effect of such hero-worship on deterrent impact of capital punishment: "It leads the young
"tough" to feel that crime is a matter of little moment, and that a plucky death on the gallows is as sure a road to
glory as the death of the soldier in battle.").
344. See Gorn, supra note 339, at 403, 408-09.
345. The Lesson of an Execution, PRESS (N.Y.), Aug. 21, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85,
at Roll 6 (arguing death penalty deters crime, especially among adolescent males).
346. Society Well Rid of Him: Edward Hovey Quietly and Expeditiously Put Out of the Way, N.Y. HERALD, Oct.
20, 1883, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 1. This nineteenth-century view of the contrast
between the wife-killer Hovey and the "tough" McGloin supports Monkkonen's argument that spousal murder is
different from murders over honor, assets, and political power. See MONKKONEN, supra note 13, at 132.
347. During the quadruple execution in 1889, John Lewis purportedly snarled at Ferdinand Carolin, with
whom he shared the gallows, "What's the matter with you? Can't you die like a man?" See Four Murderers
Hanged, supra note 332. Three years before, Miguel Chacon "indignantly denied the assertion that he had been
moved to tears [by the news that he would hang]." The statements of a prison guard, corroborating Chacon,
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dogged courage, 34 like the gang leaders achieved a measure of glory distinguish-
ing them from domestic killers. Not only did toughs enjoy influence in the Five
Points slum, they also inspired the grudging admiration of New Yorkers who
otherwise subscribed to norms of hard work and domestic tranquility.
The contrast between McGloin and Hovey hints at a preliminary answer to the
question of why intimate murder constituted the single largest category of crime
punished by death. Domestic killers went to the gallows or to the electric chair
because they were marginal figures that a broad spectrum of New Yorkers reviled.
Their prosecution for capital murder was thus uncontroversial-a safe discretion-
ary decision.
Nineteenth-century American society tolerated a certain level of violence in the
home.349 Historians disagree over precisely what level was deemed unacceptable.
According to Pamela Haag:
The ubiquitous judgment that a man "ill uses" his wife alluded to property
prerogative in and of itself, insofar as it identifies the husband's transgression
not as a morally offensive belief in his right to "use" his wife at all, but simply
in his mis-appropriation of an assumed fight of ownership, articulated implic-
itly as a right to use a wife within limits.
350
In contrast, Reva Siegel asserts that, "[b]y the 1870s, there was no judge or treatise
writer in the United States who recognized a husband's prerogative to chastise his
wife., 35 1 Nevertheless, in Siegel's view, the shift from patriarchal authority based
on corporal punishment to the ideal of the affective marriage masked a serious
failure to prevent or punish wife-beating. She argues:
[F]or a century after courts repudiated the right of chastisement, the American
legal system continued to treat wife beating differently from other cases of
assault and battery. While the authorities denied that a husband had the fight to
salvaged his masculinity. See Chacon Still Unmoved, N.Y. DAILY TRn., July 8, 1886, microformed on DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 3.
348. Lyons Met Death Coolly, supra note 277. Whereas this article in the World described Lyons as "a pest,"
other newspapers adopted the more common tone of admiration for the prisoner's final show of grit. See Died Like
a True Tough, supra note 274 (quoting sheriff as saying, "I never knew anything like his nerve... Yesterday he
coolly examined the gallows and even offered a few suggestions as to the proper weight to be used"); The Death
of Lyons, N.Y. DAILY 'NIB., Aug. 22, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 6 ("[H]is
demeanor was so remarkable as almost to be unique. There was neither stolidity nor bravado in his case, but
simple serenity. He died asking to be forgiven .... "). Even the World seemed to approve of Lyons' possibly
apocryphal last words to the hangman: "Now, Joe, will you lower me down easy, and put me in the coffin nice?
There will be a good many friends at my funeral." Lyons Met Death Coolly, supra note 277.
349. See Pamela Haag, The "Ill-Use of a Wife": Patterns of Working Class Violence in Domestic and Public
New York City, 1860-1880, J. Soc. HIST. 447,463 (1992); See also PLECK, supra note 327, at 84 (stating that New
York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children remained reluctant to help battered women because its
agents were "convinced that drunken, slothful, or adulterous wives provoked beatings").
350. Haag, supra note 349, at 464.
351. Reva B. Siegel, "The Rule of Love ": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2118
(1996).
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beat his wife, they intervened only intermittently in cases of marital violence:
Men who assaulted their wives were often granted formal and informal
immunities from prosecution, in order to protect the privacy of the family and
to promote "domestic harmony."
3 52
Late-nineteenth-century New Yorkers generally accepted that murdering one's
wife (or even one's lover) transgressed acceptable limits. 353 Furthermore, even in
non-fatal wife-beating cases, the "respectable" classes from which the District
Attorney and his assistants hailed354 were willing to police the behavior of
immigrants and unskilled workers, whom they considered dangerous.355
Thus, the fact that at least twelve of the seventeen men convicted of first-degree
domestic murders during 1879 to 1893 were working-class or unemployed comes
as no surprise. 356 The only clearly middle- or upper-class men convicted of killing
352. Id. at 2118.
353. See infra text accompanying note 387. See also Haag, supra note 349, at 462 (noting that a disproportion-
ate number of domestic violence cases that appeared in New York courts were murder cases).
354. A newspaper article describing Nicoll's appointment of his assistants indicated that most of these men
came from affluent backgrounds. Nine out of thirteen assistants and deputy assistants attended prestigious private
law schools like Harvard, Yale, and Columbia. The remaining four obtained their degrees at public schools or
Catholic universities. At least one was an immigrant: Wauhope Lynn came to New York from Ireland at age ten
and attended the Cooper Union Night School before getting his law degree. However, others were much more
white-shoe. For example, Nicoll and Gunning S. Bedford traced their "descent from Knickerbocker and
Revolutionary times." Nicoll Names His Aids [sic], supra note 139.
355. See GORDON, supra note 328, at 20 (arguing that late-nineteenth-century child protection movement
associated family violence with hard-drinking immigrants); PLECK, supra note 327, at 89 (stating that increased
governmental intervention in family became possible after Civil War due to "public fear of the violent and
dangerous classes"); id. at 109 (associating whipping-post campaign against wife-beating with desire to control
lower classes); Siegel, supra note 351, at 2134 ("While the courts pointed to the prevalence of domestic violence
among the 'coarser' classes as a reason for restricting poor women's access to divorce, during the Reconstruction
Era this same belief was offered as a reason for intensifying the criminal prosecution of poor men who beat their
wives."); see also Haag, supra note 349, at 449 (noting that laborers and semi-skilled workers disproportionately
appeared as defendants in domestic violence cases in New York courts because they could not buy their way out of
prosecution).
356. For defendants who identified themselves as working-class when questioned by the authorities, see
Examination of Harris Smiler, Police Court Records, People v. Smiler, Folder 3661, Box 393, DA Papers, supra
note 85 (1890) (newspaper folder and mailer); Examination of Miguel Chacon, Police Court Records, People v.
Chacon, Folder 1454, Box 141, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1884) ( "tobacconist"): Testimony of Pasquale
Majone, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Majone, Folder 679, Box 60, DA Papers (1882) (railroad laborer);
Examination of Augustus Leighton, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Leighton, Folder 185, Box 15, DA Papers,
supra note 85 (1880) (waiter). Many of the domestic killers lacked steady work. For information about the cases
of unemployed defendants Edward Hovey, Patrick Packenham, Ferdinand Carolin, James Nolan, John Osmond,
and Henry Fanning see infra notes 359-65 and accompanying text,
There is some question about the occupation of three defendants, but these men nevertheless seem to have
come from the working class. John Lewis' occupation is variously reported as miner and aqueduct laborer. See
Examination of John Lewis, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Lewis, Folder 3084, Box 325, DA Papers, supra note
85 (1888) (miner); Shot Down by Her Lover, WORLD (N.Y.), July 18, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra
note 85, at Roll 6 (laborer on Croton Aqueduct). James Slocum's statement to the Coroner's Inquisition about his
occupation is barely legible, but it does not indicate, as numerous press articles do, that he was a semi-employed
baseball player. Compare Examination of James Slocum, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Slocum, Folder 3570,
Box 383, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1890) (giving occupation as "truck driver") with Killed His Wife, N.Y. STAR,
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female intimates were poisoners, and there is little evidence that they engaged in
wife-beating prior to the murders. 7
More than half of the men convicted of deliberately killing female intimates
shared two traits: they drank heavily and relied on the meager earnings of women.
All of the men executed in the quadruple hanging during Fellows' term as District
Attorney fit this profile. John Lewis spiraled into a pattern of escalating violence
toward his former lover and then killed her "because she would not support him
any longer."35 In a drunken rage, Patrick Packenham slit the throat of hard-
working Margaret, from whom he continually demanded cash.3 59 James Nolan
shot his former domestic partner "because she would no longer share with him the
wages of her prostitution., 360 The fourth prisoner executed with Nolan, Packen-
ham, and Lewis was an unemployed German carpenter named Ferdinand Carolin.
Jan. 3, 1890, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 9 (reporting that Slocum was a baseball
player) and Slocum 's Ghastly Crime: He Murdered His Wife and Then Went to Hear the Trinity Chimes, PRESS
(New York), Jan. 3, 1890, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 9 (reporting that defendant
"played ball for a New England team in the summer and hung around the downtown saloons in the Fourth Ward in
winter"). Martin Loppy described himself as an engineer and machinist. See Examination of Martin D. Loppy,
Police Court Records, People v. Loppy, Folder 3766, Box 407, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1890). However, press
reports indicate that he was a "tug-boat man." See Loppy Convicted of Murder, N.Y. DAILY TRiB., Nov. 25, 1890,
microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 10.
357. The Harris case was anomalous, both for the relatively high status of the defendant and the method that he
employed to kill his young wife: poison. Carlyle Harris was a medical student from a reputable, but not wealthy,
family. See Helen Potts 'Death, PRESS (N.Y.), Feb. 3, 1891, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll
10 (noting that Harris' grandfather was a professor of medicine at Bellevue Hospital); Will Be a Famous Case,
SUNDAY ADVERTISER (N.Y.), Jan. 24, 1892, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 12 ("[Flor the
first time.., in a quarter of a century a man was on trial for his life charged with the awful crime of murder by
poison. The accused was a young man of good family, finely educated, and with a good social position and
excellent prospects."). The Buchanan case proved to be a copycat crime, in which another doctor poisoned his
inconvenient wife to get her out of the way. See People v. Buchanan, 39 N.E. 846, 848, 850 (N.Y. 1895)
(recounting facts of 1893 murder).
The occupation of two domestic killers remains hazy. Adolph Reich's occupation could not be identified.
Carpenter's is also unclear. The appellate opinion in People v. Carpenter, 6 N.E. 584, 584 (N.Y. 1886), indicates
that Carpenter may have been a cobbler because he attacked his wife with a shoemaker's knife. See id.
358. A Harvest Day for the Tombs Gallows Coming, SUN (N.Y.), June 29, 1889, microformed on DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 8; see also Slain By Her Dusky Lover, N.Y. DAILY TRm., July 18, 1888,
microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 6 (reporting that Lewis drank, beat his lover, and wounded
her in the ankle before killing her).
359. Such Brutes Die Hard, N.Y. STAR, Apr. 3, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 6
(reporting that defendant killed his wife because of "domineering look in [her] eyes"). Packenhan formerly
worked as a painter. See Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Packenham, Folder 2897, Box 304, DA Papers, supra
note 85 (1888); His Dying Day Named, WORLD (N.Y.), Nov. 13, 1888, microformedon DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 7. However, when Packenham killed his wife, he had just completed a prison term on Blackwell's
Island for stabbing her with a pair of shears. While incarcerated, he threatened to murder her upon release. See
Murdered by a Drunken Husband, supra note 312. Margaret worked to support the family, and the children also
contributed their meager wages. See id.
360. A Harvest Day for the Tombs Gallows Coming, supra note 358; see also Chasing a Murderer, N.Y.
HERALD, Nov. 20, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 7 (reporting that Nolan was
unemployed). But cf. Examination of James Nolan, Police Court Records and Coroner's Inquisition, People v.
Nolan, Folder 3158, Box 334, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1888) (indicating that Nolan identified himself as
express wagon driver).
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At least one newspaper took a somewhat sympathetic view of him, noting that he
"saved what little money he earned at odd jobs.",36' However, he may have killed
his partner, Bridget, because he suspected her of infidelity with her employer.362
363Hence, it is clear that she was a breadwinner.
In total, at least nine of the seventeen men who killed female intimates
demanded money from them, often for drink.36 4 Three other domestic killers
361. Two Wife Murders, N.Y. STAR, Mar. 16, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 5
(discussing Ferdinand Carolin's case); see also With a Shingling Hatchet: Bridget Carolin Killed by Her Husband
in Stanton-Street, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 5 (noting that
defendant had not worked for several months, aside from shoveling snow for his landlady, and that several pawn
tickets were found in apartment); Examination of Ferdinand Carolin, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Carolin,
Folder 2878, Box 302, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1888) (recording that defendant was carpenter who immigrated
from Germany).
362. See Two Wife Murders, supra note 361 (indicating motive for crime as Bridget's alleged infidelity with
man who hired her to do some cleaning).
363. See Three Drunken Murderers: Their Victims Were Women, Two of Whom Were Wives, WORLD (N.Y.),
Mar. 16, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 5 (stating that Bridget supported her partner,
Ferdinand Carolin),
364. The following are the details of the other five domestic murders that clearly fall under this category:
Edward Hovey-whose cowardice on the scaffold was contrasted with Lyons' bravery-sponged off his
sister-in-law, took meals at her home, and then killed her for sheltering his battered wife. He appears to have been
an unemployed painter. See Examination of Edward Hovey, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Hovey, Folder 75 1,
Box 67, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1882) (recording dying woman's complaint that defendant "never supported
me" and her brother's testimony that Hovey "was in the habit of getting drunk and then his wife would come to us
and Fannie, my wife [i.e. the victim], would hide her"); Hovey to be Hanged, TRtUH (N.Y.), June 5, 1883,
microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll I (stating that defendant was a "man of bad habits" who
"contributed nothing toward the support of his wife"); Society Well Rid of Him: Edward Hovey Quietly and
Expeditiously Put Out of the Way, supra note 346 ("Hovey seems to have been without a redeeming virtue. He not
only neglected his old mother, but he also brutally maltreated his wife, and finally killed the one woman in the
world whose patience his criminal conduct had not been able to tire.").
John Carpenter drank hard and "beat [his wife, Mary Ambrose] when she could not supply him with money to
continue his [drunken] orgies." Found Worthy of Death, SUN (N.Y.), July 24, 1884, microformed on DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 1I. He fatally stabbed Mary on Third Avenue after being released from Sing
Sing for the attempted murder of a woman whom he mistook for his wife. See Carpenter Kills Himself, supra note
321.
After he lost his job as a tugboat fireman, Martin Loppy "was dissipated, as well as idle, and had no means of
obtaining the money necessary to enable him to indulge his vices, except from his wife," who was a finisher of
pantaloons. People v. Loppy, 28 N.E. 600, 601 (N.Y. 1891); see also Loppy is Awaiting His Death, PRESs (N.Y.),
Dec. 7, 189 1, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 12 (reporting that defendant's wife supported
him by sewing).
Former baseball player James Slocum's wife supported him when he was unable to get odd jobs. See Killed His
Wife, supra note 356; see also Slocum's Ghastly Crime, supra note 356 (reporting that defendant worked as
baseball player in summer, but was habitual frequenter of saloons during off-season).
John Osmond "absented himself from ... home ... in carousal, debauchery and excessive drinking" and
subjected his wife to horrific physical abuse before finally shooting her and her alleged lover. Divorce Papers of
Mary and John Osmond, People v. Osmond, Folder 4180, Box 454, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1891); see also
Affidavit of Catherine O'Brien, People v. Osmond, Folder 4180, Box 454, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1891)
(stating that, after he married Mary, defendant started "drinking beer with loafers and idlers"); Osmond was
Jealous: He Had Threatened His Wife Before He Killed Her and Birchell, N.Y. HERALD, Apr. 13, 1892,
microformedon DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 12 (reporting that defendant had been kept away from work
by illness).
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besides those executed in the quadruple hanging of 1889 lacked reputable
employment.365 Another-the bigamist, Harris Smiler-had a good job, but he did
not spend his wages on any of his wives.3 66
A final characteristic of the capital domestic murders was the estranged
relationship between the defendants and their victims. At least seven of the
seventeen cases constituted revenge for the woman's attempt to leave the relation-
ship. Pasquale Majone killed his mother-in-law, as well as his wife, because he
believed the older woman was trying to break up his marriage. 367 Smiler shot his
spouse when she fled to another woman's home. 368 The victims in the Nolan,
Lewis, and Osmond cases were murdered when they sought refuge from abusive
relationships by starting romances with other men.36 9 Miguel Chacon shot his
lover after she returned to her husband. 370 Finally, Henry Fanning killed Emily
365. Augustus Leighton had been evicted from the house where his victim, Mary Deane, lived because he
failed to pay rent and because his residence there "was against the wishes of [Mary's] mother." See Testimony of
Maggie Howard, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Leighton, Folder 185, Box 15, DA Papers, supra note 85
(1880). I have counted the Leighton case as a domestic murder because there are indications that Leighton and
Mary Deane were lovers. The testimony at the Coroner's Inquisition about whether they slept together does not
resolve the question. See id. ("I cannot tell whether Mrs. Deane and Latham [i.e. Leighton] (the prisoner) ever
slept together, but I believe she kept company with him.").
Pasquale Majone fatally shot both his estranged wife and her mother. His wife had accused him of being unable
to support her because he faced imprisonment on an assault charge. See Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Majone,
supra note 356. Sources on the Majone case list his employment as railroad laborer. See id.
Finally, the appellate opinion in People v. Fanning states that "defendant was out of work, and had no means to
support [his mistress], and they were behind in their rent, and had been notified to 'pay or leave."' People v.
Fanning, 30 N.E. 569, 569 (N.Y. 1892).
366. See Smiler Had Three Wives: His Defense For Killing One of Them is Insanity, MORNING J. (N.Y.), June 7,
1890, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 9; Smiler Was a Bluebeard: He Had Three Wives and
Decided to Kill Them Off, MORNING J. (N.Y.), June 6, 1890, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll
9; Took His Wife's Life, N.Y. STAR, Apr. 4, 1890, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 9; see also
generally Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Smiler, Folder 3661, Box 393, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1890)
(recording testimony indicating that victim feared Smiler because he beat her).
367. See Testimony of Pasquale Majone, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Majone, supra note 356 (recording
defendant's statement that his wife sought divorce with her mother's encouragement).
368. See Testimony of Ella Wilson, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Smiler, supra note 356 (indicating that
Margaret Smiler was killed at home of Ella Wilson, with whom she was living).
369. See People v. Osmond, 33 N.E. 739, 740 (N.Y. 1893) (indicating that Mary Osmond was having an affair
with her boarder, John Burchell, whom Osmond also killed); Divorce Papers of Mary and John Osmond, People v.
Osmond, supra note 364 (showing that Osmond's victim sought a divorce); Chasing a Murderer, supra note 360
(reporting that Nolan's victim had broken off their relationship due to constant physical abuse and that she had
new lover); Shot Down by Her Lover, supra note 356 (indicating that Lewis' victim had recently begun
co-habiting with another man).
370. See People v. Chacon, 6 N.E. 303, 304 (N.Y. 1886) (stating that evidence showed that Chacon planned to
kill deceased woman if and when her husband returned from long absence); Chacon Must Hang: Governor Hill
Refuses to Interfere-The News Not Told to Chacon Last Night, SuN (N.Y.), July 6, 1886, microformed on DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 3 (reporting that governor refused to commute death sentence, even though
Chacon arguably killed his lover by mistake during attempt to murder her husband); Chacon Will Hang: The
Governor Notified that No Good Reason Exists for Clemency, N.Y. STAR, July 2, 1886, microformed on DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 3 (same).
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Taylor when she separated from him.37" '
The severity of punishment for domestic murders thus had one parallel to the
modem situation: men who killed women who tried to leave them predominated
on the gallows. In the present day, a man is less likely to be punished severely for
slaying a woman who lives with him than for committing a separation murder.372
The decreased likelihood that a male defendant will get a domestic discount for
killing a female who attempts to leave stems, in part, from the doctrinal emphasis
on the cooling-off period. It is more difficult for a man who stalks an estranged
partner to obtain "heat of passion" mitigation.37 3
Thus, drunkenness, financial dependence on women, and separation emerge as
the salient aspects of domestic homicides for which the District Attorney's office
obtained capital convictions. These factors merit attention because they help
explain why the domestic killers appeared more deserving of capital punishment
than other defendants. In nineteenth-century New York, violence against women
may have attracted less opprobrium than a man's failure to support his family
financially. Haag contends that women who survived brutality in the home
frequently charged non-support, rather than assault, because the legal regime took
the former failing more seriously.374 There are other explanations for women's
preference for raising economic grievances-not the least of which is the financial
hardship a wife would have endured if her husband were imprisoned for assaulting
her.375 Yet when a man depended upon his wife's earnings, he strayed far from
accepted norms of masculinity,376 especially if his indolence were combined with
371. See People v. Fanning, 30 N.E. 569, 569 (N.Y 1892).
372. See Rapaport, supra note 323, at 1517 (noting that almost half of male domestic killers on death row
during 1979-89 "killed in retaliation for a woman's leaving a sexual relationship"); see also, Martha R. Mahoney,
Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 6 (1991) (coining
phrase "separation assault" to describe great danger that woman faces when attempting to leave violent male
partner).
373. See Rapaport, supra note 323, at 1518 (stating that separation murders differ from other domestic killings
in that they are planned). Yet Rapaport notes that, for some appellate courts, "however cold-blooded or
premeditated the execution of a defecting spouse may be, such crimes are also passionate, and by definition,
time-honored and pervasive, passion mitigates." Id. at 1519. In modem New York, the extreme emotional
disturbance doctrine makes homicides committed after stalking more likely to qualify for mitigation. See People
v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (N.Y. 1980) (suggesting doctrine may apply when significant mental trauma
has affected defendant's mind for substantial period of time).
374. See Haag, supra note 349 at 467.
375. Steinberg notes that "[b]ecause of their economic dependency, most [Philadelphia women who pursed
criminal assault convictions] wanted only to scare their husbands, not to put them in prison." STEINBERG, supra
note 16, at 69.
376. Press reports on the killing of female intimates in the 1880s and 1890s almost universally characterized
the male perpetrators in terms that emasculated them. See Another Murderer Sentenced, N.Y. HERALD, Nov. 28,
1890, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 10 (describing Loppy as a "small, repulsive-looking
man"); Death Came Painlessly for the Four, supra note 259 (opining that Smiler was "not a very manly man");
Gloating Over His Crime, N.Y. STAR, Nov. 21, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 7
(stating that Nolan was a "worthless and disease-ridden fellow"); Thinks Osmond was Crazy, N.Y RECORDER,
Apr. 14, 1892, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 12 (reporting that Osmond was "a weak
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a penchant for drink.377 A wife-murderer's failure to fulfill his role as the economic
provider for his household thus played an aggravating role in the public's
perception of him. Without the greater glory of combat with another male, the
defendant's drunken sloth became, in the "respectable" worldview, an additional
abhorrent circumstance in his killing of a presumptively weaker individual.
Some New Yorkers condemned all wife-killers, but anecdotal evidence suggests
that robust men inspired popularity, despite their ill deeds. Young medical student
Carlyle Harris, who appeared to be headed for a successful professional career,
became one of the few popular murderers of women when he poisoned his secret
wife, Helen Potts. Curious crowds stampeded to the trial.3 7 8 One newspaper
reported that "[w]ell-dressed women who had never spoken to Harris in their lives
before haunted the court room, and tendered their sympathy to the prisoner during
recess and after adjournment., 379 When a jury convicted Harris of first-degree
murder, the public was bitterly divided over his guilt and whether he should die in
the electric chair.380 One of Harris' supporters even stood on a street corner
wearing a sandwich board to drum up signatures for the clemency petition.38 1 So
conflicted were contemporary views of the case that the governor appointed a
special commissioner to help him decide how to respond to the clemency
young man"); see also supra note 364 (discussing Hovey's cowardice when facing death); supra note 347
(discussing Carolin's cowardice on gallows).
377. Gordon and Pleck both associate campaigns against family violence in the 1880s with the temperance
movement. See GORDON, supra note 328, at 20; PLECK, supra note 327, at 98.
378. See Carlyle W. Harris on Trial, N.Y. RECORDER, Jan. 15, 1892, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra
note 85, at Roll 12 (reporting that "extra guards were required to keep people out of Part Ill, Court of General
Sessions"). Both Harris and the Assistant District Attorneys who prosecuted him wrote books about the case. A
Book About the Carlyle W. Harris Trial, N.Y. DAILY TiR., Mar. 12, 1892, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra
note 85, at Roll 12 (discussing prosecutors' book); Petitions for Harris, TELEGRAM (N.Y.), Mar. 22, 1893,
microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 14 (noting that Harris dictated his biography for book to
help pay costs of his defense).
379. Harris to Testify, MORNING J. (N.Y.), Jan. 31, 1892, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll
12); see Will be a Famous Case, supra note 357 ("An unusual number of women, for the most part young and
pretty... fought day after day, with feminine persistence, for an opportunity to listen the tragic story .... ").
380. Compare, e.g., Carlyle Harris Found Guilty of Murder, N.Y. HERALD, Feb. 2, 1892, microformed on DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 12 (denouncing Harris as self-confessed libertine who planned to eliminate his
inconvenient wife) with The Harris Verdict, N.Y. RECORDER, Apr. 22, 1892, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra
note 85, at Roll 12 (reporting that Recorder received hundreds of letters, both supporting and condemning Harris,
but agreeing with majority that said "the verdict should have been, if not absolute acquittal, of 'not proven').
After Harris was executed on May 8, 1893, protesting his innocence to the bitter end, his mother accused
prosecutors of succumbing to Tammany pressure. See Carlyle W. Harris is Dead, N.Y. TME, May 9, 1893,
microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 15; see also Harris's Last Word, WORLD (N.Y.), May 9,
1893, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 15 (publishing Harris' last written statement, which
made similar allegations).
381. Harris Goes to Sing Sing To-day, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 23, 1893, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra
note 85, at Roll 14; see Petitions for Harris, supra note 378 (noting that Harris claimed he was receiving fifty
letters per day and that there were five hundred active petition distributors).
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campaign.382
Harris, however, was not a typical domestic murderer, both because he came
from an educated, middle-class family and because his case did not reveal a
familiar pattern of drinking, beatings, and violent death.383 He was considered by
many to be a rising star-physically attractive and full of financial potential.384
The poisoning led to one of the most sensational trials of the nineteenth century in
part because the defendant embodied many aspects of middle-class male ambition.
Yet Harris, too, fell short of the ideal. The otherwise sympathetic Recorder opined
that "[s]ecret marriage is cowardly.' 385 In describing the justice of his execution,
the Commercial Advertiser noted, "He lacked the essential quality of a popular
hero, manliness along heroic lines... ,,386
With the notable exception of Harris, the domestic murderers were marginal
ne'er-do-wells whose cases incited little controversy. Rapidity of jury deliberation
provides one indicator of the unanimity of distaste for these men.387 Moreover,
domestic murder cases did not inspire the threats that accompanied the prosecution
of gang leaders, and the public seemed relatively uninterested in watching the
proceedings.388 By comparison, male-on-male violence implicated discordant
norms and pitted various constituencies in New York-political bosses, gangs, and
"respectable" observers-against one another in a way that made prosecution of
these cases riskier for the District Attorney's office. Thus, while the press
exaggerated the prosecutors' ineffectiveness in convicting toughs, the relatively
382. See Point for Carlyle W Harris, N.Y. TIMES, Apr, 22, 1893, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note
85, at Roll 14.
383. See supra note 357 (discussing Harris case).
384. See Helen Potts 'Death, supra note 357; Will Be a Famous Case, supra note 357.
385. The Trial of Harris, N.Y. RECORDER, Feb. 2, 1892, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll
12.
386. The End of Harris, N.Y COM. ADVERTISER, May 9, 1893, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85,
at Roll 15.
387. For example, Hovey's jury reportedly deliberated for fifteen minutes. See Hovey to Die in Nine Days, SUN
(N.Y.), Oct. 10, 1883, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 1. Juries decided to convict Smiler
and Osmond of first-degree murder in an hour. See Murder in the First Degree, N.Y. Ttmas, Apr. 15, 1892,
microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 12 (reporting Osmond verdict); Smiler Convicted of
Murder: He Hears the Verdict with Imperturbable Calmness, N.Y. STAR, June 11, 1890, microformed on DA
Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 9. John Lewis' jury took forty-five minutes to reach a first-degree murder
verdict. See A Salutary Verdict, supra note 308.
388. See Chacon Pays the Penalty: An Orderly and Speedy Execution in Tombs Yard, N.Y. TIMES, July 10,
1886, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 3; Dying of Strangulation: Edward Hovey's Death
Upon the Gallows in the Tombs, SuN (N.Y.), Oct. 20, 1883, microformed on DA Scrapbook, at Roll I ("So small a
gathering had been known before at a hanging in New York city [sic] ... [T]here was not much demand for
passes, as comparatively little interest had been taken in the doomed man."); New York's Last Hanging, N.Y.
STAR, Nov. 10, 1888, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 7 ("[The Packenham case] was bereft
of any fancied romance, the victim and the murderer being of the most degraded classes... [Packenham's] crime
was common in this great city, and the public forgot it."). But see A Triple Execution Soon to Take Place in the
Tombs, WORLD (N.Y.), July 10, 1889, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 8 ("Such an event
as the sentencing of three men [Nolan, Lewis, and Packenham] to death at the same time drew a curious
crowd ... ").
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homogenous attitude toward domestic killers like Hovey and Packenham explains
their prevalence among the executions of the 1880s and 1890s. Staging events like
the quadruple execution of intimate murderers in 1889 failed to deflect criticism
away from the District Attorney's alleged leniency toward political corruption.
Nevertheless, such a goal may have influenced the decision to prosecute.
The limited racial analysis that the records allow reveals another way that
selective prosecution and conviction resonated with the social marginality of
certain defendants. Of the thirty-four indictments for which death sentences were
initially obtained, at least eight defendants were either black or Japanese. 389 Three
of these eight men received capital punishment due to Fellows' efforts, 39° and his
zeal in prosecuting them harmonized with societal biases. According to Monkkonen,
the likelihood of arrest and trial for blacks was twice as high as for non-blacks
during the nineteenth century; blacks were also six times more likely to be
hanged.39'
Newspaper accounts of cases involving non-white defendants reveal a disturb-
ing tendency to infer mental states from stereotyped racial characteristics. For
example, the New York Herald described the Japanese prisoner, Schihiok Jugigo,
in the following manner:
389. Between 1879 and 1893, District Attorney's office obtained the indictments of eight non-whites who were
subsequently convicted of capital murder. These men were Augustus Leighton, Miguel Chacon, John Lewis,
Joseph Wood, Schihiok Jugigo, Noah Richards, Matthew Johnson, and David Hampton. I compiled information
on the execution of non-whites using a database on capital punishment created by M. Watt Espy and John Ortiz
Smykla. This database contains such variables as crime, race, and occupation, as well as jurisdiction and date of
execution. Unfortunately, this source does not record information about first-degree murder defendants who were
not convicted of the capital crime, or whose death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. See generally
M. WATt Espy & JOHN ORTIz SMYKLA, ExEcUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1608-1991: THE ESPY FILE
(Inter-university Consortium for Pol. & Soc. Res. ed., 1994). Information on the race, crime, and conviction of
Noah Richards does not appear in the Espy File because the governor commuted his sentence to life
imprisonment. See Richards'Sentence Commuted: He Will Spend His Life in Prison and the County Saves $1,000,
SUN (N.Y.), Jan. 19, 1893, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 14. All of the eight defendants
were black, except for Schihiok Jugigo, who was Japanese. One of the black men, Miguel Chacon, was also a
Cuban immigrant. See Examination of Miguel Chacon, Police Court Records, People v. Chacon, supra note 356
(recording that Chacon was born in Cuba).
390. The three non-white defendants executed during Fellows' tenure as District Attorney were John Lewis,
Joseph Wood, and Schihiok Jugigo. For the Jugigo case, see Examination of Schihiok Jugigo, Police Court
Records, supra note 332, and Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Jugigo, supra note 321 (recording that Jugigo was
Japanese); Jugigo Guilty of Murder: Convicted by an Oyer and Terminer Jury After a Short Deliberation, N.Y.
STAR, Dec. 6, 1889, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 8 (same); Murderer Jugigo Convicted,
N.Y HERALD, Dec. 6, 1889, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 8 (same). For information on
Wood's race, see Joseph Wood, a Mulatto, Accused of Murder, supra note 332 (indicating that Wood was black).
For information on Lewis' race, see Splashed with Her Blood: Jack Lewis Coolly Butchers His Former Paramour,
MORNING J. (N.Y.), July 18, 1888, microformedon DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 6 (noting that Lewis was
black).
391. MONKKONEN, supra note 13, at 148. 1 have not been able to compile comparable statistics for 1879-93 due
to the scarcity of records for cases in which the defendant pled guilty or was not convicted of capital murder for
some other reason.
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The hair was jet black, the unshaven chin repulsive. The forehead was low and
retreating. The eyes were sullen and cruel in a marked degree. They did not
look like those of one insane, but intelligence of the lowest degree shone from
them. He looked like a natural occupant of the murderer's chair, this sailor
from Japan.
392
The press described blacks in similarly offensive terms. For instance, on the eve of
Joseph Wood's execution in the electric chair, the Herald speculated about whether
"the thick skull of the Negro would make him more difficult to kill. '393 The
Morning Journal opined that African-American defendant John Lewis, who
murdered his estranged lover, had "a head shaped like that of an ape" and praised
his female victim for being "much lighter in color" than the defendant.
394
Combined with Monkkonen's statistics, these blatantly racist newspaper articles
indicate that the press and the criminal justice system may have treated non-white
defendants differently than whites, as well as punishing domestic killers more
severely than other murderers. If disparate treatment of non-whites occurred, then
it arguably hinged on the defendants' lack of support among voters with political
clout-not on white New Yorkers' fear of being killed by a person of color.
Studies indicate that the race of the victim is a significant factor in modem
death-penalty determinations, 395 but at least half of the non-white defendants
convicted of first-degree murder in late-nineteenth-century New York killed
members of racial minorities.396 While the race of the victim does not seem to have
determined the outcome of such cases, the racial identity of the defendant assumed
importance. For instance, when the killer of a male rival was a person of color,
public empathy for masculine bravado rarely seems to have spared him-as the
case of Jugigo, the Japanese sailor who killed a Japanese competitor for a
fishing job, demonstrates.397 Marginal figures, as opposed to politically con-
392. Death Came Painlessly to the Four, supra note 260 (emphasis added); see also He Bowed for the Axe,
supra note 260 ("In general [Jugigo's] face is a good living representation of that of a hideous Chinese or Japanese
idol.").
393. Death Came Painlessly to the Four, supra note 260.
394. Splashed with Her Blood, supra note 389.
395. David C. Baldus et al., Race Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An
Empirical and Legal Overview, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT wrrl CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 398 (James R. Acker et al.
eds., 1988) (quoting a General Accounting Office report for finding that "[i]n 82% of the studies [conducted in the
1970s and 1980s], race of the victim was found to influence the likelihood of being charged with capital murder or
receiving a death sentence, i.e., those who murdered whites were found to be more likely to be sentenced to death
than those who murdered blacks"). The same findings are published as David C. Baldus et al., Race
Discrimination and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent
Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1638, 1659 (1998).
396. See Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Jugigo, supra note 332 (Japanese victim); Coroner's Inquisition,
People v. Wood, supra note 332 (black victim); Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Lewis, supra note 356 (black
victim); Copy of Arrest Record from 29th Precinct Police Blotter, People v. Chacon, Folder 1454, Box 141, DA
Papers, supra note 85 (1884) (black victim).
397. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Jugigo, supra note 332 (recording Jugigo's death sentence and
describing his lethal response to being rejected for position on fishing vessel); see generally Coroner's Inquisition,
1382 [Vol. 39:1309
"PUBLIC" PROSECUTORS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
nected desperados, comprised the majority of the condemned men in New York
County.
2. Plea-bargains
To see what types of cases resulted in plea-bargains, this Article examines all of
the guilty pleas in first-degree murder cases in 1882, 1886, 1888, and 1891. These
sample years provide an indication of plea-bargaining practices under four District
Attorneys: McKeon, Martine, Fellows, and Nicoll. This analysis yields prelimi-
nary conclusions about the nature of the cases deemed suitable for non-jury
disposition and penalties based on reduced charges. The types of killings for which
guilty pleas were entered contrast with those for which capital verdicts appeared
both desirable and likely. Most importantly, the data gleaned from plea-bargains
supports my hypothesis that domestic killers were treated more harshly than men
who killed other men.
Because first-degree murder carried a mandatory death sentence, all defendants
who pled guilty sought to enter pleas to lesser charges than those on the face of the
indictment. Both plea-bargains and convictions obtained at trial show the preva-
lence of working-class defendants. 398 Racial factors could not be analyzed with
precision because the District Attorney's papers often failed to give any indication
of the race of American-born defendants and there was relatively little press
coverage of plea-bargained cases. However, the regularity with which defendants
People v. Jugigo, supra note 332 (describing defendant's lethal response to being rejected for position on fishing
boat).
Of the eight documented executions of non-whites, three defendants-Augustus Leighton, Miguel Chacon, and
John Lewis-killed female intimates. See People v. Lewis, 21 N.E. 1062, 1062 (1889) (describing Lewis' crime);
People v. Chacon, 6 N.E. 303, 303 (1886) (describing Chacon's murder of Maria Williams); Statement of Monroe
Williams, Police Court Records, People v. Chacon, Folder 1454, Box 141, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1884)
(indicating that Williams was Chacon's estranged lover, who had returned to her husband); Testimony of Louise
Hill, Sarah Wiggins, and Leopold Goldschauer, M.D., Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Leighton, Folder 185, Box
15, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1880) (recording testimony about Leighton's murder of his lover); see also
Testimony of Maggie Howard, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Leighton, supra. Five non-white defendants,
including Jugigo, murdered men in quarrels or robberies. For the Jugigo case, see the citations supra. For the other
three, see People v. Hampton, 39 N.E. 5, 6 (1894) (describing robbery-murder of Hampton's landlady); People v.
Johnson, 35 N.E. 604, 605-06 (1893) (describing fatal quarrel between Johnson and male co-worker); Affidavit of
Officer John Pepper, Police Court Records, People v. Wood, supra note 332 (describing fatal shooting of male
victim); Five Murderers Waiting, supra note 332 (stating that Wood killed victim after quarrel in which they
called each other names). The final black defendant, Noah Richards, fatally stabbed a police officer who came to
his home on a drunk-and-disorderly call. Richards' sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. See Richards'
Sentence Commuted, supra note 389 (describing murder and reporting commutation of death sentence).
398. The two doctors, Carlyle Harris and Robert Buchanan, were the only educated, professional men to be
convicted of first-degree murder. See supra note 357 and accompanying text (describing doctors' backgrounds
and crimes). Among thirty-one plea-bargains from four non-consecutive years, I counted six laborers, two
waiters, two boat-hands, two domestics, two carpenters, two cigar-makers, one baking-soda factory worker, one
paper-folder, one packer, one engineer, one former night-watchman, one jewelry peddler, one baker, one seaman,
one coach driver, one fireman, one butcher, one housekeeper, one porter, and two defendants whose occupations I
could not discern.
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answered questions about their country of origin allowed me to track immigrant
status, as well as the type of killing and the sex of the persons involved.
The most salient factor in the plea-bargains that I examined was the gendered
nature of the homicides. For example, in 1882, twelve out of fifteen plea-bargains
were entered in cases of men slaying other men. The three remaining indictments
involved male defendants who killed their wives. In at least one of these three
cases, however, the victim flouted societal norms by spending her husband's wages
on alcohol. Immediately prior to her death, Ellen Mooney bought liquor with
money earmarked to purchase chairs for the family home399 and was described by
the defendant as "stupidly drunk" 40 0 -conduct that, in an age of temperance
reform, seems to have partially excused or partially justified the homicide.
Although the temperance movement championed the cause of women brutal-
ized by drunken husbands, 40 ' a female's drunkenness may have been considered
more unusual and disreputable than a man's. In nineteenth-century America,
consumption of alcohol in saloons and at work became a common way for men to
express democratic citizenship, while "expectations of virtue and restraint" barred
women from "active participation in the public world of drink and fraternity.,
40 2
Indeed, "serious drinking was considered a male prerogative, and the American
saloon, except for hangers-on like prostitutes, was almost exclusively a male
institution., 40 3 Perhaps for this reason, temperance reform efforts led by women
attacked drunkenness as a predominantly male vice. 40 4 Literary evidence suggests,
by contrast, that "[mien who wrote temperance stories often depicted women
399. See Transcribed Testimony of Robert Mooney, People v. Mooney, Folder 659, Box 58, DA Papers (1882).
The victim's twelve-year-old son testified that she spent about twenty cents on drinks out of $9.25 in wages that
the defendant gave her to buy some chairs. According to the boy, this action provoked a beating that resulted in the
victim's death. See id. A female boarder named Annie Foley confirmed under oath that both Mooney and his wife
"were under the influence of liquor" and that they got into a quarrel when Mooney refused to give his wife some
whiskey. Transcribed Testimony of Annie Foley, People v. Mooney, Folder 659, Box 58, DA Papers, supra note
85 (1882).
400. See Affidavit of John Mooney, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Mooney, Folder 659, Box 58, DA Papers,
supra note 85 (1882). The defendant's allegations about his wife's intemperance were qualified by his admission
that he had several drinks with her on the night of the fatal beating. See id.
401. See BARBARA LEE EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF DOMESTICITY: WOMEN, EVANGELISM, AND TEMPERANCE IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMEICA 102 (1981) (discussing temperance crusaders' arguments about victimization of
women by men who drank); THOMAS R. PEcRAM, BATTLING DEMON RUM: THE STRUGGLE FOR A DRY AMERICA,
1800-1933, at 53, 69-70 (1998) (indicating that late-nineteenth-century women's temperance activism, exempli-
fied by Woman's Christian Temperance Union, was more "home protection" than philanthropy) PLECK, supra
note 327, at 49-66 (describing temperance movement as "first American reform campaign to depict for the public
the cruelty of domestic violence"); see also RUTH BORDIN, WOMAN AND TEMPERANCE: THE QUEST FOR POWER AND
LIBERTY, 1873-1900, at 7 (1981) ("The nineteenth-century drunkard's reputation as a wife-beater, child abuser,
and sodden, irresponsible nonprovider was not undeserved.").
402. See PEGRAM, supra note 401, at 11.
403. BORDIN, supra note 401, at 7.
404. id. at 7, 13; see EPSTEIN, supra note 401, at 100 ("Though [temperance crusaders] occasionally admitted
that there were some unfortunate cases of drinking women, they believed that for the most part it was men who
drank and women who suffered from men's drinking.").
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drunkards. 4 °5 Some poor urban women did drink and were punished with
imprisonment;40 6 a Brooklyn physician even proposed sterilization for female
alcoholics.40 7 Thus, murder victim Ellen Mooney may have run afoul of cultural
perceptions linking relatively rare cases of female drunkenness "to promiscuity
and neglect of home and hearth.,
40 8
A female victim's vices did not often suggest the appropriateness of a plea
bargain with her male killer, however.40 9 The press became enraged at McKeon's
decision to accept a first-degree manslaughter plea in the Siebert case (another
domestic killing in 1882).41o While Louisa Siebert's sexual infidelity arguably
placed her in the category of fallen women for whom the public lacked sympathy,
the file indicates that her husband knew about her adulterous affair for almost a
month before the murder.4 1 1 This fact may explain the newspapers' fury at the
decision to accept a first-degree manslaughter plea in the case. The press suspected
that Siebert coldly plotted the murder, despite several affidavits attesting to his




405. CAROL MATrINGLY, WELL-TEMPERED WOMEN: NINETEENTH-CENTURY TEMPERANCE RHETORIC 144 (1998).
406. See MARIAN SANDMAIER, THE INVISIBLE ALCOHOLICS: WOMEN AND ALCOHOL 42 (2 d ed. 1992) (indicating
that "no less than eight thousand women were arrested for drunkenness in New York City" in 1899). The
Irish-the ethnic group to which murder victim Ellen Mooney belonged-seem to have constituted an exception
to the rule that "men drank in this period far more than did women." PEGRAM, supra note 401, at 53.
407. SANDMAIER, supra note 406, at 42.
408. Id. at 27; see id. at 27-57 (discussing taboo against female drunkenness throughout westernsociety). Linda
Gordon contends that "women who deviated visibly from the norms of maternalism, women who worked, drank,
yelled, were dirty, remained unmarried-these women were not only considered bad mothers, they were cast
outside the boundaries of true womanhood. They were denied sympathy, let alone help." GORDON, supra note 328,
at 253. Newspaper accounts of the domestic murders in New York undermine Gordon's argument that respectable
society always condemned working women for transgressing norms of femininity by pursuing employment. In
the case of women whose husbands drank and otherwise led profligate lives, female work might be necessary to
sustain the children. Hence, the press generally spoke sympathetically of mothers like Margaret Packenham, who
became a breadwinner because her spouse shirked his duties. See, e.g., Murdered by a Drunken Husband, supra
note 312 (commenting favorably on Margaret Packenham's brave efforts to support herself and her children in
face of her husband's drunkenness, violence, and criminal convictions). However, although Gordon's conclusions
about the stigmatic implications of women's work do not find support in the New York evidence, her insight about
drunken women remains helpful.
409. Recall, for example, that the state executed James Nolan for the first-degree murder of his female lover,
who worked as a prostitute. See A Harvest Day for the Tombs Galows Coming, supra note 358.
410. See supra notes 155-57, and accompanying text. This fact may explain the newspapers' outrage at the
decision to accept his first-degree manslaughter plea, despite the fact that defense counsel mustered several
affidavits testifying to Siebert's good character. See infra note 412.
411. See Affidavit of Michael Lederman, People v. Siebert, Folder 791, Box 71, DA Papers, supra note 85
(1882) (stating that Charles Siebert told him and others of Louisa's infidelity in "the early part of May 1882,"
while shooting did not occur until May 31).
412. For press reports criticizing the District Attorney's decision to accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge, see
supra notes 155-61 and accompanying text. For good character affidavits in the Siebert case, see Affidavit of
Frank E. Kafka (describing defendant as a "quiet, industrious and kindly-disposed person" with "numerous
friends"), Affidavit of Charles Jomersbach (swearing to defendant's temperance, sociability, and "abhorrence of
notorious living and hilarity"), and Affidavit of Joseph Nepivoda (testifying that defendant was "an honest,
industrious and hardworking young man"), People v. Siebert, supra note 411. For evidence that Siebert may have
been mentally or emotionally unstable for weeks prior to the murder, see Affidavit of Michael Lederman, supra
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The outrage surrounding the Siebert plea-bargain corroborates my view that not
only could the District Attorney count on communal support for prosecuting
domestic killers, but also that the public exerted pressure in that direction. In
contrast, the relatively uncontroversial nature of guilty pleas arising from male-on-
male killings suggests that ambivalent public attitudes toward power struggles
between men sometimes made plea-bargaining the most prudent option in such
cases.
Plea-bargains from the other sample years reveal a similar pattern of leniency
toward defendants who slew male rivals. In 1886, Martine's office recommended
the acceptance of pleas to lesser charges from six men, five of whom killed male
victims. The seventh plea-bargain that year involved a woman, Kate Sullivan, who
committed infanticide by abandoning her two infant daughters in a water closet.
The District Attorney's office allowed Sullivan to plead guilty to second-degree
manslaughter only after a jury failed to reach a verdict as to her guilt.
41 3
Similarly, four out of seven plea-bargains in 1888 involved male-on-male
homicides. The remaining three cases were domestic murders, but in at least one of
them, Fellows accepted a guilty plea from a defendant whose victim allegedly
abused him. Michael Sheehy's wife appears to have been a chronic alcoholic who
threw a cup at his head right before the homicide.41 4 The Sheehy file contains
several affidavits to the defendant's good character, indicating that despite his
drunkenness at the time of the killing, his employers perceived him to be an
"honest and trustworthy" man trapped in a disastrous marriage. 41 5 Such affidavits
rarely appear in the files of defendants convicted of first-degree murder at trial.
In the last sample year, 1891, District Attorney Nicoll supervised plea-bargains
arising from only two first-degree murder indictments. Both cases involved men
who killed other men. In the first case, William Lloyd decided to withdraw his plea
of "not guilty" after a jury convicted his co-defendant of second-degree manslaugh-
ter. The District Attorney's office approved Lloyd's guilty plea to the same offense,
which enabled him to trade a possible death sentence for seven years and six
months in state prison. 6 In the second case, William Langeheine entered a guilty
plea to second-degree manslaughter for the fatal shooting of another German male
note 411 (defendant appeared to be "heavily bewildered and erratic" and "his actions indicated wild fantasies and
excitable impulses").
413. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Sullivan, Folder 2331, Box 239, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1886)
(noting Sullivan's guilty plea and fact that her earlier trial on same indictment resulted in hung jury).
414. See Testimony ofZabriskie H. Mullin, People v. Sheehy, Folder 2935, Box 308, DA Papers, supra note 85
(1888) (noting Sheehy's account of his wife throwing cup at him and his allegation that she had been drinking);
Unsigned Affidavit of Michael Sheehy, supra (stating that "she was under the influence of liquor" and threw a cup
"narrowly missing my head").
415. See Affidavits of D.S. Loughran ("I have found the defendant to be honest and trustworthy"), Abraham
Wolf (same), and John H. Sprague (same), supra note 414.
416. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Lloyd, Folder 3975, Box 431, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1891)
(recording this disposition of cases of William Lloyd and John Anderson).
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in a dispute over the installation of some restaurant windows.4 1 7 As in the Lloyd
case, Langeheine's co-defendant was convicted of the offense to which Lange-
heine subsequently pled guilty.418 The chronology of these cases thus suggests
that, after the trials of Lloyd's and Langeheine's co-defendants, prosecutors
doubted that a jury would view the fatal incidents as first-degree murder.
None of the killings described above clearly involved a robbery or other felony.
Rather, the most common scenario for male-on-male violence was a lethal
response to an insult or minor physical assault, which resonated deeply with
nineteenth-century conceptions of masculine honor. Charles Warren's murder of a
billiards opponent in 1882 exemplifies the seriousness with which men regarded
trifles like the loss of a game.419 Communal tolerance, or at least ambivalence,
toward such incidents reduced the likelihood that prosecutors could obtain a
conviction; instead, the District Attorney's office allowed Warren to plead guilty to
third-degree manslaughter.
42 0
Few cases implicated the core meaning of provocation at common law:
''extreme assault or battery upon the defendant; mutual combat; defendant's illegal
arrest; injury or serious abuse of a close relative of the defendant's; or the sudden
discovery of a spouse's adultery. ' 421 In 1882, for example, District Attorney
McKeon accepted a first-degree manslaughter plea from Terence McQuaide, who
fatally shot a young boy for pelting him with stones while he rounded up stray
dogs. However, the young victim's rock-throwing arguably did not constitute the
"extreme assault or battery" necessary to reduce the charge from murder. 2 Many
417. See Trial Testimony of Gustav Scheuerman and William Langeheine, People v. Koenigsberger, Folder
4035, Box 438, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1891) (testifying that shooting resulted from dispute over installation
of windows); Testimony of Officer Michael Bissert, Gustave Edwards, and Gustav Scheuerman, Coroner's
Inquisition at 5-7, 8-9, 26-37, People v. Koenigsberger, Folder 4035, Box 438, DA Papers, supra note 85 (189 1)
(same). Koenigsberger, who was convicted of second-degree manslaughter, was Langeheine's co-defendant. See
infra text accompanying note 418.
418. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Koenigsberger, Folder 4035, Box 438, DA Papers, supra note 85
(189 1) (recording Charles Koenigsberger's conviction and Langeheine's subsequent guilty plea).
419. See Testimony of Ferdinand Frankenburg and Jacob Duttenhofer, Coroner's Inquisition, People v.
Warren, Folder 900, Box 81, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1882) (describing circumstances surrounding murder).
420. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Warren, Folder 900, Box 81, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1882)
(recording Warren's guilty plea).
421. Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 720 (Md. 1991) (listing traditional common-law categories of
provocation sufficient to mitigate murder to voluntary manslaughter). New York clearly followed these common
law precepts in the 1880s and 1890s. See People v. Conroy, 97 N.Y. 62, 76 (N.Y. 1884) (noting that distinctions
between homicide committed after deliberation and homicide arising from immediate provocation "are not the
creation of our statute, but were considered essential elements of the crime at common law."). In the
twentieth-century, New York modified its penal laws to broaden the meaning of provocation. See People v.
Walker, 473 N.Y.S.2d 460, 463 (N.Y. 1984) (stating that New York legislature followed Model Penal Code
formulation to avoid "the strictures of early precedents" and "to abandon preconceived notions of what constitutes
adequate provocation and to submit that question to the jury's deliberation"); People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310,
1316 (N.Y. 1980) (discussing test for mitigation on ground of extreme emotional disturbance).
422. See Testimony of Patrick Hernon and Charles O'Donnell, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. McQuaide,
Folder 859, Box 77, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1882) (describing stone-throwing incident). But see Testimony of
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other cases involved simple verbal taunts or no provocation at all. In 1886, a
jewelry peddler named George Curtiss pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter
after slaying a bartender. The bartender's only mistake seems to have been his
passivity while other patrons taunted Curtiss and jokingly hid his wares.42 3 Yet the
file leaves the impression that the District Attorney's office took Curtiss' humilia-
tion, as well as his possible insanity,424 into consideration when approving his plea
to a lesser charge.
Where the initial aggressor in a fight was unclear, prosecutors may have been
swayed by communal support for the accused, as the Kennedy case suggests. Irish
immigrant James Kennedy killed an Englishman in a saloon fight in 1886.
However, armed with affidavits confirming Kennedy's good character 42 and the
deceased's violent nature and penchant for drink,426 Kennedy pled guilty to
first-degree manslaughter and was sentenced to just eight years and eleven months
427in state prison. In several cases, the defense marshaled an even more imposing
array of affidavits regarding the fine character of the accused. For example, six
deponents swore that Charles Still-indicted for killing his brother in 1886-
possessed a reputation for "peace and quietness." One also testified that "he [came]
from a good and respectable family. '428 These affidavits, combined with a sworn
statement that Still periodically acted insane after a childhood fall from Barnum's
Circus wagon,4"9 may have convinced Martine to accept a plea to first-degree
manslaughter.
Other factors, in addition to empathy for defendants displaying masculine
bravado, may have influenced pleas to lesser charges. The District Attorney's
office frequently justified its participation in plea-bargains on the ground that it
lacked proof of premeditated murder. In several cases, deficiencies in the evidence
Edward Kelly, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. McQuaide, supra (stating that he saw some of boys chase
dogcatcher's wagon but that he did not see any of boys throw stones).
423. See generally Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Curtiss, Folder 2089, Box 210, DA Papers, supra note 85
(1886) (describing circumstances of killing).
424. See Letters from Allan Lane Hamilton, M.D. to Roger A. Pryor and District Attorney Randolph B.
Martine, Mar. 25, 1886, supra note 420 (opining that Curtiss was insane); Memorandum by Albert Leffingwell,
M.D., May 7, 1886, supra note 420 (same); Letters from A.E. MacDonald, M.D., to District Att'y Randolph B.
Martine, July 20, 1886, People v. Curtiss, supra note 420 (same).
425. See Affidavit of Phillip Divers (opining that because Kennedy was "peaceable" man, homicide must have
been committed in self-defense), Affidavit of Charles Leonard (describing Kennedy as "a sober decent industrious
man, a good citizen, fond of his wife and children and respectful in his manner and address"), Affidavit of Patrick
O'Shea (stating that Kennedy "was possessed of a nicer sense of honor than is usually found in men in his position
of life"), People v. Kennedy, Folder 2319, Box 238, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1886).
426. Affidavit of George H. Winter, People v. Kennedy, supra note 425 (stating that "when we heard [the
deceased] approach, it was customary to lock and bolt our doors").
427. See Indictment Coversheet, People v. Kennedy, Folder 2319, Box 238, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1886)
(noting disposition of case).
428. See Miscellaneous Affidavits, People v. Still, Folder 2222, Box 227, DA Papers (1886) (swearing to
defendant's good character).
429. Affidavit of Louisa E. Hopkins, People v. Still, supra note 428.
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allegedly arose from the collusion of the police and the urban community in
protecting the defendant. New York policemen were widely suspected of shielding
"toughs," especially those of Irish descent who served as partisan bullies at the
polls, 430 and this deference may have extended to non-political crimes that the
policemen's favorites perpetrated. For example, when Thomas and Bridget Healy
killed a man who called Bridget foul names, a female witness complained that an
officer who patrolled the neighborhood "told her that she had better know nothing
of it" and placed her and others in "mortal fear" with his threats.43 1 In 1886,
Assistant District Attorney Semple hinted of similar misconduct in the Hunt case:
There is to my mind an irrepressible suspicion of suppression and concealment
which nothing could remove but a more thoroughly conducted investigation.
This suspicion is strengthened by the defendant's offer of a plea of manslaugh-
ter in the first degree, for the evidence in our possession is not of such a
character as to justify the offer of such a plea. The conclusion is irrepressible
that the defendant fears that we know more of the truth than we really do.4 32
Under Martine's supervision, Semple nevertheless accepted the plea, rather than
proceeding to trial on flimsy evidence or pigeon-holing the case while he sought
proof of a more serious crime.4
Finally, the files sometimes betray the scent of ethnic favoritism on the part of
the prosecutors themselves. It seems remarkable, for instance, that eleven out of
fifteen plea-bargains in 1882 involved immigrant defendants-six of whom shared
Irish heritage with District Attorney McKeon.434 In contrast, only nine out of
430. MILLER, supra note 70, at 150. See also id. at 20 ("The police tended to reflect and act out community
conflicts instead of trying to establish and maintain standards which transcended conflicts.").
431. Unsigned Statement of Charles Becker, People v. Healy, Folder 914, Box 83, DA Papers, supra note 85
(1882).
432. Letter from Assistant District Attorney McKenzie Semple to District Attorney Randolph Martine, Jan. 19,
1887, People v. Hunt, Folder 2345, Box 241, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1886).
433. See id. (describing Semple's inclination to accept plea "[i]f the evidence we have now is all we can get");
see also Indictment Coversheet, People v. Hunt, Folder 2345, Box 241, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1886)
(recording defendant's guilty plea to first-degree manslaughter).
434. See Examination of Christian Graive, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Graive, Folder 943, Box 86, DA
Papers, supra note 85 (1882) (German); Examination of Bridget Healy, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Healy,
supra note 431 (Irish); Examination of Thomas Healy, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Healy, supra note 431
(Irish); Examination of Terence McQuaide, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. McQuaide, supra note 422 (Irish);
Examination of Patrick O'Carew, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. 0' Carew, Folder 844, Box 75, DA Papers,
supra note 85 (1882) (Irish); Examination of Charles Siebert, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Siebert, supra note
411 (Polish); Examination of Joseph Carroll, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Carroll, Folder 768, Box 69, DA
Papers, supra note 85 (1882) (Irish); Examination of Michael Cooney, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Cooney,
Folder 697, Box 62, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1882) (Irish); Examination of John Briganto, Coroner's
Inquisition, People v. Briganto, Folder 695, Box 61, DA Papers, supra note 85 (1882) (Italian); Examination of
Rocco Dillasio, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Dillasio, Folder 695, Box 61, DA Papers, supra note 85 (Italian);
Examination of Robert Mooney, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Mooney, Folder 659, Box 58, DA Papers, supra
note 85 (1882) (Irish). For McKeon's cultural background, see The Death of John McKeon: His Illness and Last
Hours, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Nov. 23, 1883, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 1 (stating that
McKeon was of Irish stock); Death ofJohn M'Keon: A New York Citizen Who Was Many Years in Public Life, SUN
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thirty-five first-degree murder convictions appear to have involved immigrant
defendants, and only one of these individuals was Irish.435 Irish immigrants may
have engaged in more male-on-male violence than other defendants. However,
these figures, combined with explicit allegations that the police suppressed
evidence in the Healy case,436 indicate that decisions to approve guilty pleas
sometimes stemmed from ethnic loyalties, as well as from evidentiary concerns or
norms of masculine behavior.
Where strong public attitudes toward ethnicity and gender were involved, the
District Attorney's office faced substantial pressure in its discretionary decisions.
If the police empathized with the accused, prosecutors might not even be able to
ferret out the material evidence needed for trial. Defendants for whom other
citizens felt loyalty or admiration thus enjoyed a better chance of pleading guilty to
lesser charges than did marginal individuals. The reasons that influential defen-
dants did not always seek acquittal at trial remain unclear. However, the contested
nature of masculinity and the fact that accused men occasionally received the death
penalty for killing male rivals suggest that asserting one's jury rights carried
sufficient risks to make a guilty plea attractive. The plea-bargaining decisions of
the District Attorney's office thus bore a complex relationship to public pressure.
While the public criticized prosecutors' efforts to avoid trial, societal biases and
sympathies seem to have shaped the calculations of both sides in considering
whether to place a case before a jury.
Discretion is a neutral concept that can be exercised for good or ill; 43 7 the same
is true of public opinion. In addition to its deterrent function, the death penalty was
used to express communal condemnation of premeditated killings, but this
anti-violence norm was not consistently applied. While the men executed for
killing female intimates certainly deserved severe punishment, the unequal re-
(N.Y.), Nov. 23, 1883, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll I (noting that McKeon was a devout
Roman Catholic).
435. The nine immigrants were Robert Buchanan (Canadian), Frank Rohl (German), Schihiok Jugigo
(Japanese), Ferdinand Carolin (German), Patrick Packenham (Irish), Adolph Reich (German Jew), Chiara
Cignarale (Italian), Miguel Chacon (Cuban), and Pasquale Majone (Italian). See People v. Buchanan, 39 N.E. 846,
850 (N.Y. 1895); People v. Rohl, 33 N.E. 933, 934 (N.Y. 1893); People v. Cignarale. 17 N.E. 135, 136 (N.Y
1888); Examination of Schihiok Jugigo, Coroner's Inquisition and Police Court Records, People v. Jugigo, supra
note 332; Examination of Ferdinand Carolin. Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Carolin, supra note 361;
Examination of Patrick Packenham, Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Packenham, supra note 359; Examination of
Miguel Chacon, Police Court Records, People v. Chacon, supra note 356; Examination of Pasquale Majone,
Coroner's Inquisition, People v. Majone, supra note 356; Death His New Year Guest: Murderer Reich to Die by
the Rope Tomorrow Week, WoRLD (N.Y), Jan. 1, 1889, DA Scrapbook, supra note 85, at Roll 7 (reporting on case
of Jewish immigrant Adolph Reich, whose sentence ultimately commuted to life imprisonment).
436. See Unsigned Statement of Charles C. Becker, People v. Healy, supra note 431 (stating that witness was
suppressed from speaking about case and that witnesses in Healy case were in mortal fear of police commis-
sioner).
437. See Breitel, supra note 1, at 435 (recognizing that discretion is essentially good but can also be pernicious,
depending on who uses it). But see Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1523, 1554-55 (arguing that prosecutorial
discretion is inconsistent with due process).
[Vol. 39:13091390
"PUBLIC" PROSECUTORS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
sponse to their transgressions, compared to male-on-male homicides, suggests the
potential for caprice and conflict in popular influence on criminal justice policy.
The concept of "public moral judgment[,] ' 4 38 even when instilled through profes-
sional training and experience, thus may prove to be an unstable baseline for
gauging the rightness of prosecutorial decisions.
CONCLUSION
By analyzing the history of the New York County District Attorney's office, this
Article demonstrates the fallacy of equating the rise of public prosecution with
norms of neutrality and fairness to defendants. The private model, in which crime
victims brought their own cases, waned slowly. Starting in the mid-nineteenth
century, counsel retained by the victim disappeared from court; that function began
to be performed exclusively by the District Attorney and his assistants. By the late
1800s, the private complainant could do no more than call the government's
attention to the crime and appear as a witness. Despite these changes, however,
neither the actual system of public prosecution nor prevalent normative views of it
resembled the defendant-protective ideal that has become an overriding principle
of liberal jurisprudence.
Public prosecutors, buried under a growing mountain of indictments, increas-
ingly disposed of cases through plea-bargaining as the nineteenth century pro-
gressed. Yet close analysis of news reports indicates that the New York public
favored vigorous prosecution on the most severe charges possible. Plea-bargaining
in murder cases meant that defendants often escaped with twenty years' imprison-
ment or less for manslaughter, as opposed to a mandatory death sentence for
first-degree murder. The public knew of and opposed such tactics. Indeed, the
press associated plea-bargains and dismissals with leniency toward the corrupt
political machine that ruled New York City: prosecutors who did not win enough
convictions were labeled factotums of the political bosses.
While the newspapers excerpted in the District Attorney scrapbooks do not
provide a transparent window on public views, they nevertheless appealed to a
broad cross-section of New Yorkers. Many of the papers were one-penny publica-
tions read in the tenements, as well as by more affluent citizens. Thus, they seem to
have voiced norms of respectability not solely identified with the upper class and
bourgeoisie. Moreover, the denunciation of pre-trial tactics allowing defendants to
go free or to be punished for lesser offenses was not limited to late-nineteenth-
century New York 39 or articulated only by the press. Indeed, as late as 1922,
438. Griffin, supra note I1, at 304-07 (arguing that prosecutors must represent the people, rather than
implementing personal morality, and that they must obtain "public moral judgment" through training and
experience).
439. Although Fisher found little evidence that the public was aware of plea-bargaining, he does cite several
newspaper articles from Boston in the 1860s criticizing out-of-court settlements in which defendants received no
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Roscoe Pound complained about the "loose" and "dangerous" system under which
prosecutors decided not to try cases and proposed that daily written reports be
required to curb prosecutorial lenience. 440
Close scrutiny of late-nineteenth-century murder cases affords a chance to
compare norms of public prosecution with the realities of the District Attorney's
office. Felix Frankfurter once commented that "[w]hen life is at hazard at trial, it
sensationalizes the whole thing almost unwittingly .... ,441 Yet sensation leaves a
paper trail in the archives. Murders are the grist of news reports, for they arouse
laypeople's interest. In a time when few legal records were kept,442 potential
capital cases generated a wealth of material. Studying murder indictments, as
opposed to the regulation of small-time vice, thus provides insights into public
attitudes toward the prosecutor's role and the pressures that bore on the District
Attorney.
This study of 405 murder indictments between 1879 and 1893 demonstrates
that, although public prosecutors plea-bargained more cases than the press liked,
they nevertheless disposed of a greater number at trial. The nature of the
first-degree murder convictions obtained during this period reveals much about the
interplay of prosecutorial discretion and public opinion. The decisions of the
District Attorney's office reflected the conflicts and values of lay society. Men who
killed female lovers, wives, and other family members comprised the largest
category of convicted first-degree murderers. These marginal individuals-many
of them unemployed drunks who depended on the earnings of the women they
butchered-transgressed widespread norms. Hence, their convictions were easier
to obtain and justify than those of men who enjoyed ties to Tammany Hall and
whose bravado inspired admiration.
Reporting on the controversial Harris case in 1892, the Herald noted: "There
punishment at all. See Fisher, supra note 16, at 930-33. He and Wilbur Miller also quote New York newspaper
articles from the mid-nineteenth century, indicating that hostility toward plea-bargaining pre-dated the 1880s and
1890s. See MILLER, supra note 70, at 80 (stating that, in the press' view, plea-bargaining impeded effective
policing because first-degree murderer could plead to lesser charges and then be free to "'shoot or dirk the next
man that crosses his path"'); Fisher supra note 16, at 931 (quoting New York 7mes article from 1865 that blamed
prosecutors for fact that "criminals seldom receive the punishment due to their crimes").
440. CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND: REPORTS OF THE CLEVELAND FOUNDATION SURVEY OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND, OHIO 206-08 (Roscoe Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922).
Elsewhere, Pound declared:
Where the number of prosecutions each year has become enormous-far beyond the possibilities
of trial-the common-law unlimited power of noL pros, becomes a public means of selection of
those to be prosecuted, of which politicians have not been slow to take advantage. Originally this
was a check upon private prosecutions. Now, it is not a check upon a power, but a power needing
check, and thus far the statutory checks provided in some of our states have operated perfunctorily
and achieved little.
ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 1887 (1930).
441. Liebman, supra note 26, at 2082 (quoting Frankfurter (internal citations omitted)).
442. There are no criminal trial transcripts, except for cases in which the defendant could afford to appeal and
even then, such records are limited to the very end of the nineteenth-century.
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are two juries in every trial of this kind-'the sworn twelve,' who are specially
instructed to look for reasonable doubt.., and the jury of the public, who are not
constrained by legal technicalities, but reach a decision through channels which
are ruled out of court.''443 The concept of the public as a second jury is applicable
to the twenty-first century. Several commentators urge that the shroud of secrecy
be lifted from the pre-trial process, so that the public knows what prosecutors
do.444 And another contends, "the virtuous prosecutor pursues the morality of the
public he serves-public (not personal) morality." 4 5 However, beneath many of
these arguments lies the dubious, implicit assumption that the public today favors a
criminal justice regime in which prosecutors are at least neutral, if not active, in the
promotion of defendant's rights. Despite the sensitivity of a few scholars to the
interplay of law and cultural norms, 4 46 critics of prosecutorial discretion rarely
address the nature of the public that prosecutors supposedly serve, or assess
conflicts between popular opinion and the social good. Instead, vague references to
the public nature of the office have become shorthand for exhorting evenhanded-
ness toward victims and defendants.
The history of prosecution contained in this Article reveals the historical
inaccuracy of such shorthand. In late-nineteenth-century New York, the second
jury-the jury of public opinion-usually urged the District Attorney to deter
crime with the speedy conviction and punishment of offenders; the rights of the
accused were left for defense counsel to champion. The desire for vigorous crime
control-the strongest force behind the rise of the District Attorney's office in the
nineteenth century-now seems to be associated primarily with the victims' rights
or re-privatization camp, whereas those dedicated to preserving public prosecution
are also concerned about fairness to defendants. However, as long as proposals for
reform invoke the public interest without adequately defining and justifying that
term, or explaining whether it differs from what the modern public desires,
confusion will continue to afflict the exercise of prosecutorial power.
443. Some Peculiarities of the Harris Trial, N.Y. HERALD, Feb. 3, 1892, microformed on DA Scrapbook, supra
note 85, at Roll 12 (emphasis added).
444. See, e.g., Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1531, 1565; cf Lee, supra note 33, at 238-39 (criticizing lack of
public proceedings attending federal prosecutor's decision about whether to make substantial assistance motion).
445. Griffin, supra note 11, at 304.
446. Paul H. Robinson contends that, for the law to have normative power over society, the criminal justice
system must give some deference to laypeople's notions of justice. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 42 at
xv-xvi; Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks is Just? Coercive Versus
Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1841, 1864 (2000). According to William J. Stuntz, a legal victory
fails to result in a triumph in the realm of public opinion if law and lay morals conflict. See William J. Stuntz,
Self-defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1889 (2000). The influence of popular norms on the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion may not be beneficial or desirable, however, as James Liebman suggests in his discussion
of communal pressure on prosecutors to obtain death sentences. See Liebman, supra note 26, at 2078-79; see also
Stuntz, supra note 11, at 533-39 (discussing influence of public opinion on prosecutorial decision-making); supra
note 48 and accompanying text.
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